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Project risk management is currently used in several industries and mandated by 
government acquisition agencies around the world to manage uncertainty in an effort to 
improve a project's probability of success. Common practice involves developing a list of 
risk items scored with probability and consequence ordinal scales by committee usually 
focusing on cost and schedule issues. A scenario based process modeling construct is 
introduced using a hybrid Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis 
framework integrating project development risks with operational system risks. Project 
management's decisions are explicitly modeled and ranked based on risk importance to 
the project. Multiple consequence attributes are unified providing a basis for computing 
total project risk. This study shows that such an approach leads to an analysis system 
where scenarios tracing risk items to many possible consequences are explicitly 
understood; the interaction between cost, schedule, and performance models drive the 
analysis; probabilities for overruns, delays, increased system hazards are determined 
directly; and state-of-the-art quantification techniques are directly applicable. All these 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 The management of a project is a difficult and challenging task due to the many 
variables determining its final outcome. Although classic project management techniques 
addressing cost, schedule, and performance requirements have proven effective, projects 
often run into trouble even when well-planned and sound control methods are employed. 
A common reason is that threats to projects are not clearly identified and actions to 
control them not properly implemented or analyzed for secondary impacts. Consequently, 
project managers and project engineers must be consciously aware of potential threats to 
success of their projects and take early and effective actions. Risk management is a 
technique that significantly increases the probability of identifying those threats in time to 
assure success. 
 Current project risk management (PRM) techniques view risks as independent 
entities. Cost and schedule issues are worked separately from performance issues. 
Furthermore, safety and reliability risks are treated completely separately. An integrated 
approach is needed.  
1.1 Motivation 
 Most U.S. government projects require a Risk Management presentation as part of 
the mission operational reviews. A recently attended review was no different. The 
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Quality Assurance lead proceeded to go through the “Top 5 Risks”. Top on the list was a 
risk titled “Inexperienced Staff on Console” and categorized as “Red” with the risk 
matrix position of 4x4 (Likelihood=4, Severity=4). This of course meant that the issue 
would receive significant management “assistance”. The briefer described how staff 
turnover meant that having inexperienced staff sitting on console was highly likely. 
Further, inexperienced personnel could do many things to end the mission prematurely or 
not respond correctly, ending the mission. Therefore, risk was “Red”. Heated discussions 
broke out. 
 As I listened to the arguments, I had a sense that the characterization of the risk 
was wrong or at best, incomplete. While the statements about the likelihood of 
inexperienced staff and what could happen with inexperienced staff on console were 
correct, the conclusion that it was the major risk was not. Sketching out the problem as an 
event sequence diagram as if performing a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) it 
became evident that only one possible endstate had been explored and that a systematic 
process to describe the scenario emanating from an initiating event would have led the 
program to a different conclusion. PRA is a systematic, scenarios-based methodology to 
evaluate risks associated with complex engineered technological systems. Scenarios 
follow an off-nominal event or condition as it propagates through a system based on 
designed robustness or procedural responses. More on PRAs is provided in Section 2.5.5. 
This started my thought process to move Risk Management away from a qualitative 
brainstorming process to a more systematic quantitative one.  
 Some of the basic risk assessment characteristics are usually not found in project 
risk matrices or registers. For instance, within current best practices of project risk 
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assessments, events are assumed to be independent, probabilities are assigned to events 
with no supporting documentation, no uncertainty about those probabilities are identified, 
nor are common cause failures addressed. In addition, safety hazards are treated as a 
separate discipline and not shown on the risk matrices at all.  
 This approach denies a Project Manager (PM) the ability to adequately answer 
some basic questions, such as: 
 If I spend the money you are asking for how much risk is reduced for my 
project? 
 Can I get more risk reduction, spending that same money elsewhere? 
 What is the significance of assumptions made in the likelihood and 
consequence assignments?  
 This study shows the Risk Management process can be treated as a technical risk 
assessment. Several important questions are answered: 
 What insights to risk can be uncovered? 
 Can it assist leadership in the presence of uncertainty? 
 It is likely that this approach will increase cost at the start, so is the value of 
new insights worth the increased cost? 
 This study has the following objectives: 
 Integrate programmatic cost and schedule metrics, safety, and reliability into 
one cohesive risk picture. 
 Identify “controls” or “decision points” that significantly improve the risk 
posture of a project. 
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 Describe and create the transfer function between project models the system 
models using risk as the common currency. 
 Develop risk metrics to provide a basis for decisions in the face of multiple 
objectives under uncertainty. 
 Fit the integrated risk picture within accepted risk management processes. 
 While much of the pedagogical literature discusses project risk management as a 
tool to support management of total risk, in practice it does not. Reliability, safety, 
programmatic risk, technology risk, and financial risk are often stove piped and addressed 
by separate disciplines. Mitigations and controls are measured against reducing a risk of a 
single item in question, but not against the totality of the project, leading to suboptimum 
performance. There is also a disconnect between finishing the project on time and within 
budget and how the system will function and operate. Conrow notes that within military 
projects performance requirements are paramount, with cost and schedule sacrificed to 
meet those requirements (Conrow, 2003). Without an integrated framework, the actual 
risk posture of the project and the decision-makers risk preference are likely to be 
inconsistent. 
 PRA is an excellent framework because it is scenario based, multi-disciplined, 
and systematic; leading to more repeatability of analysis. PRA ensures that dependencies 
are captured within the scope of the system and that they project through the use of logic 
models such as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
Uncertainty and variability are explicitly addressed. It also allows for the determination 
of risk metrics for sensitivity analysis and development of importance measures for 
relative risk contributions of model constituents. 
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 Decision Analysis (DA) allows for the incorporation of decisions in the modeling 
framework and provides a systematic mechanism for the incorporation of decision-maker 
preferences.  
1.2 Project Failures 
 Recent high profile failures and trends show the need for better risk management 
within projects. This section is devoted to describing how risk management fits into the 
discipline of project management as well as providing background information on risk 
assessments and decision analysis. 
 The press is full of stories detailing the failures (or significant setbacks) of various 
high profile projects. In March 2009, the CATO Institute published a study titled 
“Government Cost Overruns.” The study compares the original cost estimates at the time 
that the projects were initiated to the most recent estimates as reported in official 
estimates from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) or official estimates as 




Table 1-1. Government projects overrun in all sectors 








Transportation    
Boston Big Dig highway project $2.6b (1985) $14.6b (2005) 462% 
Virginia Springfield interchange $241m (1994) $676m (2003) 180% 
Denver International Airport $1.7b (1989) $4.8b (1995) 182% 
Hiring of airport security screeners $104m (2002) $741m (2006) 613% 





Hanford nuclear waste clean-up $4.3b (2000) $12.2b (2008) 190% 
All nuclear waste sites clean-up $63b (1996) $105b (2003) 67% 
National Ignition Facility $2.1b (1995) $4.2b (2000) 100% 
Clinch River Breeder Reactor $400m (1971) $4b (1983) 900% 
Superconducting Supercollider $4.4b (1987) $11.8b (1993) 168% 
FutureGen clean coal project $1b (2003) $1.8b (2008) 80% 
 
Defense Development Costs ($2008) 
   
Global Hawk surveillance plane $989m (2001) $3.7b (2007) 274% 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle $1.6b (2000) $3.6b (2007) 125% 
C-130J Hercules 10.9m (1996) 430.3m (2007) 3848% 
Extended Range Munitions 86.9m (1997) 500.1m (2007) 475% 
DDG 1000 destroyer 2.2b (1998) 9.3b (2006) 323% 
V-22 Osprey helicopter 4.0b (1986) 12.5b (2006) 213% 
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter 388.3m (2005) 750.9 (2007) 93% 
Space Based Infrared System High 4.2b (1996) 8.5b (2006) 102% 
NPOESS Satellite System 5.0b (2002) 7.9b (2007) 58% 
 
Other Defense 
   
Coastal Patrol Ships $220m (2004) $350m (2007) 59% 
Joint Strike Fighter $232b (2001) $337b (2008) 45% 
Marine One (VH-71) helicopters $6.1b (2005) $11.2b (2008) 84% 
Coast Guard, NSC ships, per unit $250m (2002) $536m (2007) 114% 
 
Technology Projects 
   
Air traffic control modernization $8.9b (1998) $14.6b (2005) 64% 
FBI Trilogy computer system $477m (2000) $600m (2004) 26% 
Pentagon airborne laser system $1b (1996) $2b (2004) 100% 
Border radiation detectors $2.1b (2008) $3.1b (2008) 48% 
 
NASA 
   
International Space Station $17b (1997) $30b (2001) 76% 
Mars Science Laboratory $1.6b (2008) $2.3b (2009) 44% 
Source: Edwards, C. Government Cost Overruns. CATO Institute. 2009 
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 In addition to the cost and schedule failures, many project suffer from 
performance shortfalls. For example, the Denver International Airport’s much heralded 
state-of-the-art baggage handling system never met expectations and was eventually 
scrapped, the FBIs Virtual Case File cost $170 Million and never became operational 
(Eggen & Witte, 8/18/2006), Mars Science Laboratory is $400M over (due to technical 
problems with instruments and robotics) and 2 years late and has missed one launch 
window (Chang, 10/11/2008), the FAAs air traffic control modernization systems spend 
over $2.6 Billion only to be canceled (R. Charette, 2005), and Boston’s Central Artery 
Project – $2.6 billion to $14.6 billion and years late and plagued with technical problems 
such as falling panels and leaking tunnels. 
 Project failure is not just a U.S. phenomena, international construction examples 
include the Jubilee Line Transit Project in London was 2 years late and £1.4 billion 
(67%) over budget; the Channel Tunnel was £3.7 billion (80%) over budget; Denmark’s 
Great Belt Link came in 54% over budget.  
 According to the GAO, in 2000, projected costs of 75 major weapon programs 
were $42 billion, or 27%, over initial budgets, including average delays before initial 
deliveries of 16 months. By 2007, 95 major weapons programs, projected cost inflation 
had risen to $295 billion, or 40% over early estimates, including average delays of 21 
months (Savage, 6/4/2008). This is not just a recent trend. For large U.S. government 
programs, Conrow cites statistics showing cost and schedule variations between 40% to 
over 200% of project baselines from 1940 thru 1990s (Conrow, 2003). Other authors, like 
Charette and Verner, cite similar numbers. Kendrick’s database also shows similar 
numbers for smaller projects (Kendrick, 2003). Of particular significance from Conrow’s 
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dataset, is that 90% of the programs experienced cost growth and 78% experienced 
schedule slips. The GAO found similar project performance in DoD, NASA, and FAA 
projects (GAO, 2009a). 
 Similar trends are found within the IT sector. Charette lists over thirty high profile 
software projects that have failed (R. Charette, 2005). He notes the universality of these 
failures, in that “they happen in every country; to large companies and small; in 
commercial, nonprofit, and governmental organizations; and without regard to status or 
reputation.” All of which adds an additional $60 billion to $70 billion yearly to software 
projects in the U.S. alone. The often cited Standish Chaos Report states 84% of software 
projects either failed or were challenged1. While the report has some detractors, its 
consistency over the past decade shows little project performance improvement (see 
Figure 1-1). 
 
Source: Standish Chaos Reports  as cited  by Dan Galorath (www.galorath.com) 
Figure 1-1. Trends for IT projects  
                                                 






























 In 2009, GAO issued a report on NASA’s large projects (GAO, 2009b). Excerpts 
are shown to illustrate breadth of the problem within just one agency. Other agencies 
(FAA, Census, IRS, DoD, EPA) have similar issues. 
NASA has also had its share of challenges. For example, the X-33 and X-
34 programs, which were meant to demonstrate technology for future 
reusable launch vehicles, were cancelled due to technical difficulties and 
cost overruns after NASA spent more than $1 billion on them. More 
recently, the Mars Science Laboratory, which was already over budget, 
announced a two-year launch delay. Current estimates suggest the price of 
this delay may be $400 million—which drives the current project lifecycle 
cost estimate to $2.3 billion, up from its initial confirmation estimate of 
$1.6 billion. GAO and others have also reported on overruns on many 
other NASA programs over the past decade. What is common among 
these and other programs is that whether they succeed or fail, they cost 
more to build and take longer to launch than planned. As a result, NASA 
is able to accomplish less than it plans with the money it is allocated, and 
it is forced to make unplanned trade-offs among its projects—shorting one 
to pay for the mistakes of another. 
 More than sensational headlines normally reported in the press or to Congress, 
consequences can have far more ranging effects as shown in the following excerpt from a 
Harvard Business Review article (Matta & Ashkenas, 2003): 
Big projects fail at an astonishing rate. Whether major technology 
installations, postmerger integrations, or new growth strategies, these 
efforts consume tremendous resources over months or even years. Yet as 
study after study has shown, they frequently deliver disappointing 
returns—by some estimates, in fact, well over half the time. And the toll 
they take is not just financial. These failures demoralize employees who 
have labored diligently to complete their share of the work. One middle 
manager at a top pharmaceutical company told us, “I’ve been on dozens of 




 As one would expect there are many reasons why projects fail. While the 
circumstances are as unique as the project, failure modes can be categorized into 
surprising few reasons. Many authors have complied lists of top reasons (Chapman & 
Ward, 2003; R. Charette, 2005; Conrow, 2003; Kendrick, 2003; Verner, Sampson, Cerpa, 
Nicta, & Sydney, 2008). Many focus on governance issues and inadequate risk 
management as the main culprits (Lawrence & Scanlan, 2007). Their research shows 
failures of competence by program managers and risk management systems vary in 
sophistication and effectiveness. Failings typically involve the factors listed below: 
 Poor initial planning 
 Lack of clear objectives and deliverables 
 Lack of understanding of dependencies 
 Inadequate resource allocation 
 Poor risk analysis 
 Poor change management 
 Lack of “buy-in” from stakeholders 
 Poor understanding of priorities 
This list is symptomatic and that the underlying causes of project failure are deep seated, 
structural and endemic, leading to the weaknesses identified above.  
1.3 Document Organization 
 Current risk management practices may provide more insights for management 
with the adoption of integrated scenario-based analyses which examines dependencies 
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across risk items and unifies multiple attributes of consequences into a single risk 
management system. Chapter 2 sets the stage by reviewing current project management 
and project risk management literature that shows there is still a need to integrate various 
assessments into a single risk picture for project managers in order to provide insights 
into the myriad of decisions to be made. Developing an integrated approach requires the 
combination of several existing assessment methodologies and the creation of techniques 
to allow seamless communication among them. 
 The methodology is described in chapters 3 through 8. This methodology 
examines the project-product system using scenario-based PRA techniques along with 
DA evaluation methods to focus insights on decisions impacting cost, schedule, and 
performance of delivered systems. Chapter 4 introduces Risk Sequence Diagrams (RSD), 
which are hybrid logic diagrams providing a more complete representation of risk items 
and their array of potential impacts. RSDs are quantifiable and consistent with proven 
theory, and provide easily understood metrics derived from probability and consequences 
of risk items. These are combined across an entire project to provide a project-level risk 
profile metric to aid project endstate analysis and prediction. Several importance metrics 
are evaluated in Chapter 8 for use in ranking contributors to project risk providing insight 
to management. 
 Implementation topics are discussed in chapters 9 through 11. Integration of this 
new method with current PRM processes, enhances the information available to support 
project decisions is addressed in Chapter 9. An end-to-end example is presented in 
Chapter 10 to show its implementation and potential benefits. In addition, this study 
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evaluated two actual development projects with interesting observations and lessons 
learned. 
 Finally, Chapter 12 reviews the new methodology developed here and discusses 
key areas that expands the field of risk assessment. Chapter 13 addresses potential future 





Chapter 2 Project Risk Management Research 
 A review of current project management and project risk management literature 
shows there is still a need to integrate various assessments into a single risk picture in 
order to provide insights into the myriad of decisions to be made. Developing an 
integrated approach requires the combination of several existing assessment 
methodologies and the creation of techniques to allow seamless interactions among them. 
 This chapter introduces project risk management in the context of project 
management in order to define the scope of this study. Current PRM practices are 
discussed as are recent research into various analytical frameworks for modeling and 
communicating project risk. Gaps between current practice and the potential of using 
state-of-the-art risk assessment techniques are also provided. 
2.1 Project Management 
 Organizing people and resources have been around since humans were civilized. 
Modern project management approaches are relatively new as a formal discipline having 
roots in DoD projects beginning in the 1950s. By the late 1970s, project management was 
confined to DoD and NASA contractors, and construction companies (Kerzner, 1989). 
Today, Project Management is ubiquitous. Organizations have formed to promulgate 
consistent set of tools and techniques such as the Project Management Institute’s Project 
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Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) (PMI, 2003) and the Association for Project 
Management’s Body of Knowledge (APM, 2004). 
 Changes to the way projects are managed reflect adaptations organizations have 
made to accommodate ever more complex, sophisticated, customized, dangerous, and 
costly projects. The complexities and multidisciplinary aspects mean projects now have 
integrated many moving parts to meet objectives. Along with this came smaller margins 
of error and the consequences of a failing project are immense, not just in cost, but to 
careers, reputations, the environment, the economic livelihood of towns and regions. For 
a full treatment of project management disciplines, see (Kerzner, 1989; Meredeth & 
Mantel, 1989; PMI, 2003) or any number of other texts. 
 The PMBOK states that project management is accomplished through the 
application of processes for initializing, planning, executing, monitoring, controlling, and 
closing. The basis of performing these processes is the decomposition of the project into 
more manageable elements by task, by time, and by cost. Each of these breakdowns are 
associated with different (and independent) tools such as a Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS), Critical Path Method / Program Evaluation and Review Technique (CPM/PERT), 
and Earned Value Management System (EVM). All the activities must be accomplished 
within the constraints of a budget, a schedule, and performance specification of the 
product, service, or result. Figure 2-1 shows a project management model commonly 
used to represent how projects manage resources within these constraints. One side of the 
triangle cannot be changed without affecting the others. This is often accompanied by the 
sarcastic slogan “You can have 2 of the 3” belying the fact the constraints compete 




Figure 2-1. Project management triangle 
 Completing a project within the triangle is usually defined as success. Softer 
notions of customer relations, reputation (organization’s or manager’s), and others are 
interwoven in the success criteria although not explicitly written. 
 Predicting with certainty at the start of a project, how cost, time, and performance 
constraints would be achieved would be comforting. There is always considerable 
uncertainty about the team’s ability to meet them, but it is the project manager’s 
responsibility to understand and make good decisions in the presence of this uncertainty. 
Today's management analysis incorporates uncertainties to provide probability 
distributions around cost and schedule estimates, often using Monte-Carlo simulation to 
augment cost and schedule models (Garvey, 2000; Stewart, 1991; Vose, 2008). However, 
"most project management pedagogical literature does not consider the way that 
managing uncertainty should be integrated with project management more generally." 
(Ward & Chapman, 2003) Additionally, project risk management practices do not use 
methods to quantify uncertainty. 
2.2 Risk Assessment 
 Risk assessments are, at least in principle, designed to inform decision-makers. 
Straight forward decisions do not require formal risk assessments. However, when 
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decisions are complex, information uncertain, impacts ambiguous, and consequences 
have multiple attributes, a formal structured systematic risk assessment is useful. Certain 
characteristics of state-of-the-art risk assessments are now standard (T. Aven, 2003; 
Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Cox, 2009; Frank, 2008; Henley & Kumamoto, 1996; 
Modarres, 2006; NASA, 2004; NRC, 1983; Vose, 2008), but are not reflected in current 
PRM practices. For this study the following risk assessment characteristics are 
incorporated: 
Scenario-based: Assessments that are scenario-based contains model logic tracing 
events that perturbs nominal functioning of a system and examines how the 
system responds. Multiple potential outcomes are addressed. These scenarios 
often include potential mitigation alternatives in order to evaluate their benefit. 
This tool allows PMs to “think” through situations before they occur in order to 
prepare for contingencies and provides a platform to quantify consequences and 
likelihoods. 
Integrated: Analyses address a wide scope of concerns for the decision-maker. 
Integrated frameworks address the entire system/project as a whole, combined 
effects of multiple risk items, dependencies among and within risk items, and 
interfaces with other existing risk assessment models. A systematic integrated 
framework enables trade-off studies and sensitivity analysis across multiple risks 
and constituent system/project elements.  
Quantitative: Model based assessments compute measures representing risk. 
Emphasis is placed on expressing the likelihood of observable performance 
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measures or events. Probabilities are assigned based on systematic proven 
processes for data analysis and probability calculus. 
Multi-attribute: Decision-makers struggle with multiple aspect of decision 
consequences that must be unified. They rarely make decisions on risk values 
alone, but integrate their view of the world. Assessments account for decision-
maker’s risk aversion levels and preferences to those attributes.  
Probabilistic: Any model involves assumptions, simplifications, and data 
variability. It is essential that decision-makers receive information about all three 
in the form of uncertainties. Both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties are 
included as an integral part of the assessments. 
Actionable: Framework scope and level of detail must be coincident with 
decision-makers' ability to take action. This focus on actions that can be 
implemented is the only way a PM can influence the course of events. 
Probative : The ability to rank order important drivers and perform sensitivity 
analysis enables insights about current situations and future alternatives. 
Importance measures provide quantitative view of model elements. 
 As we will see, current project risk management practices do not posses all these 
characteristics.   
2.3 Project Risk Management 
 One of the project management processes gaining popularity is Project Risk 
Management. Risk Management is a much discussed topic. A simple Google search on 
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“risk management” returns over 43 million hits of websites discussing or selling various 
concepts, books, articles, and consulting services. A more limited search in the academic 
literature (Google Scholar) returns 629,000 hits on various papers addressing risk 
management. In addition, several books have been published in the past 15 years focused 
explicitly on project risk management (Chapman & Ward, 2003; Chong & Brown, 2000; 
Conrow, 2003; Cooper & Chapman, 1987; Cooper, Grey, Raymond, & Walker, 2005; 
Kendrick, 2003) . 
 Discussing risk management is problematic in the sense that the term is used 
differently in various sectors and therefore appears differently in the literature depending 
of what the author’s background is and what issue they are addressing. Even within 
project management literature one finds the following being addressed. 
Financial risk management articles focus on risks associated with various 
investment options (Christoffersen, 2003; Duffie & Pan, 1997; McNeil, Frey, & 
Embrechts, 2005). For example, spending funds on overseas investments could 
involve assessing political, social, and financial risks as well as the potential 
market share that could be gained. Assessments such as these inform decisions on 
where and whether capital should be invested. These assessments deal with 
controlling variability within portfolios of many assets. The mathematical 
“products” are designed to hedge against variability. 
Insurance risk management papers addresses how companies evaluate risks when 
insuring businesses and homeowners against catastrophic situations too costly to 
recover from (Croson & Kunreuther, 1999; Woo, 2004). They assess the 
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probability of disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, law suites, and 
accidents, based on past history and the costs resulting from the damage caused or 
the lives lost. On the basis of actuarial analysis, companies set policies and costs 
that apply to businesses and homeowners. These issues often appear in articles 
about construction project risk (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997). 
Engineering risk management literature discusses assessment of risks related to 
safety and security when designing and constructing large projects such as 
chemical plants, nuclear reactors, or bridges (Bier & Azaiez, 2009; Cox, 2009; 
Vick, 2002). Using risk analysis techniques, engineers examine the possible 
threats to the safety and security of the structure and evaluate ways to address the 
threat by considering various design features that could reduce vulnerabilities or 
consequences.  
There is also a sector of sociology and psychology that discusses risk and how it is 
perceived and how humans respond to risk (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1982; 
Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). 
 Within the government sector, risk management literature shows evaluations of 
consequences to public health and safety (Cox, 2009; Furberg, Levin, Gross, Shapiro, & 
Strom, 2006; Henson & Caswell, 1999). For example, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) assesses risk associated with diseases related to various types of food and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) analyzes health risks caused by toxic chemicals, 
emissions from vehicles, and other sources of pollution. Much is written about models, 
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how risks are perceived, and how to use information to make recommendations and set 
policies or regulations aimed at improving safety and minimize public risk.  
 For purposes of this study, the literature review is focused on project risk 
management. PRM is the act or practice of dealing with risk items. It includes planning 
for risk, assessing (identifying and analyzing) risk issues, developing risk handling 
options, monitoring risks to determine how risks have changed, and documenting the 
overall risk management program (DoD, 2006). Although, concepts and ideas pertaining 
to implementation a PRA framework is also examined. Much of the PRM information 
focuses on controlling adverse outcomes, primarily cost and schedule. Many non-peer 
reviewed conference articles advocate building administrative processes and database 
tools to implement published guidelines and standards. In addition, a lot of energy is 
spent convincing management that Risk Management is worthwhile. 
 Technology risks is another related topic reviewed that previously was kept 
separate from the cost and schedule risk discussions. Specifically, DoD and NASA 
characterize technology risk by using a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale. Data is 
also available to assign percentage of cost overruns and schedule delays based on the 
project’s TRL(Dubos, Saleh, & Braun, 2008). 
 In many papers reviewed, authors take time to discuss previous work associated 
with their particular topic within risk management. Two works are noteworthy because 
they were published as literature reviews. 
 In 1995, Williams published the first comprehensive PRM bibliography 
(Williams, 1995). His goal was to take the first step in “integrating this work within a 
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cohesive academic framework.” His bibliography contains 241 references that were 
gathered from research scattered across a wide range of disciplines; management science, 
operations research, engineering, and psychology. Information was limited to cost and 
schedule discussions. 
 Galway, published a report (Galway, 2004) of an internal RAND Corporation 
study to survey “how quantitative risk management and risk analysis methods were 
applied to the planning and execution of complex projects, particularly those which 
planned to use new and untried technologies.” Resulting research came from many 
industries and disciplines. While Galway mentions integrating technical performance 
with cost and schedule as a desire, he focuses only on cost and schedule risk methods. 
One self expressed disappointment was the lack of empirical data supporting the value of 
risk analysis techniques.  
… there is a striking lack of literature on the use of the techniques. This 
study conducted unstructured interviews with a number of researchers and 
practitioners. The universal statement about the general utility of 
quantitative project risk analysis was that it is clearly useful, because it is 
so widely used and so widely recommended. However, this was always 
followed by comments that project risk analysis is not well understood by 
project management. There was also agreement, confirmed by a literature 
search that virtually all of the evidence for its utility was anecdotal. 
Galway asks the community to continue efforts of producing critical literature since 1) 
methods are not uniformly used, indicating a practical lack of consensus and 2) 
application of PRM methods is expensive and time consuming, so better guidance about 
value is needed.  
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2.3.1 Terms and Definitions 
 Risk management has many incarnations and therefore terminology is not 
consistent. This section defines various terms and how they are used herein. 
 Peter Bernstein chronicles the evolution of risk to modern day sophisticated risk 
management approaches (Bernstein, 1998). It is quite remarkable that only 350 years 
separate these approaches from “decisions guided by superstition, blind faith, and 
instinct.” In addition, we are only 50 years removed from the advent of quantitative 
analysis used to support decisions. 
 Everyone is familiar with the concept of risk. We use it in everyday language to 
address uncertainties in the world around us and as influences to decisions we make. It is 
this familiarity that manifests itself in remarkable variety of senses we give to the term. 
Risk is a calculation. Risk is a commodity. Risk is capital. Risk is a technique of 
government. Risk is objective and scientifically knowable. Risk is subjective and socially 
constructed. Risk is a problem, a threat, a source of insecurity. Risk is a pleasure, a thrill, 
a source of profit and freedom. Risk is the means whereby we control the future. Within 
technical disciplines, risk is a mathematical combination of probability and consequence. 
Risk is uncertainty. Risk is an event. Risk is an input function to a project or an output 
function given project events and conditions. The dictionary defines risk as: 
1. exposure to the chance of injury, damage or loss; dangerous chance; 
hazard. 2. Insurance: a. the hazard or chance of loss. b. the degree of 
probability such loss. c. the amount that the insurance company may lose. 
d. a person or thing with reference to the hazard involved in insuring him 
or it. e. they type of lass against which an insurance policy is drawn. 3. To 
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expose to the changes of injury or loss; hazard. 4. To venture upon; take or 
run the change of. [From the Italian risicare to dare] 
 Even within the smaller subset of PRM, definitions of risk vary. Listed below are 
three from Project Management Institute (PMI), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). There are many others, but 
these are germane to the discussion. 
 An uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative 
effect on a project’s objectives (PMI, 2003) 
 A measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals 
within defined cost and schedule constraints (DoD, 2006) 
 A measure of the uncertainty of attaining a goal, objective, or requirement 
pertaining to technical performance, cost, and schedule (INCOSE, 2006) 
 For purposes here, Kaplan and Garrick's concepts are used (Kaplan & Garrick, 
1981). They set the fundamentals of risk analysis to answer three questions 1) What can 
happen? 2) How likely is it that that will happen? 3) If it does happen, what are the 
consequences? Answers define a set of triplets containing scenarios of possible outcomes, 
probability, and consequence (measure of damage) of each scenario. Kaplan notes that 
“defined in this way, risk is not a number, nor is it a curve, nor a vector, etc. None of 
these mathematical concepts is ‘big’ enough in general to capture the idea of risk.” 
(Kaplan, 1997) Components of project risk include: 1) a future root cause, which if 
eliminated or corrected, would prevent a potential consequence from occurring; 2) a 
probability assessed at the present time of that future root-cause occurring; 3) the 




 PRM provides PMs with tools to understand an uncertain future of system 
development/operations and provide an analytical capability to examine impacts of their 
decisions. Also we want a definition of project risk that contains quantitative notions of 
uncertainty described by Kaplan and Garrick; supports decision making processes of 
management; and acknowledge constraints imposed by contracts or statements-of-work. 
Therefore,  
Project Risk is a measure of future uncertain shortfall, as referenced from 
the project baseline, in achieving system operational performance goals 
within defined project’s cost, schedule, and technical constraints and is 
thusly described using a set of quadruplets; scenarios, decision points, 
consequences, and likelihoods. 
 A fundamental assumption for use of this definition is that stakeholders have 
agreed, through negotiations, on requirements and constraints. In other words, they have 
agreed to a level of residual risk present in cost estimates, projected schedules, and the 
technical proposal. The embodiment of this agreement takes the form of management 
reserve funds, schedule slack, and technical margin. So if the project is proceeding within 
constraints and meets requirements, no risk is incurred. This does not mean that the 
product is risk free or that the probability of failure is zero. Risk is, in part, a deviation 
from the agreed residual risk. 
 Project risk in this context includes only the undesired consequences. Pursuing an 
“opportunity” as advocated by some (D Hillson, 2006; Sanchez, Robert, & Pellerin, 
2008; Ward, 2003) is seen as a variance against the plan (Conrow & Charette, 2008). 
Most often this leads to requirements creep and therefore increased cost and delay. This 
is not to say that exploiting opportunities should be ignored, we are saying it is not part of 
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the project risk assessment process. Opportunity belongs to higher organizational levels 
or enterprise and is embodied in the establishment of a project. 
 The measure of the project risk is measured as a deviation from this baseline 
curve due to the various risk scenario consequences identified. A thorough treatise of the 
quantification of the methodology is discussed in Chapters 5 - 7. 
 A risk item is an initiating event or condition which can propagate to an undesired 
consequence. Also referred to as risk elements, risk events, risk factors, or project risks. 
Risk items may be associated with more than one consequence category (e.g, cost, 
schedule). All categories must be carried and propagated through the risk assessment, risk 
handling, and risk monitoring phases of the management process to evaluate the full 
impact of a risk item.  
 Integrated risk is the concept containing a combination of risk items leading to 
and interacting with consequences of all risk types; cost, schedule, technical, and safety. 
Within the literature, integration of risk is considered an essential part of the risk 
management process. However, the literature rarely discusses how to accomplish this. 
Another issue with “Integrated risks” is that it means different things to different authors. 
It has been referred to mean cooperation among project elements (Roberts, 2001), 
consistent process from enterprise to project and task (D. Hillson & Hulett, 2004), 
incorporation of all project life cycle phases (PMI, 2003), and cost-schedule integration. 
 Project risks are categorized in many different ways. NASA and the National 
Research Council broadly define categories as follows (NASA, 2007; NRC, 2005):  
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Cost Risk –risk associated with the ability of projects to achieve life-cycle cost 
objectives (and secure appropriate funding.)  
Schedule Risk –risk associated with adequacy of time estimated and allocated for 
development, production, implementation, and system operation.  
Technical Risk –risk associated with evolution of design and technology 
implementation affecting level of performance. 
Performance Risk – risk associated with how well a given design will operate. 
Programmatic Risk – risk associated with action or inaction from outside the 
project, over which PMs have no control, but which may have significant impact 
on the project.  
Environment, safety, and health risks – risks associated with detrimental effects 
on the environment or hazards that may be uncovered during project execution. 
These risks are technical risks but are treated separately here to add focus to the 
category, and out of tradition. Within government acquisition programs, safety 
risks are treated separately from project risk management processes. 
A risk source is akin to a root cause. The term is used as an overarch set of causes from 
which risk item spawn. Various industry specific lists exists for software (Dorofee et al., 
1993), for construction (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997) and for large engineering projects 
(Miller & Lessard, 2001). They can also be project specific. Risk sources are used as a 
checklist to explore how project elements can go wrong.   
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2.3.2 Project Risk Management Background 
 This section provides an overview of common practices for risk management 
within a project. In a broad sense, assessing risk is a necessary skill for modern day life. 
Peter Bernstein argues that “the ability to define what may happen in the future and to 
choose among alternatives lies at the heart of contemporary societies” (Bernstein, 1998). 
His discussion of probability and risk assessments have fundamentally changed our view 
of the world from one of predetermined destiny based on pleasing the Gods to one in 
which the future can be understood and planned. 
 PMs adopted PRM to help manage uncertainty in achieving project goals and 
requirements. To this end, PRM seeks to identify all significant risks to understand 
potential range of consequences and to estimate likelihood of their occurrence. 
Information is needed to support PM's decision-making process. 
 While managing large scale projects has been around since humans starting 
building large structures, the management of risk has not. Most risk management tools 
were developed by U.S. military programs in the 1950s as part of a wider adoption of 
quantitative management techniques for defense procurement activities aimed at cost and 
schedule issues (Galway, 2004). Underlying methodology and philosophy of project risk 
management tools has not changed a great deal since then. 
 Common practice for PRM includes a planning activity, assessing risk items, 
developing and handling alternatives, monitoring to understand changes in risk posture 
over time, and communicating (internal and external) with documentation throughout the 
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process. They are incorporated as an integral part of the project governance providing 
decision-makers with risk based view of decisions.  
 At least within U.S. government procurement, PRM practices are mandated 
policy as shown in this excerpt from Office of Management and Budget’s Capital 
Programming Guide (OMB Circular A-11): 
Risk management should be central to the planning, budgeting, and 
acquisition process. Failure to analyze and manage the inherent risk in all 
capital asset acquisitions may contribute to cost overruns, schedule 
shortfalls, and acquisitions that fail to perform as expected. For each major 
capital project a risk analysis that includes how risks will be isolated, 
minimized, monitored, and controlled may help prevent these problems. 
 PRM is thought to be vital for the completion of modern large complex 
engineering projects, within given constraints. At this point in the discussion of PRM, it 
would be preferable to review evidence supporting (or not) the notion that PRM improves 
project performance. However, as Galway, Williams, and Lawrence also discovered, no 
such critical literature exists. These authors speculate two possible reasons. First, 
interested parties in project management are highly fragmented, being split across a 
practitioner community and a variety of academic disciplines that publish in very 
disparate media. Second, failures of projects are highly sensitive and often involve 
proprietary information, which analysts cannot access.  
 Another issue in showing PRM importance lies in the fact that adoption of formal 
project management and project risk management methods coincide with project failure 
trends. A fact the even Conrow concedes (Conrow & Charette, 2008), stating: 
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Alas, our experience suggests that risk management is often poorly 
performed on many DoD programs. Results from the Tri-Service 
Assessment Initiative (which looked at 50 major DoD programs), 
performed a few years ago indicate that while risk management is carried 
out on most programs, it is often ineffective. Risk management process are 
often superficial, risk analyses are not communicated, and identified risk 
frequently do not influence program decision making (e.g., outputs are not 
utilized to make decision or to improve how the program is being run).  
 Various industries incorporate PRM methods as part of their management 
approach. Off-shore oil platform projects used PRM to solve issues relating to safety and 
supply logistics in the 1980s (Chapman, 1990). Construction projects have long used cost 
and scheduling models are now using PRM to tie them to project risk (Cooper, et al., 
2005; del Caño & de la Cruz, 1998). Utility companies also use PRM in construction 
projects (Elkington & Smallman, 2002; NRC, 2005). Transportation industry is being 
forced through government contracts to show project risk evaluations as part of project 
planning and proposals (CalTrans, 2003). Software projects have taken PRM and 
incorporated it as part a the development process (Boehm, 1991; R. N. Charette, 1996; 
Dorofee, et al., 1993). 
 Ultimately, PRM is about providing PMs with actionable information to steer 
projects to success. A well-managed risk management program provides a repeatable 
process for balancing resources within program constraints. PMs can derive benefit from 
this process when system designs are tightly constrained or have optimistic cost, 
schedule, and performance goals. Without effective risk management PMs may find 
themselves in a crisis management mode; a resource-intensive process that is typically 
constrained by a restricted set of available options (DoD, 2006). PRM allows the PMs an 
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increased confidence in achieving desired outcomes, to effectively constrain threats, and 
to make risk-informed decisions.  
2.3.3 Project Risk Management Standards and Guidelines 
 This section should have been straightforward. Find risk standards in use, 
describe best practice methodology, identify some industry examples, and move on. 
However, the quote from computer scientists Andrew Tanenbaum comes to mind; “The 
good thing about standards is that there are so many to choose from.” Due to the same 
forces that produced a great many perceptions of risk, a multitude of standards exist. 
National and international standards have been published by several organizations. A 
comparative study and description of these is outside the scope of this study. See (R. 
Charette, 2006; Cooper, et al., 2005; Raz & Hillson, 2005) for more detailed information. 
Here we will focus on just a few to use as a basis for PRM processes: 
 Project Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK) produced by the Project 
Management Institute. PMI’s PMBOK addresses all manner of project 
management issues. Chapter 11 specifically addresses project risk 
management. It (like the other chapters) is process oriented listing inputs, 
outputs, and processes needed to complete each of six steps. The focus is on 
qualitative assessments of risk with minor discussions of quantitative methods 
as they apply to cost and schedule. 
 Continuous Risk Management (CRM) produced by the Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University. SEI’s CRM book focuses on 
risks within software development projects. It is part of the overall software 
capability maturity model integration process. The book provides a view of 
what risk management could look like when implemented within a project and 
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shows how an organization might tailor the process to fit in its specific 
environment. 
 Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition produced by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense.  This document reflects lessons learned on the 
application of risk management on past programs. It is structured to provide a 
basic understanding of risk management concepts and processes. The focus is 
for DoD to use risk management in the acquisition of systems from 
contractors and therefore centered on unique DoD environments.  
 As an indication of how specific PRM guidance has proliferated, the list below 
shows a sample what is available. Many project specific plans can also be found. 
 AS/NZS 4360, Risk Management.  
 APM Project Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM). 
 NASA NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements.  
 California Department of Transportation, Project Risk Management 
Handbook. 
 Washington State Department of Transportation, Risk Management Manual. 
 ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002, Risk management -- Vocabulary -- Guidelines for 
use in standards. 
 UK Office of Government Commerce, Management of Risk (M_o_R) 
guideline. 
 One other standard to mention is Mil-Std-882, System Safety Program 
Requirements. While not strictly a risk management guidance document, its processes, 
techniques, and communication mechanisms mirror those listed above. System safety is 
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risk management focused solely on safety aspects of a system. The majority of the effort 
is qualitative in nature using the same risk matrix construct to communicate results. 
Interestingly, the activities performed in this risk matrix are not combined with project 
risk matrices. 
2.4 Risk Management Practice 
 First thing to note for all the risk management processes is that they are 
continuous in that they exist in all phases of the project life-cycle and provide a feedback 
mechanism to track and monitor risk. Figure 2-2 is a typical model depiction of a 
continuous risk management process. The process balances a number of interwoven 
elements which interact with each activity. Furthermore, “specific risks cannot be 
addressed in isolation from each other; the management of one risk may have an impact 
on another, or management actions which are effective in controlling more than one risk 
simultaneously may be achievable.” (HM-Treasury, 2004) 
 
Figure 2-2. Continuous risk management process 
 Risk management models can become quite intricate with incorporation of 








core risk management processes are not isolated, but takes place in a context; and, how 
certain key inputs have to be given to overall processes in order to generate outputs 
which will be desired from risk management.(HM-Treasury, 2004) 
 PMBOK's risk management chapter explains how to manage project risk with an 
approach that is prescriptive dovetailing into all project management processes of book at 
large. Six steps of this process include: 
 Risk Management Planning 
 Risk Identification 
 Qualitative Risk Analysis 
 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 Risk Response Planning 
 Risk Monitoring and Control 
 Other standards and guidelines provide similar steps. Some have more but they 
describe the same process in differing levels of detail. For example, APM’s Project Risk 
Analysis and Management (PRAM) Guide maps to nine steps, Synergistic Contingency 
Evaluation and Response Technique (SCERT) uses four, SEI’s CRM Guidelines uses 
five.  
 The process model used herein is taken from DoD’s Risk Management Guide -
version 5, (see Figure 2-3). This process includes a planning activity, assessing risk 
items, developing handling alternatives, monitoring risk posture, and communicating 




Figure 2-3. Project Risk Management process  
These process steps are defined within the DoD risk guide are: 
Risk planning is the process of developing and documenting an organized, 
comprehensive, and interactive strategy, process, and methods for identifying and 
tracking risk issues, developing risk-handling plans, performing continuous risk 
assessments to determine how risks have changed, and assigning adequate 
resources. 
Risk assessment is the process of identifying and analyzing project areas and 
critical technical process risks to increase the likelihood of meeting cost, 
performance, and schedule objectives. Risk identification is the process of 
examining the program areas and each critical technical process to identify and 
document the associated risk. Risk analysis is the process of examining each 
identified risk issue or process to refine the description of the risk, isolating the 
cause, and determining the effects (more on this in the next section). 
Risk handling is the process that identifies, evaluates, selects, and implements 
options in order to set risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and 
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objectives. This includes the specifics on what should be done, when it should be 
accomplished, who is responsible, and associated cost and schedule. Risk 
handling options include assumption, avoidance, control (also known as 
mitigation), and transfer. The most desirable handling option is selected, and a 
specific approach is then developed for this option. The chosen option coupled 
with the implementation approach is known as the risk handling strategy. 
Risk monitoring is the process that systematically tracks and evaluates the 
performance of risk-handling actions against established metrics throughout the 
acquisition process and provides inputs to updating risk-handling strategies, risk 
analysis results, and risk identification information, as appropriate. 
Risk documentation is recording, maintaining, and reporting assessments, 
handling analysis and plans, and monitoring results. It includes all plans, reports 
for the PM and decision authorities, and reporting forms that may be internal to 
the program. 
Chapter 9 addresses how the new analytical framework fits to this established PRM 
practices. 
 As shown above, PRM processes can reside in a much larger process as it is with 
the PMBOK or by the Orange Book. NASA’s process is created to work as an integrated 
system throughout all levels of the agency. It is also integrated at the project level 
through explicit coordination with their Risk-Informed Decision Process. The process 
identifies and rank orders the decision alternatives based on set of performance measures. 
It employs various boards and panels, Authority to Proceed milestones, Safety Review 
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Boards, Risk Reviews, Engineering Design and Operations Planning decision forums, 
Configuration Management process, and commit-to-flight reviews (NASA, 2008). 
2.4.1 Risk identification 
 After the infrastructure is in place, work of analyzing the risk environment begins. 
First identify the risks. An initial identification occurs early in the project and 
identification must also occur continuously throughout the project. There is always new 
information gathered and potential for new risks to appear. During execution of the 
project, constant examination of current versus baseline staffing levels, cost expenditures, 
design progress can provide indications for risk items. Monitoring tests for performance 
shortfalls and failures also provides insights. 
 The literature provides many tools to perform this activity. Raz and Hillson have 
compiled a list of risk identification techniques discussed in several PRM guidance 
documents (See Table 2-1). Two common methods to identify risk items are drawing 
from experience (personal and corporate) and brainstorming. Another technique 
advocated by DoD is to analyze each item in the project’s WBS and compare against a 
list of risk sources. The resulting list of risks is captured in a structure called a Risk 
Register. Many authors (Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997; Chapman, 1997; D. Hillson, 2003; 
Kwak & Stoddard, 2004) suggest organizing the risk items by risk source. A long list 
without this organization can hide patterns as to which risk sources are contributing to the 
overall risk.  
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 A common misconception, and project practice, is the identification and tracking 
problems (not risks) and then manage the consequences. This practice tends to mask true 
risks, and it serves to track rather than resolve or mitigate risks (DoD, 2006). 
Table 2-1. Risk identification tools and techniques 
Assumptions analysis Expert opinion Prompt lists 
Benchmarking  Fault tree analysis Prototyping 
Brainstorming Flow charts Questionnaires 
Cause and effect diagrams Hazard and operability studies Risk assessment workshops 
Checklists Historical data Root cause analysis 
Constraints analysis Incident investigation Scenario analysis 
Delphi technique Influence diagrams Stakeholder analysis 
Diagramming techniques Interviewing Structured interviews 
Documentation reviews Lessons learned SWOT analysis  
Evaluation of other projects Nominal group technique System engineering techniques 
Event tree analysis Peer review Systems analysis 
Experience in organization  Personal observation Taxonomies 
Experience in similar orgs Previous experience Technology readiness levels 
Examination of vulnerabilities Project monitoring Testing and modeling 
Source: (Raz & Hillson, 2005) 
2.4.2 Risk Register 
 The Risk Register is a list containing the output of the risk identification process 
used to assist the project management and project team review project risks. Each risk 
item is given a separate entry with the following information usually laid out in a tabular 
format: 
 Unique identifier for each risk 
 Description of each risk and how it will affect the project 
 Assessment of the likelihood and the possible impact  
 List of proposed mitigation actions (preventative and contingency) 
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 Root causes the give rise to the risk item 
In many respects it resembles a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) worksheet 
and suffers from the same limitations in that it is difficult to read as a whole to get the 
entirety of the project's risk posture. The attraction is its simplicity and convenience.  
 Risk registers have shortcomings as the project becomes larger and more 
complex. The issues with this format include: (Chapman & Ward, 2003) 
 Individual risk drivers may not be described in sufficient detail to avoid 
ambiguity and misunderstandings about what risk is being described 
 Important inter-dependencies between risks are not readily highlighted 
 A table of risk drivers, particularly a long one, provides limited guidance on 
the relative importance of individual risk drivers 
 Many large programs subdivide the list so that smaller organizations hold risks 
relevant to them. This however, tends to compound the issues listed above. In addition, 
the integration of risk items is not a trivial matter. For instance, a high risk for a small 
organization may be negligible for the prime organization. 
2.4.3 Risk Response 
 Risk Response addresses how PMs manage risk items. The responses contain 
approaches and specific actions, as well as, whether each response is to be planned 
(occurring prior to the risk manifesting), or contingent (occurring once the risk has 
manifested). There are four different types of risk responses. For every risk, PMs must 
decide which type of risk response to use. The four types of risk response are: 
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Mitigation – Mitigation is reducing the probability of occurrence or impact of a 
risk, before it happens. Mitigation may also include contingency, in the event the 
risk still happens. Mitigation requires action, resulting in some level of planned 
response prior to the risk manifesting and/or contingent after the risk manifests. 
Acceptance – Acceptance is deciding not to change the project management plan 
to deal with a risk. Acceptance is a passive response requiring no action. 
Avoidance – Avoidance is eliminating the risk, or protecting the project 
objectives from its impact (i.e. if the risk were to occur, it would not impact the 
project). Avoidance requires more action, but provides the largest reduction of 
risk from a particular risk item. Note, eliminating the risk may have unintended 
consequences elsewhere in the project.  
Transference – Transference is shifting the threat of impact and ownership of 
response to a third party, through a contractual agreement between the two 
parties. Liability for the costs of a risk is transferred to the other party. In other 
words, your risk is eliminated and the risk now rests with the third party. 
2.4.4 Qualitative Risk Analysis 
 Once risk items are identified and documented, a probability of occurrence and 
consequence are assigned to each. This assignment can be a quantitative assessment or a 
qualitative one. Common practice is to make a qualitative assessment using interviews 
and meetings with personnel familiar with risk items and assigns an ordinal value from 
predetermined tables. These tables can be standard within an organization or unique to 
the project. Table 2-2 illustrates what these tables look like. 
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Table 2-2. Typical likelihood and consequence scores  
Likelihood of Occurrence 
 
Consequence 
5 Very likely 91-100% 
 
5 Critical 
The program will fail. Minimum acceptable 
requirements will not be met. 
4 Likely 61-90% 
 
4 Serious 
The program will encounter major cost/schedule 
increases. Minimum acceptable requirements will be 
met. Secondary requirements may not be met. 
3 Possible 41-60% 
 
3 Moderate 
The program will encounter moderate cost/schedule 
increases. Minimum acceptable requirements will be 
met. Some secondary requirements may not be met. 
2 Unlikely 11-40% 
 
2 Minor 
The program will encounter small cost/schedule 
increases. Minimum acceptable requirements will be 
met. Most secondary requirements will be met. 
1 Rare 0-10% 
 
1 Negligible 
No effect on the program. All requirements will be 
met.  
 
 The risk matrix (see Figure 2-4) is the preferred communication vehicle for 
relative risk of risk items. Likelihood of occurrence and consequence are plotted onto a 
matrix. The matrix itself is coded to identify the level of significant (High, Moderate, 
Low). This NASA example shows the moderate range to be asymmetrical meaning lower 
right corner to be more important than the upper left. Other organizations skew the 
matrix, add levels of granularity to the axes, or increase the number of significance 
levels. A quick internet search reveals no consistency to how risk matrices are 
constructed. This variety makes it difficult to compare risks from one organization to 




Figure 2-4. Typical risk matrix 
 The region of the risk matrix then determines the priority of the risk items; "High" 
(red) gets more attention than "Moderate" (yellow). "Low" (green) risks are usually 
ignored as insignificant. Think of this as a game of whack-a-mole, where upper 
management wields the hammer. The idea is to move the risk item to a lower region by 
developing a response plan. These responses either lower the risk item probability or 
soften the blow of the consequence. Those that cannot be moved are accepted risks 
(usually with some supporting rationale). 
 Despite their extensive use, risk matrices have issues. Even though guidance 
documents state that risk matrices are not assessment tools (NASA, 2007), tendency has 
been to consider a subjective placement on a matrix as sufficient. Placement of a risk 
item provides characteristics of just that item and provides no information about the 
interactions between risks. In other words, they are treated as independent items. 
Consequently any attempt to aggregate risks to provide a picture of the total project risk 
will give significantly incomplete information. 
 Uncertainty is addressed only in the narrow sense that risk items have a 
probability of occurrence. A risk item exists in one position assuming that it is within a 
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likelihood range and consequence range, both of which are assumed to be known. This 
does not represent the realistic uncertainties in analyses. Effects of assumptions, 
variability in data, and incompleteness of knowledge should be acknowledged and 
managed with PRM.  
 The consequence score is typically applied to a single consequence type. A risk 
item however, may, and usually does, have many consequences of cost, schedule, and 
performance. This is a multi-dimensional decision problem over-simplified to one ordinal 
scale. The relative magnitude and relative importance of consequences are not conveyed 
in the matrix.  
 In addition, there are some mathematical problems when attempting to perform 
mathematical operations on ordinal values, and when determining risk ratings 
unambiguously. Conrow warns against the practice of performing mathematical 
operations on scale values for probability and consequence (Conrow, 2003). He 
demonstrates through example the meaningless results from these operations and 
provides a few examples where project made profoundly incorrect decisions based on 
these analyses. Unfortunately, this practice is common “having been promoted by DoD in 
the 1980s to mid-1990s and also widely used by the aerospace and even general 
commercial industry.” Conrow also profiles how DoD guidance documents contained the 
calculation errors and the effort to rewrite the offending passages. 
 Cox examined the mathematical properties of risk matrices and shows limitations 
with poor resolution, errors, suboptimal resource allocation, and ambiguous inputs and 
outputs (Cox, 2008). After working through several examples where risk matrices yield 
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incorrect results, he concludes that “risk matrices do not necessarily support good (e.g., 
better-than-random) risk management decisions and effective allocation of limited 
management attention and resources.” Cox concedes that the creation of risk matrices is 
too pervasive not to use them, and suggests more research is needed to better characterize 
the conditions that are helpful and harmful, and thus develop procedures to account for 
the limitations.   
 PRM process takes each risk item and assigns a score for probability of 
occurrences and a score for consequence (usually the worst-case consequence). The 
assignments of probability and consequences are typically done by committee in 
brainstorming secessions. The secessions have shown to be very good for identification 
of risk items when facilitated using checklists, lessons learned data, and examining the 
WBS. Two problems exist in this approach: first, people are not very good at assigning 
probabilities to events without detailed supporting analysis or at assessing all possible 
consequences; and second, people succumb to “groupthink” and other group dynamic 
forces that distort independent analysis.  
 Studies have shown people’s estimation of probability of uncertain events to be 
predictably incorrect. People tend to use rules-of-thumb (heuristics) to reduce complexity 
in their own minds, but they often lead to significant errors. People also suffer from 
biases (representative, availability, and anchoring) and overconfidence. Consistently, 
small probabilities are over-estimated and large-probabilities are under-estimated. The 
estimates made are accompanied by unrealistic overconfidence in the quality of their 
estimates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
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 The situation is exacerbated as events are combined into a mix of independent 
events and dependent events; information combinations from various sources and types; 
sampling from non-homogenous population sets etc. The tendency is to focus on the 
worst case consequence and assign its probability to the initiating risk item, or an 
observable subset of that risk item. 
 “Groupthink” refers to faulty decision-making in a group (Janis, 1971). Flawed 
decisions are often the result of the following practices: 
 Incomplete survey of alternatives 
 Incomplete survey of objectives 
 Failure to examine risks of preferred choice 
 Failure to reevaluate previously rejected alternatives 
 Poor information search 
 Selection bias in collecting information 
 Failure to work out contingency plans. 
 Within a project, these committees tend to vote on how risks should be captured 
and treated, therefore determining resources. These voting schemes based on preferences 
are not necessarily internally consistent and can result in suboptimal decisions (Arrow, 
1963; Franssen, 2005; Hazelrigg, 1996). 
 I am certainly not claiming that the issues discussed above will go away with the 
implementation of this approach. However, a systematic process of identifying scenarios, 
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collecting evidence, and documenting assumptions will decrease the occurrences of 
errors in risk management.  
2.4.5 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 Quantitative risk analysis is used to numerically determine the probability that 
projects meet objectives. Techniques such as sensitivity analysis, statistical methods, 
decision analysis, and simulations provide better insight into project risk. The prevailing 
guidance is to use quantitative method only under specific circumstances, such as those 
deemed to have high risk, as determined by qualitative risk analyses. In practice, 
quantification is done only to uncover details about a particular risk item or, in the case of 
a large project, to assess cost and schedule objectives. 
 Whether to quantify risk or not is a much debated subject with some authors 
expounding the virtues of risk numbers while others point to the amount resources 
required. For example, a National Research Council report sees quantitative analysis as 
overkill; “While probabilistic risk assessment methods are certainly useful in determining 
contingency amounts to cover various process uncertainties, simple computation methods 
are often as good as, or even better than, complex methods for the applications discussed 
here” (NRC, 2005). PRM standards echo this bias toward analyzing the risk from a 
qualitative point of view. PMBOK suggests that quantitative analysis is often 
unnecessary. In some guidelines no mention is given to the set of quantification tools 
available (HM-Treasury, 2004). 
 A common form of quantitative risk analysis uses Monte-Carlo simulations of the 
schedule. This is now an integrated part of the CPM/PERT computer software. Estimates 
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are often made as triangular probability distributions about task duration times provided 
as input from interviews or consensus at meetings. Techniques for performing these 
analyses can found be in texts (Garvey, 2000). The same methodology is applied to cost 
estimates by treating WBS costs as random variables to get the uncertainty of project 
costs. 
 Even though many of the guidance documents say to include technical risk, it is 
often not considered in the quantification of risk. Only the cost and schedule are 
combined into a cohesive analysis. 
 Some PMs and authors question the value of traditional and commonly used 
expected value concepts. They complement and supplement the concept with conditional 
expectation, where decisions about extreme and catastrophic events are not averaged out 
with more commonly occurring events (Haimes, 2004). 
2.5 Previous Research 
 Researchers have focused on the risk analysis aspects of PRM. This section 
identifies several of them and shows that a true integrated PRM framework is still 
needed. Separate discussions of PRA and DA are provided since they play a prominent 
role in the formulation of this framework. 
2.5.1 Project Risk Frameworks 
 Many methods have been introduced and used in industries including 
construction, chemical processing, and government systems procurement. Lists of risk 
sources or drivers appear in abundance in the literature, but only a few develop them into 
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methodologies using risk factors. Scenario-based analysis is certainly the foundation for 
engineering risk assessments which influence some researchers in propagating them into 
project risk analysis. Failure modes and effects analysis analogies have also been shown 
as a helpful tool. Project management techniques for cost and schedule estimation have 
incorporated uncertainty in by using variability of low level cost or tack elements and 
propagating them through existing models. Bayesian Belief Networks have been shown 
as an integration tool with Monte-Carlo simulations. Other techniques also show promise. 
 Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a systematic qualitative project 
risk analysis technique called Risk Factor Analysis method as a useful tool for early, pre-
conceptual risk analyses (Kindinger & Darby, 2000). The method assigns ordinal values 
to risk factors for each activity in the project. The risk factors are items such as technical 
maturity and cost uncertainty. Another approach using risk factors was developed for 
offshore petroleum installation called risk indicators (Øien, 2001). Risk indicators are 
established from the performance measures of the system. Embedded in the methodology 
is a system control view that changes in indicators can alert the project to changes in risk. 
 LRAM is a methodology created for U.S. Air Force’s information system security 
risk management (Guarro, 1989). The basic structure (Risk Element) includes the 
combination of a threat initiator, its propagation path (that it ultimately reaches and 
affects the system assets), the possible resulting consequence, and the applicable controls. 
A complete list of Risk Elements is then analyzed quantitatively to find risk significant 
paths and develop mitigation strategies around them. The methodology was later to 
become the core of a software tool, CARMA (Guarro & Feldman, 2002). Zhang explores 
vulnerabilities of projects to the operational systems in which they exist (Zhang, 2007). 
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His methodology examines more than the common view of risks as initiator and 
consequence as statistical cause and effect relationship. Chapman and Ward (Chapman & 
Ward, 2003) explored PRM in all phases of a project life cycle and argue for the 
inclusion of source-response diagrams as an integral part of their SHAMPU framework 
to summarize the links between activities, risk sources, and responses. 
 Dillon, Pate-Cornell, and Guikema developed a model, Advanced Programmatic 
Risk Analysis and Management model (APRAM), as a decision-support framework for 
the management of the risk of failures of dependent engineering projects, based on a 
series of optimization steps aimed at budget allocation(Dillon, Paté-Cornell, & Guikema, 
2003). The framework, originally used for NASAs Mars Exploration Program, has been 
extended to analyze cost, schedule, and quality in construction projects (Imbeah & 
Guikema, 2009). 
 An examination of PRM practice shows a strong resemblance to a Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) commonly used in reliability engineering. A gap analysis 
showed that FMEA processes as defined by Mil-Std-1629A meets the requirements of the 
PMBOK criteria for risk management (Santos & Cabral, 2008). Risks are prioritized 
using the FMEA concept of a Risk Priority Number and possibly an addition of a 
detectability value (Carbone & Tippett, 2004). FMEAs have the ability to examine cost, 
schedule, and performance simultaneously but does so with ordinal, not cardinal, scales 
thereby limiting its usefulness. 
 Hierarchical holographic modeling (HMM) is a holistic philosophy/methodology 
aimed at capturing and representing the essence of the inherent diverse characteristics and 
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attributes of a system – its multiple aspects, perspectives, facets, views, dimensions and 
hierarchies (Haimes, 2004). HHM recognizes that most organizational as well as 
technology-based systems are hierarchical in structure, and thus risk management of such 
systems must be driven by and responsive to this structure. The risks associated with each 
subsystem within the hierarchical structure contribute to and ultimately determine the 
risks of the overall system. This methodology was applied to a large software acquisition 
project in order to facilitate the risk identification process. As a result the HHM model 
identified over 250 sources of risk (Lambert, Haimes, Li, Schooff, & Tulsiani, 2001). 
HHM has also been used to analyze System of Systems projects.(Haimes, 2008) Haimes 
further suggests that good management must incorporate and address risk management 
within a holistic and all-encompassing framework that incorporates and addresses all 
relevant resource allocation and other related management issues. A total risk 
management approach that harmonizes risk management with the overall system 
management must address hardware failures, software failures, organizational failures, 
and human failures. 
 Dey has built and implemented a PRM model based around analytic hierarchy 
process and decision tree analysis for petroleum pipeline construction projects (Dey, 
2002). Analysis techniques are used to model risk response alternatives for specific work 
packages. Flyvberg uses decision theory to address inaccurate forecasts of project costs, 
demand, and other impacts that are identified as project risks (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A 
decision framework for risk management is proposed by Aven in which they relate 
several issues of a problem to the decision and various solution alternatives(T Aven, 
Vinnem, & Wiencke, 2007). 
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 Cost and schedule uncertainty analyses quantify the cost impact of uncertainties 
associated with estimates. Probability distributions are generated for WBS cost elements 
or schedule tasks. Monte-Carlo simulations propagate the uncertainty to provide the total 
project cost and delivery date as distributions (Stewart, 1991). Garvey stresses the 
importance of this analysis to include: establishing a cost and schedule baseline, 
determining cost reserve, and conducting risk reduction trade-off analysis (Garvey, 
2000). 
 Earned Value Management (EVM), while not specifically a PRM tool, provides a 
good frame for integrating cost and schedule metrics. It provides the ability predict future 
performance based on trends. EVM provides an early warning tool alerting PMs as early 
as the 15% completion point on a project (Flemming & Kippelman, 2000). This signal 
allows PMs to forecast final required funds needed to finish the job within a narrow range 
of values. If final forecasted results are unacceptable, steps can be taken early to alter 
final requirements. 
 When projects develop Monte-Carlo simulations for their cost and schedule 
estimates the impact of probabilistic correlation is often ignored. One alternative to 
directly solving this difficult problem is the integration of Bayesian Belief Networks 
(BBN) within the integrated cost-schedule simulation (Arizaga, 2007). BBNs are used to 
generate dependency among risk factors and to examine non-additive impacts such as 
reputation of various providers. Fan designed a procedure to incorporate BBNs in a 
continuous monitoring loop to support the decision- making process of risk management 
(Fan & Yu, 2004). BBNs were chosen since risk management is performed continuously 
in a feedback loop so that problems are dynamically detected and adjusted. BBNs’ 
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influence diagrams also provide a visual model of cause consequence relations, and thus, 
help to identify sources of risks. BBNs can also model uncertainties and provides 
probabilistic estimates. Whenever new evidence is available in the proposed monitoring 
loop, the new data can be plugged in the related BBNs again to recalculate and update 
previous estimates. 
 Uncertainty management requires a “broader perspective” than risk management 
in order to improve project management (Ward & Chapman, 2003). Their paradigm is an 
attempt to balance the negative focus on threat with opportunities. Attention shifts from 
examining only risk items to examining uncertainty in five areas: the variability 
associated with estimates of project parameters, the basis of estimates of project 
parameters, design and logistics, objectives and priorities, and relationships between 
project parties. 
 Cost and schedule models have difficulty when project tasks are more 
interdependent than just finishing one before another can start. These models cannot 
account for the iteration and feedback that often takes place within complex engineering 
projects. System dynamics models describe and explain how project behavior and 
performance are driven by the feedback loops, delays, and nonlinear relationships in 
processes, resources, and management. System dynamics models are based on dynamic 
feedback taken from control theory. They can be used to evaluate the impacts of various 
failure modes or root causes, particularly in cases where the root causes can be identified 
but the ripple effect of their impacts is difficult to estimate with any confidence. System 
dynamics models have been effectively used for project evaluation, planning, and risk 
assessment (Lyneis & Ford, 2007; Rodrigues, 1994; Shang, 2002). Although the use of 
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these models is not standard practice for project planning and risk management, they can 
significantly help to improve understanding of project risks (NRC, 2005). 
2.5.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
 Risk assessment has a long history. Of interest here is the use probabilistic 
scenario-based analysis to examine engineered systems. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were 
among the first methods developed for this purpose in the early 1960's within the 
aerospace industry. By the late 1970's the nuclear power industry was using FTA along 
with Event Trees in what is now called a traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment. 
Today it is also being used in petro-chemical, off-shore oil drilling, and defense 
industries. PRA studies over the past several decade have pioneered the inclusion of new 
analysis tools like human reliability analysis, common-cause-failure analysis, external 
event analysis, software reliability, and consequence modeling. All this activity has led 
Bedford and Cooke to state the “trend in all these areas is for PRA to support tools for 
management decision making, forming the new area of risk management” (Bedford & 
Cooke, 2001). This methodology will actively tie PRA to specific decisions to reduce 
risk. 
 As mentioned in the discussion of risk, Kaplan and Garrick saw PRA as a method 
to answer three questions: What can go wrong? How likely is it? What are the 
consequences? The answer to these questions are what project managers needs to know if 
they are to be successful.  
 PRA is a top-down examination of a system. Apostolakis summarizes the PRA 
process as (Apostolakis, 2004): 
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 A set of undesirable end states (adverse consequences) is defined, e.g., in 
terms of risk to the public, loss of crew, and loss of the system. These answer 
the third question. 
 For each end state, a set of disturbances to normal operation is developed that, 
if uncontained or unmitigated, can lead to the end state. These are called 
initiating events. 
 Event and fault trees or other logic diagrams are employed to identify 
sequences of pivotal events that start with an IE and end at an end state. Thus, 
accident scenarios are generated. These scenarios include hardware failures, 
human errors, fires, and natural phenomena. The dependencies among failures 
of systems and redundant components (common-cause failures) receive 
particular attention. These scenarios answer the first question. 
 The probabilities of these scenarios are evaluated using all available evidence, 
primarily past experience and expert judgment. These probabilities are the 
answer to the second question. 
 The accident scenarios are ranked according to their expected frequency of 
occurrence. 
These 5 steps are graphically shown in Figure 2-5. All the parts fit together to make one 
large cohesive risk representation of the system. This is what the new methodology will 




Source: Smith, C.et.al., ISS Stage 7A PRA.  
Futron Corporation. 1999. 
Figure 2-5. PRA components integrate together to form a cohesive model 
 The methodology draws from this to form analogies to the PRM process. The end 
states are related to the consequences of cost overrun, schedule delay, and performance 
short fall. Initiating events are the risk items. Accident scenarios are the paths that 
connect risk items with end states.  
 A typical representation of risk in PRAs is the use of Farmer Curves or risk 
profiles. These curves plot magnitude of many different consequences against the 
complementary cumulative probability distribution of the scenario. Figure 2-6 shows a 
famous Farmer Curve used to show relative risks of nuclear power plants compared to 
other risks in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (1975). The analyst compares the 
risk of nuclear power plant fatalities with fatal frequencies by air crashes, fires, dam 
failures, explosions, chlorine releases, and air crashes. Kumamoto and Henley further 
explain the figure by stating “Nonnuclear frequencies are normalized by a size of 
population potentially affected by the 100 nuclear power plants; these are not frequencies 
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observed on a worldwide scale. Each profile in the figure is a Farmer curve; horizontal 
and vertical axes generally denote the accident severity and complementary cumulative 
frequency per unit time, respectively.”(Henley & Kumamoto, 1996) 
 
Figure 2-6. Famous PRA Farmer Curves example  
 This allows an analyst to move away from displaying only a single dimension of 
risk, but instead the probability for all possible values of consequence. Currently, PRM 
examines a risk item and assumes a causal link to a consequence. With a PRA view point, 
risk items take many paths to several consequence values. PRA methods consider 
thousands of scenarios that involve multiple failures or events, thus providing an in-depth 
understanding of potential project system failure modes. Such an enormous number of 
possible scenarios is not investigated by PRM traditional methods.  
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 PRA strengths have been well demonstrated. Each of the benefits realized from 
PRAs can be provided to project management. Building scenario models increases the 
probability that complex interactions between events, conditions, systems, and personnel 
will be identified. The scenario graphics, called Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) 
provides an easy to follow flow chart of the analyst’s thought process and assumptions 
while creating a common understanding of the problem, thus facilitating communication 
among various stakeholder groups. 
 Quantification of uncertainty creates a better picture of what the community of 
experts knows or does not know about a particular issue. This gives decision-makers 
another option to research as particular issue that is driving uncertainty before a decision 
is made. Good PM do this instinctively, but it is often difficult to quantitatively define the 
action. 
 Alignment of PRA’s objectives with those of PRM is an ideal fit because it 
formalizes the process of identifying, and analyzing potential outcomes, and determining 
uncertainty. Insights gained by conducting a PRA, and its results are currently missing 
from common PRM practice. 
2.5.3 Decision theory 
 Another branch in the risk assessment story follows along through decision 
analysis (DA), a term coined in 1964 by Howard, but has its roots with the work of 
Ramsey in the mid 1920s and von Neumann & Morganstern in the late 1940s. "Decision 
analysis is no more than a procedure for applying logic" (R. A. Howard, 1989). DA 
systematically examines decisions with tools like decision trees to show alternatives, 
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impacts, and uncertainty of events. Just like PRAs uncertainties are represented through 
probabilities and probability distributions. The decision maker's preferences about risk 
are incorporated with utility functions. These methods have been effectively used in 
many fields, including business planning and marketing, environmental mitigation 
activities, oil exploration, litigation and dispute resolution (Clemen & Reilly, 1999; 
Goodwin, Wright, & Phillips, 2004; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). 
 In decision theory, risk is defined as variation in the distribution of possible 
outcomes, a definition that allows risks of alternatives to be quantified, calculated, 
expressed numerically, and compared (NRC, 2005). Even with uncertainty in possible 
outcomes, PMs are asked to make decisions. Raiffa describes the problem for decision-
makers as “you should scale your subjective feelings about vague but relevant 
uncertainties in terms of judgmental probabilities and you should use these probabilities 
to analyze your problem and to decide which action you out to adopt.” (Raiffa, 1968) 
Decision theory provides many tools and techniques to help sort out the options, and 
since that is exactly the goal of this study, the decision analysis tools will be an integral 
part of the study’s methodology.  
 However, data shows that most project managers do not completely adhere to the 
decision-theory paradigm. They tend to view risk under the following general 
characteristics: (March & Shapira, 1987) 
 Managers typically define risk as their exposure to loss. 
 Managers are more interested in the magnitude of their exposure than 
reducing project risk to a single number.  
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 Managers are more likely to take risky actions when their jobs are threatened 
than when they feel safe.  
Therefore the process must be transparent and constituent losses must be identifiable and 
separable for the project manager to be comfortable. 
2.5.4 Discussion 
 Based on the above summaries, Table 2-3 shows the intersection of frameworks 
with the characteristics required for a PRM risk assessment method. None provide 
coverage in all categories. Many of these methods are quite useful and been proven in 
many projects and assessments. The framework presented herein will use several of the 
techniques and fundamental structures. Where disparate methods are used, integration 
methods are developed. 






















































Project Risk Management        
Cost/Schedule Estimating Methods        
FMEA Methods        
Risk Factor Methods        
Scenario-based Methods        
Bayesian Networks        
System Dynamic Models        
Probabilistic Risk Assessments        
Decision Analysis        





Chapter 3 Integrated Assessment Methodology 
 PRM offers a great many benefits for project management. The ability to 
anticipate potential problems before they occur is an enormous advantage in achieving 
project goals within constraints, but only if actions can be taken to mitigate the impacts. 
Of course, committing resources to eliminate all risk is not feasible and therefore PMs 
must decide how and where to reduce risk. This starts with a need for an analytical 
capability to assess risk, but then moves to a need for analyzing decision alternatives. 
 This methodology is essentially a project risk model. A tool that provides PMs 
with information regarding the amount of risk deviation from an accepted project plan 
and alternatives under their control. The methodology evaluates total project risk, risk 
items decisions, and mitigation strategies. Two separate but similar analysis techniques 
are melded together; PRA and DA. PRA techniques are used to address risk to a system 
when it is perturbed by “events” much as a risk item can perturb a baseline project. DA 
allows the examination of various decisions that must be addressed throughout a project. 
Both detail concerns with uncertainty in the data, modeling, impacts, and dependencies. 
 This chapter builds on brief overviews of PRA and DA presented in Chapter 2 to 
set the foundation for this methodology called Integrated Scenario-based Project 
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Assessment for Risk (ISPAR). Top-level description of the methodology is provided, 
details of which are covered in subsequent chapters. 
3.1 Project As A System 
 Understanding that development of a project and the product together make up a 
system is the foundation of ISPAR. A project system in its basic form is the 
quintessential project management triangle. That construct is insufficient for our 
modeling purposes, so we expand it to focus on broad risk types and their interactions. 
Figure 3-1 shows three sides of the triangle recast to three nodes representing cost, 
schedule, and system performance risk that are linked by resulting “pressure to change”. 
Dotted lines indicate project requirements seeding risks. At project start, these risks are in 
equilibrium and residual risk represented is acceptable to all parties (assuming that all 
risks are known and disclosed). This model is a dynamic system containing pressures to 
move the system out of equilibrium. As risk increases in one area there is pressure to 
compensate by changing one or both of the other areas.  
 This framework extends beyond the development cycle into the operational phase 
(see Figure 3-2). Pressures due to technical performance risk can translate to operational 
performance and the operational cost risk. These frequently show up as design risk 
reduction measures that transfers development problems to operators. One of the enablers 
for this behavior is often a result of not having an integrated model showing how and 
where the risk goes. The operational system risk model is different from the performance 
risk model because of the operational environment, such as maintenance, operating 




Figure 3-1. Project management system represents risk interactions 
 
 





































 Risk items are random events or conditions that threaten to decrease the 
probability of meeting project requirements. Requirements can sometimes include a level 
of system risk deemed acceptable. Impacts can propagate to other risk areas. Responses 
or mitigations to risk items may also affect other risk areas. Therefore, risk items may 
have cumulative effects on the system's equilibrium. For example, Figure 3-3 illustrates a 
risk item whose performance measure will not meet a requirement and will put pressure 
on the project to mitigate the concern. The impact means that more cost is needed to 
devise a technical solution. It would also result in changes to the operational concept of 
operations. Cost in turn may push for other alternatives with less cost impact, but with 
significant delays. At some point the project manager will make a decision that sets the 
system stable, and in the process comes to an optimum choice among competing 
pressures. 
 
Figure 3-3. Risk items propagate through in various paths 
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 From the perspective of a modeling framework (see Figure 3-4), a risk item elicits 
a response from the project system. The pressure to response is described by various 
system models currently in existence in most projects. This framework collects and 
combines the responses to develop an impact on the system as a whole. 
 
Figure 3-4. Risk item propagates through system models 
 Currently, PRM examines a risk item and assumes a causal link to a consequence 
(see Figure 3-5) often using an “if-then” statement to analyze likelihood and consequence 
shown as a location on a risk matrix. Within ISPAR, risk items may take many paths to 
several consequence values, thereby considering several scenarios that involve multiple 
failures, events, or conditions resulting in a risk profile. This provides an in-depth 
understanding of potential project system failure modes. Such an enormous number of 
possible scenarios are not investigated by current PRM methods. By extension, these risk 
profiles can be aggregated across all risk items to produce an understanding of the 
























Figure 3-5. PRM translation to scenario-based models 
 Risk profiles are compared to a project baseline risk profile to determine a risk 
metric. Risk profiles are also combined into a composite profile and also compared to the 
baseline for a measure of total project risk. Various importance measure are computed 
providing insights into the risk criticality of events and model assumptions. 
 These concepts are generic and do not preclude any risk from any kind of project. 
The framework scope is only bounded by the project's reach and level of detail required 
to inform decisions. While it is easier to view this in context of a large project such as a 
government development or construction project, it is just as capable for use in small 
projects that currently employ risk management. 
3.2 Role of Decision Analysis 
 A key aspect of ISPAR is the incorporation of PM decisions. It is through 
decisions that PMs influence outcomes of a project. Decisions are the controls and inputs 
to the process by which PMs steer projects. Often risk mitigation strategies are enacted 
without any risk analysis of these decisions. Resources needed to plan mitigations and 
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then implement them are ignored or assumed to be part of the nominal design cost and, 
more dangerously, independent of other current or future risk activities. Decisions are 
often difficult. Clemen and Reilly discuss the benefits of decision analysis in addressing 
four areas: complexity, uncertainty, multiple objectives, and multiple perspectives 
(Clemen & Reilly, 1999). 
 Decision analysis is a method to bring structure to decisions. Keeney describes 
decision analysis as "a formalization of common sense for decision problems which are 
too complex for informal use of common sense." Since its inception as a discipline in the 
early 1960s, decision analysis has become a useful tool in commerce, industry, 
government, military, and medical applications. 
 Axiomatic foundations were provided by of von Neumann and Morganstern in 
1947, Savage in 1954, and Pratt et al in 1964. This work implied that alternatives are 
chosen based on the likelihood of possible consequences, and the preferences of decision-
makers' for those consequences. From this, probability and expected utility are used to 
include judgments and values in a defensible choice among alternatives. These first steps 
have been expanded upon greatly by many authors, see (Clemen & Reilly, 1999; PC 
Fishburn, 1970; Goodwin & Wright, 2004; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Raiffa, 1968). 
 Decision analysis involves decomposing a problem into a set of smaller 
constituent parts which are then analyzed individually. Decision analysis methods are 
used to put them back together in a consistent logical framework allowing decision 
makers to chose a course of action. This has been referred to by Keeney as the “divide 
and conquer orientation” of decision analysis (Keeney, 1982). This decomposition 
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process is the decision modeling. It takes the form of decision trees to model the structure 
of the problem, probability to represent the uncertainty, and hierarchical trees to show the 
relationships among objectives and preferences. As with PRA models these are both 
graphical and mathematical constructs.  
 Often, decision analysis is only applied to a part of the process. It is not intended 
to make the decision but instead inform based on data and stated preferences. Of course, 
this may conflict with the decision maker’s intuitive feelings and should then be 
investigated. Intuitive judgments may represent only partially formed or inconsistent 
preferences, or the analysis has overlooked some aspect of the problem. The analysis can 
help the decision maker to develop a better understanding so that his preference may 
change towards that recommended by the analysis. 
3.3 Components of Integrated Scenario-Based Assessment for Risk 
 ISPAR is a systematic methodology aimed at investigating how complex projects 
and systems function, interact, and how they could fail. ISPAR models the interaction 
between the system being designed and built with the project processes creating the 
design and building the system. It also examines the interplay among the various aspects 
that projects are measured against, they are (but not limited to) cost, schedule, and 
performance.  
 Through scenario development and system decomposition of potential issues 
management to gains a deeper understanding of the complexities built into the project 
system. The model also allows for the prediction of risk (probabilities and consequences) 
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and associated metrics. Just as the value of PRA is discussed by Modarres, the same can 
be ascribed here: 
The main result of the PRA is not the actual values of the risk computed 
(the so called bottom-line number); rather it is the determination of the 
system elements that substantially contribute to the risk of that system, 
uncertainties associated with such estimates, and effectiveness of various 
risk reduction strategies available. That is, the primary value of a PRA is 
to highlight the system design and operation deficiencies and optimize 
resources that can be invested on improving the design and operation of 
the system. (Modarres, 2006) 
 ISPAR has been purposely designed to mimic an engineering style PRA in 
content for its benefits on many fronts. Components of ISPAR are shown in graphical 
form (see Figure 3-6). This figure is an adaptation from NASA's PRA Practitioner's 
Guidelines with several key additions. First, a box for Consequence Analysis is added to 
emphasize the incorporation of other probabilistic models for endstate attributes. Second, 
a thread of qualitative only analyses exist within this framework that provides results to 
the project without quantification (dotted lines). Third, explicit inclusion of performance 
monitoring after risk mitigations have been implemented feed the data analysis block. 
Inputs to and output from this illustration support the overall RM process as described in 
Chapter 9. One omission, when compared to PRA elements, is the planning and 
familiarization block, because it is assumed that ISPAR exists within a PRM framework 
that already establishes the planning protocols. 
 There is one more rather large difference with modeling a system and a project; a 
project when dealing with risks must make decisions. These decisions are about the 
implementation of various risk mitigation measures or not. This of course is where the 
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DA comes into effect and why it is important to have a hybrid modeling approach of 
scenarios given risk items and the decisions that must / can be made. Decision Analysis 
structures and procedures are imbedded throughout the methodology. 
 The following sections briefly describe the components shown in the figure. 
Again, for RM to be considered a credible assessment tool, it must conform, at a 
minimum, to the standard elements that define today's PRAs and DAs. 
 
Figure 3-6. Components of ISPAR process 
3.3.1 Risk Item Characterization 
 This element assumes that risk items have been identified. Herein, risk items are 
analyzed to determine root causes and assign probabilities of occurrence. Risk items 
having the same effect and response on the project system are grouped together. 





































3.3.2 Scenario and Sequence Development 
 Scenarios are hypothetical sequence of events, constructed for the purpose of 
focusing attention on causal processes and decision points. They are coherent 
descriptions of alternatives images of the future, created from mental maps and models 
reflecting different perspectives on past, present, and future developments. To be credible 
as an analytical tool, scenarios must be internally consisted, plausible and recognizable 
stories (Van Asselt, 2000). 
 An analyst develops scenarios by analyzing how risk items can propagate through 
a project and system leading to adverse consequences. Along the way, various pivotal 
events can occur which either exacerbate that problem or mitigate it. Cause and effect 
relationships among triggering and mitigating events or circumstances are investigated 
along with the impacts of risk mitigating actions that may be taken. Risk sequences are 
determined when decision points are included in the scenarios which can alter the 
trajectory of the risk item. The path through the scenario is probabilistic, fulfilling the 
PRA approach to risk as a set of triplets (scenarios, probabilities, consequences).Within 
PRAs event trees or event sequences diagrams are used. With the addition of decision 
points a hybrid technique called Risk Sequence Diagrams (RSD) are employed. RSDs 
provide a systematic method to view the potential impacts of the risk items and the 
overall response of the project. These are covered in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
3.3.3 Logic Modeling 
 Events in an RSD can and should be decomposed further using methods such as 
fault tree analysis to obtain a credible probability value. In many cases, pivotal events 
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may require equipment to function (hardware and software), people to perform a task, or 
testing to succeed, all of which can be modeled. Sometimes, failure data of these events is 
not available which necessitates methods such as fault trees to be developed. Care must 
be taken to explicitly model dependencies including common cause failures. 
3.3.4 Endstate Analysis 
 Projects currently have models for cost, schedule, and system performance. These 
might be as simple as costs by task, calendar of task, and performance formula. They may 
also be sophisticated probabilistic cost rollups, integrated PERT charts, and PRAs of 
system reliability, availability, and safety. In whatever form, ISPAR integrates existing 
analyses at each endstate combining the results with a utility function. 
3.3.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
 Collecting and analyzing data is critical to supporting the RSD development. This 
element determines both the qualitative and quantitative values depending on its use. The 
best resources for predicting future events are past project experiences and tests. While a 
large encompassing event may have no past relevant experience for a project, smaller 
decomposed event will have more accessible data. Hardware, software and human 
reliability data are inputs to assess performance of triggers and mitigating events. It must 
be recognized, however, that historical data have predictive value only to the extent that 
the conditions under which the data were generated remain applicable. Generally within 
PRAs generic data is collected and statistically analyzed for relevance to the project at 




 Probability distributions may also be generated from expert judgment when 
interviews and results are conducted properly (Clemen & Winkler, 1999; A. Mosleh, 
Bier, & Apostolakis, 1988). 
3.3.6 Quantification and Integration 
 Scenarios and event logic are integrated into a larger model and then quantified to 
determine probabilities of risk items, total risk metrics and associated uncertainties. 
Boolean expressions are derived from the logic models and then "reduced" to the smallest 
combination of basic events called minimal cutsets in processes identical to those used in 
traditional PRAs.  
3.3.7 Uncertainty Analysis 
 Within this context, uncertainties must be communicated to PMs to show impacts 
of analyst's assumptions, variability in parameters, impact of data incompleteness, and 
effect of expert opinion. These are captured as probability distributions, which are then 
propagated through the risk model. Risk metrics can be provided with associated 
uncertainty. 
3.3.8 Importance Ranking 
 Risk items and events are ranked according to their risk significance. These 
importance rankings measure elements with respect to a composite risk measure in 
conjunction with all other elements. 
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3.3.9 Interpretation of Results 
 An analyst must verify that risk models are providing results that make sense in a 
project's context. Interpretation of metrics in combinations with the importance rankings, 
sensitivity analysis, and uncertainty analysis provides a necessary check. Without this 
step, it is easy to take results that contain flaws.   
3.3.10 Updating and Monitoring 
 Obtaining feedback allows the model to improve. With probability distribution 
data in the model, Bayesian updating techniques can be used, making not only 
predictions for the current project better, but also building a repository of information for 
future projects. 
3.4 ISPAR Model 
 The process presented in the previous sections results in an integrated scenario-
based model of a project, see Figure 3-7. Risk items are transformed into RSDs showing 
multiple potential paths to several endstates, decision points required by management, 
and mitigation actions. Pivotal events in the scenarios are supported with probability 
distributions based on data and judgment. Cutsets of the scenarios are input to 
consequence models for cost, schedule, and other technical performance measures which 
in turn are converted into utility values. Endstate probabilities are combined in a 
composite structure of all RSDs. Both utility values and probabilities combine to produce 
risk profiles for each RSD individually and the composite project RSD. When compared 
against the project baseline risk metrics, importance measures, and risk drivers are 
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determined and communicated to project team-members. This comparison is captured in 
a figure of merit called the Composite Project Risk Metric (CPRM). 
 
Figure 3-7. ISPAR model depiction 
 This depiction is intentionally similar to that of a PRA. This structure has proven 
to be very effective as a modeling tool. Necessary interfaces with other team-members 
and organizations are well understood and established in organizations using PRAs. 
3.5 Assumptions 
 This new methodology includes few assumptions apart from those inherited as a 
result of incorporating PRA and DT techniques; they are: 
 Consequence models are accurate representations of the project at a level of 
detail consistent with the risk model 
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 Consequence models are independent of one another. Dependencies can be 
handled with the multi-attribute utility function 
 Project managers will make decisions that maximize expected utility 
 A project baseline is agreed to by the PM and the customer based on shared 







Chapter 4 Risk Scenario Development 
 Central to ISPAR's modeling methodology is the scenario. Scenarios convey 
possible courses of action due to probabilistic events that could unfold. Practitioner’s of 
PRA and DA have their own separate diagramming tools. PRA analysts use Event Trees 
(ET) and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and decision analysts use Decision Trees 
(DT). A hybrid of both called Risk Sequence Diagrams (RSD) is introduced. This chapter 
discusses RSD diagrams and how to create them within a project setting. Several 
examples are given. 
4.1 Scenario Modeling  
 Scenarios are stories about hypothetical series of events constructed for the 
purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points. Scenarios are 
coherent descriptions of alternative images of the future, created from mental maps of 
reflecting various perspectives on past, present, and future developments. They are used 
within risk assessments to broaden views and raise questions about conventional success 
oriented thinking.  
 Modeling risk scenarios begins with a description of the success scenario. This 
scenario can be represented as a trajectory of the system. At each point in this trajectory 
we can ask “What can go wrong here?” The answer to that question is termed an 
 
76 
“initiating event” or in a risk item. Given that a risk item occurs, then, depending on what 
happens next, a set of paths, emerges from that risk item and terminates at an endstate. In 
many engineering systems (a project being no exception) there are “safety” or “backup 
systems” meant to be activated in response to the various events. If backups work as 
intended, consequences are typically insignificant. However, if the event occurs and 
corresponding backup systems fail, there could be serious consequences.  
 Scenarios are useful tools in articulating key considerations, assumptions, and 
constraints. They provide a platform to blend qualitative and quantitative knowledge of 
systems and their interactions. Caution still is needed by analysts to avoid common traps 
of narrowly examining a situation, applying assumptions inconsistently, or not full 
documenting assumptions thereby reducing transparency. 
4.1.1 Event Trees / Event Sequence Diagrams 
 Technical risk analysts formulate scenarios using ETs and ESDs which are 
supported with embedded fault trees. Often the terms ET and ESDs are used 
interchangeably. Here ESD (and therefore RSDs) are flowchart formulations of various 
scenarios under study, while the reference to ETs is to the branching tree structure used to 
facilitate computation of probabilities and risk. Both ETs and ESDs are logically 
equivalent. 
 ETs are inductive logical constructs showing the progression of an initiating event 
through a series of uncertain events, system elements, and procedural steps to end-states 
(consequences). ETs are primary scenario evaluation tools used in PRAs. Analysts have 
used this technique since the early 1980’s, (Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999) to show 
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qualitative scenario representations and to direct quantitative risk computations. 
Experience has shown that ETs provide an excellent visualization of scenarios and 
facilitates communication among analysts, engineers, and managers.  
 An ET is a diagram showing branch points associated with events resulting in a 
tree structure. Each path through the tree is a scenario or event sequence. By convention 
upper branches signify success of the event while lower branches are failures. ET are 
typically shows with binary branches but do not need to be so. The branching nature 
allows for easy probability computations using the "split fractions" progressing along a 
scenario. ESDs are stylized extensions of ETs where the event labels are integral in the 
path much like a flowchart. They are more readable and convey annotated information 
facilitating communication of the scenarios. 
4.1.2 Decision Trees 
 Understanding potential scenarios of what can go wrong is only part of the 
analysis. Exploring the impact of potential mitigation measures (or lack of any) must also 
be accomplished. This provides management with actions to be taken, i.e., decisions. DTs 
model sequential decision problems under uncertainty focused on determining the “best” 
decisions. They graphically describe the decisions to be made, the events that may occur, 
and the outcomes associated with combinations of decisions and events.  
 A decision tree is, like an ET, is an abstraction of a problem. "At each tip of the 
tree there is a consequence that characterizes the full cognitive impact of that position 
point in time and space. The decision maker is called on not only to rank the consequence 
at the tips of the tree, but also to evaluation the strengths of his preferences and his 
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attitudes toward risk in terms of a utility function defined on these consequences. This is 
not an easy task"(Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). Decision theory is often applied to assist 
decision-makers when faced with decisions under uncertainty. Typical DTs show a series 
of stochastic events (chance nodes) and decisions (decision nodes). Expected values (or 
expected utility) is computed and branches with the higher values are chosen as the "best" 
alternative. This framework carries a number of such future decisions forward in a total 
project risk picture. For a discussion of their use and implementation see (Clemen & 
Reilly, 1999; Goodwin & Wright, 2004; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). 
4.1.3 Risk Sequence Diagrams 
 The goal of RSD development is to create as complete a set of scenarios as 
possible representing the paths leading to consequences. RSDs are systematic inductive 
reasoning tool describing potential cause and effect relationships between risk items and 
subsequent events and decisions. They are ordered chronologically depicting success or 
failure of events and decision paths available. A path where no decision is made is always 
shown. 
 Before describing how to create RSDs, a description of the building blocks, 
symbols, conventions are presented. RSDs typically flow from left to right indicating 
chronological progression. Pivotal events typically shows a TRUE response as branching 
to the right and a FALSE response branching down. Decision points typically show NO 
DECISION in the down direction. Although if responses are not binary directions may 
vary. This means that for a simple Risk Item entry, flow is right to left out of Risk Items 
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and down due to a negative pivotal event or no action taken. Table 4-1 shows symbols 
used RSDs. 
Table 4-1. RSD symbols 
RSD Symbol Name Description 
 
Risk Item 
Top level risk item corresponding to the label or title in a risk 
register. Logic of root causes will appear below this symbol. 
 
Basic Event 
A basic event requirement no further development. Level at which 
quantitative data is gathered. 
 
Pivotal Event 
Intermediate event mitigating or exacerbating the path toward a 
consequence. These may be quantified at this level or it may be 
further decomposed. (see Embedded Logic) 
 
Endstate End of the path through the RSD representing a consequence. 
 
Decision Point 
Decision that must be made to choose among alternative path. This 
is not a stochastic branch point. 
 
Mitigation Action 
Actions taken to mitigate a potential consequence. These may be 




A small triangle inside a symbol indicates that the item is further 
decomposed and that the logic exists elsewhere. 
 
Transfer Diagramming is continued elsewhere or logic is replicated.  
 
 A RSD is illustrated in Figure 4-1. The link between the risk item and endstate is 
now a collection of events, conditions, decisions, and mitigations. This RSD will be used 




Figure 4-1. Example risk sequence diagram 
 Risk item descriptions are based on risk register entries. For this example there 
are two potential root causes (RC); either can cause the risk item (RI). Pivotal Event 1 
(PE) is a circumstance that, should it be present, will negate the risk item entirely, 
sending the path to Baseline endstate (ES). If PE1 were not to occur, a decision is 
necessary, Decision Point 1 (DP), either to enact Mitigation Action 1 (MA) or not. If no 
decision is made, the path leads to Endstate 3. Note, this path is equivalent to the original 
risk statement. The decision to implement the mitigation could lead to Endstate 1, if 
successful, or Endstate 2 should the mitigation fail. 
 Root causes can be derived from a number of places. They may potential failures 
of hardware, software, or procedures. They may be endstates from other RSDs. They may 
also be a decision that must be made. Any of the pivotal event or mitigation action boxes 
can be decomposed using fault trees to show details of the events. 
 
81 
 Within PRA, initiating events are organized in a hierarchy called a Master Logic 
Diagram. Fortunately, Risk Registers can also be similarly organized using a risk 
breakdown structure (D. Hillson, 2003). 
 RSDs provide a more robust documentation and communication vehicle than the 
current "if-then" risk statements. Full scope of potential consequences are analyzed and 
simplified causal relationships are not implied between initiating event and endstate. 
They are a departure from ESDs in that decisions are implicitly modeled as part of the 
scenario. While DTs account for both stochastic events and decisions, they do not 
typically address causes of stochastic events. RSD formulation, like PRA ET-FTA, 
allows for the decomposition of events and thereby provides insights into causes that can 
effect risk items and the mitigations concurrently. 
4.2 Dependencies 
 When moving from a system with a risk register to an integrated scenario based 
system, dependencies are emphasized. The dependencies can be described in three broad 
categories: Inter-scenario, Intra-scenario, and Extra-scenario.  
 Inter-scenario dependencies are those contained within a scenario across logic 
segments. Dependencies within a logic structure such as a fault tree are not 
considered since, by their very construct are explicitly defined. Examples 
include: root causes of a risk item or pivotal event may also influence 
subsequent pivotal events and mitigation actions; pivotal events maybe 
dependent on decision outcomes even though not directly downstream of the 
decision point; or initiation of one mitigation action may influence the 
effectiveness of another. 
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 Intra-scenario dependencies are those that across scenarios, meaning that an 
element in one scenario is dependent on the outcome of another scenario or 
element in the other scenario. Examples include: pivotal events in one 
scenario may be shared or be a root cause in another scenario; mitigation 
actions or endstates may be a root cause for another risk item; or mitigation 
actions may be shared among scenarios. 
 Extra-scenarios are the dependencies to elements not contained in a scenario. 
Examples include: PM preferences, time to act, or availability of resources. 
 Formal recognition of common cause failure (CCF) analysis does not exist in the 
PRM as it does for the PRA community (A. Mosleh, Rasmuson, & Marshall, 1998). 
CCFs are those that occur simultaneously or those due to shared causes other than those 
already in logic models. Typically, they defeat redundancy designs however they could 
also be circumstances that cut across all RSDs.  
 By way of illustration, the collapse of American Insurance Group (AIG) in 
December 2008 shows how a common cause risk could appear in project risk models 
(O'Harrow & Dennis, 2008). Over several years AIGs Financial Products group had 
become widely successful based on assessing data daily, recalibrating assumptions 
constantly, counterbalancing one risk against another and making the hedges. The deals 
made by Financial Products were always in balance from a risk perspective. However, all 
the deals written were based on a single foundation, AIG's AAA rating (one of only a 
handful in the world). It was taken for granted that the AAA rating would always be there 
as it always has. Due to many circumstances AIG was downgraded to AA. Under the 
terms of their many contracts, AIG had to keep more capital on hand and pay more in 
monthly payments, but it could not and the entire system fell apart. The analysts had 
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extremely sophisticated risk models finely tuned and working in real time. The common 
cause was not accounted for in any of the risk models.  
4.3 External Events 
 Kumamoto and Henley describe external events as, “characteristic of the 
environment in which the system operates. Such events are considered to be independent 
of any human influence within the boundaries of the system being analyzed, although 
risk-management policy is expected to ensure that adequate defenses are available against 
external events that constitute significant threats to the system” (Kumamoto & Henley, 
1996). Although defined in the context of a technical risk assessment, external events 
can, and do, effect projects.  
 External events have the potential to affect many parts of the system much like 
CCFs. However, unlike CCF the affected items do not need to share locations, duty cycle, 
lot identifiers, or even failure mechanisms. The common assault of an external event may 
affect several components exciting different responses depending on the type of event, 
decision, or component. External events may be represented in risk model in several 
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4.4 Example RSDs 
 Two project risk examples are provided. Case I shows the richness of information 
contained in a RSD when compared to the same risk item originally written in a risk 
register database. Case II illustrates how worst case assumptions in a risk item can lead to 
incorrect conclusions. The example also demonstrates potential dependencies among risk 
items.  
4.4.1 Case I: Engineering Risk 
 A project had started component fabrication prior to entering spacecraft level 
Integration and Testing (I&T)2. A nutation damper experienced a leak in an engineering 
model during a cold soak cycle test. This leak put the reservoir design in question, which 
may require some redesign. Dampers are required to be installed on the spacecraft 
                                                 
2 This example is RI-160 from Project #2 described in Chapter 11 and Appendix B 
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structure prior to beginning I&T. As a result of the failed test, a risk was entered into the 
risk register, see Figure 4-2, about consequences of failing the damper re-test. This is a 
typical technical risk item found in many project risk registers. Risk is classified as 22 
(Green) based on project specific definitions. The consequence of interest is limited to 
schedule impact. Mitigation steps are a required element for this program and are listed.  
 
Risk Item: Damper Leak 
 
If the damper leak is not resolved in a timely manner, then the beginning 
of spacecraft I&T will be delayed. 
 
Risk Level:  Green 
 
Likelihood:  2  
 
Severity:  2  
 
Class:  Schedule  
 
 
Mitigation Strategies:  
 Perform room temperature test. Repeat this test at cold 
 Redesign the piston to increase the amount of compression 
 Re-inspect piston and cylinder to verify a fabrication error is not causing the leak  
 Conduct peer review following testing and redesign  
 Fabricate new piston, assemble damper, repeat testing as described in mitigation step 1.  
 
Figure 4-2. Damper risk register entry  
 The engineer’s thought process for working this risk and potential multiple 
endstates are hidden. It appears from the mitigation that a set of serial steps need to be 
added to the process in order to validate the design. In fact, the process can be an iterative 
one with several potential new tests and redesign efforts. RSD in Figure 4-3 shows these 
scenarios. The RSD also indicates consequences for cost, technical, and schedule. The 
technical parameter in this case is the probability of Loss of Mission (LOM) as computed 




Figure 4-3. Damper risk item RSD 
 Several endstates appear. At this point only qualitative statements about the cost, 
delay, and LOM are presented. ES-1 represents the baseline case for damper passing the 
test. Should the test fail however, results of two failed tests are used to determine the best 
course of action. The engineer analyzed the very small chance that the damper leaks 
cannot be overcome necessitating a system redesign without a damper (ES-5). Neither of 
these possibilities were included in the risk narrative as the scenario was not drawn out 
fully to examine the failure of the next test of a redesigned damper. In the engineer’s 
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the narrative would have dominated the discussion based solely on its consequences and 
taken away from the activities needed for retesting and rebuilding the damper. 
4.4.2 Case II: Potential Dependencies 
 In a recent project review the Quality Assurance lead for a spacecraft 
development project presented the “Top Project Risks”. Number 1 was a risk titled 
“Inexperienced Staff on Console” (see Figure 4-4) which was categorized as “Red” with 
the risk matrix position of 44. Of course this meant that the issue would receive 
significant management “assistance”. The briefer described how staff turnover would 
result in a high likelihood of inexperienced staff sitting on console. Further, 
inexperienced personnel may respond incorrectly to an anomaly thereby ending the 
mission.  
 
Risk Item #1: Inexperienced Staff on Console 
 
Staff transition and functions distribution could result in disruption and 
confusion, reducing the effectiveness and efficiency of the team.  This 
issue is compounded by a complex mission with busy schedule.  
 
Risk Level:  Red 
 
Likelihood:  4 (High): Considerable transitions in key positions. 
 
Severity:  4 (High): Significant reduction. May not meet success 
  criteria. 
 
 
Mitigation Strategies:  
 Plan for knowledge retention as staff transitions and new staff are integrated into mission efforts. 
 
Figure 4-4. Inexperience staff risk item entry 
 The statements about the likelihood of inexperienced staff and what could happen 
with inexperienced staff on console were correct, but the conclusion that it was the major 
risk was not. Using an RSD, it becomes evident that only one of the possible endstate had 
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been explored and that a systematic process to describe the scenarios emanating from an 
initiating event would have led the program to a different conclusion. The RSD (Figure 
4-5 is simplified to show only 2 outcomes and does not include any Decision Points), 
paths to mission failure do indeed exist. However, many pivotal events are required 
before a mission failure is realized. When this RSD is analyzed a very different picture 
emerges. The probability of LOM is only 2% of the risk.  
 
Figure 4-5. RSD shows the complexity of the staffing scenario 
 The risk matrix should only show 2% of the risk in 4x4 position and 98% of the 
risk in another box showing high likelihood and low severity as illustrated in Figure 4-6. 
Discussions about this risk item would have been quite different had the scenario been 




Figure 4-6. Risk allocated to more than one location 
 Let us now expand the example by considering an additional risk, but not 
presented during the meeting (see Figure 4-7). Here diagnostic circuits on a board had 
failed twice intermittently. The circuit is not required to meet mission. Risk Item #2 has 
been deemed “negligible” by a Risk Board. Indeed a RSD analysis confirms this 
conclusion. The mitigation was rejected since repairing the circuit card could possibly 
cause more harm than good. This risk item was closed and accepted as is. However, since 
diagnostics may not be performed as a consequence, the conditional probabilities of Risk 
Item #1 change. The net effect is an increase in the likelihood in the High severity 
category from 2% to 7%. 
 
Risk Item #2: Circuit Board Intermittent Anomaly 
 
Current sensing circuit could fail during flight. The circuit is not used for 
system control or performance, but only for diagnostic purposes. 
 
Risk Level:  Green 
 
Likelihood:  3 
 
Severity:  1  
 
Mitigation Strategies:  
 Repair board. Pull board, remove potting, unsolder and replace parts.  
 Re-qualify board for flight and install. Run regression test on system. 
 









 The net effect of this risk item carries more likelihood in the “Red” risk level than 
Risk Item #1. In combination, the resulting risk is opposite of the original picture shown. 
Imagine tens or hundreds of “Green” risk items being accepted. The assumption of 
independence in this case is shown to be a dangerous one. 
4.5 Benefits of RSDs 
 Risk registers have proved quite useful to many projects. However, they suffer 
from limitations in analyzing inter-dependant risks and information overload as more and 
more risk items get added. Narrative risk statements often too narrowly define the 
potential consequences to a worst-case and only a single attribute. RSDs are design to 
overcome these shortcomings by combining characteristics of ESDs and DTs providing a 
robust graphical language depicting risk as off-nominal scenarios.  
 The process of developing RSDs in and of itself forces analysts to question 
success oriented conventions and pull out details given potential failures in process, 
mitigations, equipment, or software. Endstates are addressed as multi-attribute elements 
of a model which requires all pertinent information to be presented not just a perceived 
worst-case. 
 As a communication vehicle, ESDs and by similarity RSDs, enhance discussions 
among team-members and management and analysts. Focus is drawn away from correct 
wording of a risk statement for striking a balance between not too much and misleading 
information and too little resolution of the problem statement.  
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 Appendix B contains risk item RSDs developed during the execution of a Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory spacecraft project concurrently with its 
existing PRM activities. 
 RSDs are a hybrid of PRA and DA tools incorporating the power as a quantitative 
platform for analyzing root causes, dependencies, decisions, and effects of management's 





Chapter 5 Quantifying Risk Sequence Diagrams 
 Quantifying an RSD is equivalent to quantifying other scenario-based analyses. 
This section examines aspects of RSD quantification and emphasizes differences with 
respect to ESDs, DTs, and current PRM practices. Addressing risk items as one would 
PRA initiating events is consistent with current proven theory. Any variations are 
explained and shown to be valid. Later chapters discuss implementation of analyzing 
several RSDs together. RSDs have been devised to be equivalent to ESDs with one major 
exception; inclusion of decision points within the modeling logic. Details of PRA 
quantification techniques can be found in several texts (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Frank, 
2008; Henley & Kumamoto, 1996; Modarres, 2006; NASA, 2004; NRC, 1983).  
 RSDs are graphical representations of Boolean expressions of risk progression to 
endstates. Once expressions are generated, they are evaluated by logically reducing the 
expressions and quantifying them with probability axioms. Next, endstates are evaluated 
using cutsets to define configuration inputs to various attribute models. Utility functions 
translate these model results to a risk preference values and then combined to create one 
number along with its associated uncertainty. Throughout this chapter, we refer to the 




Figure 5-1. Example RSD 
5.1 Risk Sequence Probability Quantification 
 Quantifying RSDs uses the same techniques as those for evaluating integrated 
event trees - fault tree PRA models; determine the Boolean expressions, logically reduce 
the expressions, and compute the associated probabilities. Suppose for example RSD 
probabilities are assigned as follows: 
 δ  = 0.85 
 E1 = 0.30 
 M1 = 0.15 
 RSDs use a split-fraction approach to decompose the total probability of risk 
items along various branches. First, the non-occurrence of a risk item results the baseline 
endstate denoted as BL. Endstates are quantified by multiplying probabilities (and 
complements) along the scenario. Each path is mutually exclusive and independent. An 




Figure 5-2. RSD translated to pivotal event level event tree 
 Next we "gather the endstates" by summing the probabilities for identical 
endstates. This gives the probability of ending the scenario in any identified endstates. 
Table 5-1shows results for each path using the numerical values given earlier. Notice that 
the decision point is carried through cutsets like all other events and when quantified lead 
to two sets of endstate probabilities. 
Table 5-1. Pivotal event level results 
 Probability 
Endstate "Do Nothing" "Implement" 
BL 0.7490 0.7490 
ES1 -- 0.2132 
ES2 -- 0.0379 
ES3 0.2510 -- 
 
 So far the quantification has taken place only at the RSD level. Each event can be 
further decomposed with logic down to lower level events. 
5.1.1 Pivotal Event Quantification 
 At a top-level evaluation, using probabilities for pivotal events provides a sense 
for which paths and endstates are more likely. However, this masks conditional 
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dependencies which can be uncovered when decomposing the pivotal events into basic 
events. Pivotal events (often referred to as triggers in PRM texts) are assigned a 
probability which are obtained by a logic model such as a fault tree. Cutsets from fault 
trees can be combined with RSD logic to provide a detailed combinatorial evaluation 
leading to various endstates. Sometimes historical data or expert opinion is used to assign 
probabilities.  
 A special form of pivotal events are mitigation actions. These represent a 
collection of events and/or procedural steps that are planned as a remedy for a particular 
risk item. In the example, successful implementation of the mitigation action leads to an 
endstate different from the baseline because mitigation actions brings its own costs, 
schedule impacts, or technical compromise.  
 As with all human endeavors, these mitigations are not 100% perfect. Therefore, 
the question is asked, what happens should a mitigation fail. Failure of a mitigation event 
may carry additional consequences other than not implementing the action. One can 
imagine a case where significant additional resources are expended and still incur the 
unwanted consequence. In such a case the endstate of a failed mitigation action is worse 
than the original endstate. 
 By way of expanding the example, the RSD events (, E1, M1) are represented by 




Figure 5-3. Pivotal event fault trees 
 In addition to the probability assigned to pivotal events, other data elements are 
also assigned. Pivotal events often have cost, time, mass, system reconfiguration, or part 
failure rate changes associated with them. As the scenario unfolds these other attributes 
accumulate or combine based on various consequence models. Cost for example may add 
directly to the project cost but delay may not if a given task is not on the critical path. 
5.1.2 Basic Event Quantification 
 Basic events represent potential failures of equipment, processes, human error, 
test results, or adverse conditions. Basic events signify the modeling resulting from a risk 
narrative decomposition process. They are root causes for risk items or lowest logic 
levels of pivotal event models. Data supporting basic event quantification is from 
historical data and/or expert opinion forming probability distributions.  
 Relevant data sets used to assign probabilities are critical steps in the process. 
Several authors have written extensively on data collection and quantification for use in 
technical risk assessments (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Henley & 
Kumamoto, 1996; A Mosleh & Apostolakis, 1986; Winkler, 1996). Decomposition of 
events within PRM can be similarly quantified. Data can be collected at this level far 
more easily than at the level of the risk narrative.  
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5.1.3 Decision Point Quantification 
 Decision events are treated differently. It is not the intention to predict how 
decisions will be made, and therefore they do not have probabilities assigned to them. 
Instead, they are left as variables without assignments. Decision points act as switches to 
restructure the system response of a model. In the parlance of fault trees they are "house 
gates". The effect is multiple mutually exclusive responses exist within a RSD. In terms 
of cutsets, this translates to some cutsets being ignored while others are not. 
 There may be non-binary decision points where the choice is among 3 or more 
options. Within the drawing of the RSD more than 2 lines emerge from the decision 
event. One way to maintain the functionality of a switching network is to translate this to 
a combination of binary decisions so that the cutsets show a series of binary events. 
 
Figure 5-4. Multiple alternative decision modeling logic 
5.1.4 Sequence Probability 
 Once pivotal events have been decomposed, sequence cutsets are more complex 
and provide more information about the combination of events and conditions that can 
lead to adverse consequences. Boolean reduction of cutsets incorporate impacts of basic 





Figure 5-5. Basic event level event tree 
 Continuing the example, logic for events is used to re-compute sequence 
probabilities. We set the basic event probabilities equal to: 
 a = 0.82 
 b = 0.15 
 c = 0.21 
 d = 0.001 
Endstate probabilities are recalculated. This time the results are quite different (see Table 
5-2) even thought the pivotal event probabilities are the same, reflecting the Boolean 
reduction of the expressions. This is because of dependencies among the events. Event b 
is common to each fault tree as the cutsets show.  
Table 5-2. Basic event level results 
 Probability 
Endstate "Do Nothing" "Implement" 
BL 0.7036 0.7036 
ES1 -- 0.1462 
ES2 -- 0.1501 
ES3 0.2964 -- 
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 No systematic process exists within current PRM practices to discover 
dependencies such as these. Instead, they rely on the memory of the risk facilitator. A 
PRA analyst would be forced to ignore the decision point and run to versions of the 
analysis for the PM. When examined from a decision tree perspective, notice that the 
decision is conditioned on whether event b occurs as depicted in Figure 5-6 (dotted line 
indicated that DP is the same decision). Additionally, the nature of the decision impacts 
changed as well from a decision between two certain choices (ES2 or ES3) to one with 
uncertainty of event d and endstate ES1. Also if neither a or c occur the decision is moot. 
 
Figure 5-6. Example decision tree 
 At this point the probabilities are computed for the RSD but the consequences for 
the sequences are not. The next section examines that step of the process. 
5.2 Endstate Quantification 
 Each endstate represents a potential consequence. More specifically, it is the state 
of project attributes given a specific path or sequence of events and decisions. 
Quantification is accomplished by evaluating cost models, schedule models, and system 
models given the path taken to reach an endstate. Cutsets of paths are used to configure 
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various models as it provides the combination of events and conditions as input. These 
attributes are then combined using a multi-attribute utility function to provide a single 
value to represent the endstate. 
5.2.1 Consequence Analysis 
 ISPAR relies on existing tools and models to determine the specific 
consequences. Tracing paths through the RSD provides a sets of inputs required for 
consequence models. Figure 5-7 shows the inputs as the set of probabilities, sequences, 
and decisions as inputs with the consequence value c as the output. Risk analysts must 
work closely with other disciplines to fully populate the risk model. This is an intentional 
feature in that it forces communication and understanding of potential endstate contexts 
and therefore risk.  
 
Figure 5-7. Consequence outputs from scenarios and decisions inputs 
 For example, examine Sequence #3 from the above example with respect to cost 
only. The sequence identifies that risk item δ occurred, E1 did not, and M1 was 
implemented but failed. Inputs to a cost model would be the costs associated with 
implementing M1 and perhaps repair cost for the cause of δ. The project's cost model 
would return a cost associated with these events and any other dependencies internal to 
the cost model.  
 Diamond shapes represent results of this processing (see Figure 5-8). They 
identify attribute data so that if and when one of the models change attributes or the 
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utility function changes, a new value can be recomputed. Current PRM techniques often 
force analysts and PMs to choose only the worst-case attribute to focus on. With this 
implementation all attribute information is kept and analyzed. Should the PM’s utility 
function focus on a particular attribute, so be it, but it is a traceable and defendable aspect 
of the entire model. 
 
Figure 5-8. RSD endstate depiction 
 For now, a single attribute endstate is assumed for illustrative purposes. Let us 
suppose that the risk analyst provides the cost analyst a set of scenarios from our example 
yielding the following results: 
 BL = 0 
 ES1 = 100 
 ES2 = 125 
 ES3 = 2000 
 At this point endstates are "gathered", meaning that probabilities for identical 
endstates are combined. Since the paths within a RSD are mutually exclusive, the 
probabilities are summed.  
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5.2.2 Single Attribute Utility 
 Using only raw consequence values as the basis for a risk metric would be 
convenient and straight-forward. However, it would be equivalent to computing an 
average consequence. This can lead to intuitively unpalatable decision recommendations 
because it does not account for the PM's tolerance for risk or imbedded preferences. 
Decision analysts solve this problem by using expected utility theory. The application of 
this concept is succinctly characterized in (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993); "If an appropriate 
utility is assigned to each possible consequence and the expected utility of each 
alternative is calculated, then the best course of action is the alternative with the highest 
expected utility." The next step in the endstate evaluation process incorporates utility 
functions. RSDs, once quantified, simplify to decision trees as found in the decision 
analysis literature. As such they conform to their assumptions and constraints. Within the 
field of decision analysis, utility theory is a driving analytic technique for examining 
decisions with uncertainty (Clemen & Reilly, 1999; P. Fishburn, 1989; R. Howard, 1988; 
Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; C Kirkwood, 1992; Raiffa, 1968). 
 Utility functions translate consequences to a unit-less number usually typically 
scaled so that the least preferred level equates to 0 and the most preferred is 1. It is this 
value we use to quantify endstates (see Figure 5-9) so that risk profiles and metrics can be 
computed. How to develop a utility functions for a specific PM is outside the scope of 





Figure 5-9. Utility value output from scenarios and decisions 
 One point to note is that utility exists independent of probability and belongs to an 
individual. Changing the decision-maker or her perspective, i.e. the utility function, can 
change results significantly. The practical implication here is that we can change the 
framework based on who is using it (customer, internal Project Manager, Enterprise 
manager, or vendor) but not the underlying data. 
 PMs are assumed to be risk averse when making project decisions. Although this 
is not strictly true, some studies show that PMs are risk neutral toward low consequence 
decisions and risk averse toward decisions with large consequences (March & Shapira, 
1987). But we use this for simplicity only, there is no theoretical limitation to using any 
valid utility function. Risk aversion assumptions force us to use concave utility functions 
(Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). A convenient utility function used here is an exponential 




where: β is the risk aversion measure and c0 and c1 are the minimum and maximum 
consequence values respectively 
 Continuing with our example, a cost utility function is generated as shown in 
Figure 5-10. A minimum cost increase of $0 is the most preferred and a maximum loss of 
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$2500 is deemed the least preferable. A β value of 0.0008 was chosen. For comparison 
the risk neutral function is shown.  
 
Figure 5-10. Example utility function u(c) 
 Applying this utility function to values from consequence models allows us to 
expand the results as shown in Table 5-3 
Table 5-3. Attribute utility PMF 
   Probability 
Endstate Consequence Attribute Utility* "Do Nothing" "Implement" 
BL $0 1.0000 0.7036 0.7036 
ES1 $100 0.9867 -- 0.1462 
ES2 $125 0.9832 -- 0.1501 
ES3 $2,000 0.3675 0.2964 -- 
* u(c) = 1.16 - 0.16 exp(0.0008 c) 
5.2.3 Multi-Attribute Utility 
 We have so far dealt with endstates as a single value (quantity or utility number), 
however they actually encompass many attributes. Cost, delay, and performance 






















endstate. Multi-attribute utility theory is commonly used by decision analysts to 
aggregate many attributes into a single value (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993). Techniques apply 
the PM's preferences about attributes not particular values of those attributes. So that if a 
PM is more concerned about cost than schedule, this utility function incorporates that 
preference. 
 Cutsets define input parameters for individual attribute models which provide a 
shortfall quantity. Previously defined utility functions, u(c), are applied to each attribute 
individually. A multi-attribute utility function, U[u1(c), …, un(c)] is then applied. Figure 
5-11 shows an illustration of the entire endstate quantification process resulting in a 
single utility number to be used in defining the risk profiles.  
 
Figure 5-11. Utility output from multiple attributes 
 Multi-attribute utility functions can take many forms under various assumptions 
and constraints. For simplicity of showing implementation only, we use the additive form 
which assumes that consequence utility functions are independent. It is fully recognized 
that all attributes are not independent, not even in our simple example. One can easily 
find coupling interactions such as; delays increase cost; mass increases degrade speed; 














































attribute utility function, however, is out of scope of this work. See (Clemen & Reilly, 
1999; Keeney & Raiffa, 1993) for more information about multi-attribute utility 
functions. For now the following function is used: 
, , … ,  
 where: n is the number of attributes 
  ki, are weighting factors constrained by ∑ 1 
 This creates a multidimensional surface representing the PM's utility risk aversion 
for each attribute individually and preferences regard relative importance of each 
attribute. For our example, a PM's preference weighting factors for cost, schedule, and 
reliability are: 
 cost  = 0.3 
 delay  = 0.5 
 reliability  = 0.2 
Combining the results above and other similar analysis for delay and reliability (not 
shown) we get results shown in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4. Endstate Utility PMF 
  Probability 
Endstate Endstate Utility "Do Nothing" "Implement" 
BL 0.9998 0.7036 0.7036 
ES1 0.8222 -- 0.1462 
ES2 0.7477 -- 0.1501 




 This approach can be further augmented (although not explored here) by 
implementing principles from Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to better 
account to PMs' decision making behavior. As long as output is a cohesive set of values 
with respect to endstates, risk profiles can be constructed.  
 PRM typically investigates risk consequences in one axis at a time, be it cost, 
schedule or performance. This not to say that projects are unaware of the other aspects, 
they are. It is typically seen as too hard and complicated. Normal response is to use the 
worst-case consequence type only as risk ranking criteria. This practice leads programs to 
1) get a conservative view of the world since all risk items are treated as their worst-case, 
2) relationships such as cost versus schedule, or schedule versus performance are not 
analyzed for correlations or dependencies, and 3) management's priorities are not 
considered. A better strategy is to analyze and carry all consequences forward to address 
in combination. In other words address this as a multi-attribute decision analysis. 
 Method described here combine consequences at each endstate using a predefined 
utility function specific to each PM. This means that a different PM may have a different 
set of utility functions. Imagine a case where a PM reaches a conclusion about a risk item 
as being not significant. Another manager could look at the very same data and reach a 
different conclusion. Does this indicate a flaw in the system? Not at all. Consider, a risk 
impact of $100,000. For the PM of a $100 million program this consequence is in the 
noise and not significant. However, if this risk is coming from a vendor whose total 
contract is $500,000, it is extremely significant. ISPAR allows the same data to be used 
through the lens of utility functions to arrive at different results reflecting appropriate 




 The inclusion of uncertainty is central to PRAs and DAs. As stated earlier, 
probability distributions are attached to events. The framework structure allows for 
propagation of these distributions by using Monte-Carlo simulations. Several software 
codes are available to perform the analysis in its current state. For instance, the above 
example has been run using Microsoft Excel with Palisades' @Risk add-on. 





"Do Nothing" "Implement" 
5th Mean 95th 5th Mean 95th 
BL 0.9998 0.6775 0.7036 0.7291 0.6775 0.7036 0.7291 
ES1 0.8222 -- -- -- 0.1216 0.1462 0.1712 
ES2 0.7477 -- -- -- 0.1419 0.1501 0.1584 






Chapter 6 Risk Profile and Risk Metric 
 Once quantified, RSDs provide probability and analysis of consequences for a 
given risk item. A figure of merit is needed to distill all this information for use as a basis 
of comparison. With such a metric, insights are possible into a variety of aspects of 
project risk. For example, whether a mitigation is likely to decrease risk and by how 
much; which decision (and associated expenditures) are more likely to reduce risk; or 
deriving a list of elements effecting risk the most.  
 Risk profiles are a natural outcome of RSDs. Much like Kaplan and Garrick 
championed the use of Farmer Curves (consequence versus frequency), ISPAR creates 
risk profiles in the form of exceedance probability curves as a way to describe the risk. 
An exceedance probability curve specifies the probabilities that certain level of loss will 
be exceeded. In our case, loss is utility. These curves are referred to as risk profiles. 
 Risk profiles are compared to a project baseline risk profile to determine a risk 
metric specific for a RSDs. The metric computed based on the shortfall, or area between 




Figure 6-1. Utility risk profiles 
 This chapter discusses risk profile development and shows how risk metrics are 
computed. 
6.1 Risk Profile Function 
 Risk profile are created starting with a set of ordered pairs of probability and 
utility values from a RSD. This probability mass function (PMF) is transformed into a 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) and then a complementary cumulative 
distribution function (CCDFs) which we call the Risk Profile. Risk profiles are plotted on 
two axes each ranging from 0 to 13. More "risky" profiles are lower and left while less 
risky curves are higher and right. Intuitively, the baseline should be the farthest up and 
right. 
                                                 
3 Utility need not be represented on a 0 to 1 scale. ISPAR makes accommodations for any utility function. 
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6.1.1 Construction of a Risk Profile 
 This section addresses the development of risk profiles starting with output of 
RSD quantification procedures. A table of probabilities for each endstate is the input data 
needed. We consider the utility as the random variable with a finite number of distinct 
values, denoted here by xi, with i = 1, 2, … , n. We have a PMF of 
Pr	  
The CDF, F(x), and CCDF, R(x), are given by 
 
1  
 If utility random variables are continuous then R(x) has an integral form 
1 	  
 One of the properties of CCDFs is that its integral is the expected value of the 
underlying distribution. For this application the limits of integration are 0 → 1.  
	  
From this we can show that the shortfall between baseline and RSD (area between the 
curves) is the difference in expected utility. 
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6.1.2 Risk Profiles with Decision points 
 Presence of decision points represents different response mechanisms to an 
initiating event. Since they are not quantified, separate risk profiles emerge for each 
decision option. Only one of response is present at a time. Using data from the previous 
example, F(x) and R(x) are created for both decision cases. A superscript designates the 
decision points activated within the RSD.  
Table 6-1. Utility PMF and CCDF 




0.6206 0.2964 0.7036 0.0000 1.0000 
0.7477 0.0000 0.7036 0.1501 0.8500 
0.8222 0.0000 0.7036 0.1462 0.7036 
0.9998 0.7036 0.0000 0.7036 0.0000 
 
 These curves are plotted in Figure 6-2 to illustrate an improvement as a result of 
implementing mitigation M1 via decision point (DP). Note that a baseline with no 
possibility of shortfall is assumed. Before computing a risk metric, one can visually 
determine a significant improvement. The left plot (solid) is akin to a risk statement and 
the right (dashed) is the same with a mitigation. But unlike a risk statement, these plots 




Figure 6-2. RSD risk curves showing mitigation effects 
6.1.3 Comparison of Risk Profiles 
 A method of comparison is needed for PMs to make informed decisions of the 
differential risks. Comparisons must be made in a consistent manner that addresses not 
only the expected value, but also its variability and PM's preferences. Two questions need 
to be addressed in order to determine a metric for comparison purposes.  
 Is using the area between CCDFs an appropriate, proven, and meaningful 
technique? 
 What is the impact of this comparison when curves cross each other once, 
twice, or more? 
 Research into comparison methods of stochastic models yields a wealth of 
literature from financial, statistics, and decision theory communities. Several methods for 
comparing distributions are currently in use, including; mean, mean-variance, mean-
critical probability, and stochastic dominance. Graves and Ringuest provide a tutorial 



























weaknesses. Among the methods reviewed, stochastic dominance is recommended 
(Graves & Ringuest, 2009). 
 Stochastic dominance (SD) first discussed in the early 1930s, but was not widely 
used until the publication of four separate papers in 1969 and 1970 (Hadar & Russell, 
1969; Hanoch & Levy, 1969; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970; Whitmore, 1970). Since then 
hundreds of papers have been written extending the topic, see (Bawa, 1982; Levy, 1992). 
SD is used to predict a decision, preference or choice between given pairs of uncertain 
alternatives without knowing the utility function of the decision-maker. Its usefulness 
here is to show meaning for the use of the area under a CCDF. 
 Let us focus on second degree stochastic dominance (SSD). This is used when 
first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) does not provide a clear choice, which occurs if 
two CDFs intersect. Given two alternatives A and B, with CDFs FA(x) and FB(x), A is said 
to dominate (less risky) B if 
	 0, 
for all z over x. This applies only under some assumptions about the unknown utility 
function, u(x). Namely, when u(x) increases with x, u'(x) ≥ 0, and also when the decision-
maker is risk averse, u"(x) ≤ 0 for all x. The form of the equation is the area between 
CDFs and Müller and Stoyan have shown that these criteria also hold true for Survival 
Functions (Müller & Stoyan, 2002). 
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 Graphically, we can use area between risk curves to indicate an alternative is 
more risky and another. Numerically, we can integrate the difference between CCDFs as 
a basis for the project risk metric. 
6.1.4 Baseline Risk Profile 
 Project risk baselines are weighted consequence profiles that are used to measure 
risk performance throughout project life cycle. Often they include contingencies to 
accommodate uncertainty of unidentifiable but normally occurring costs, delays, and 
performance variations within a defined scope. This contingency is margin carried by a 
project and agreed to by all parties. Baselines are modified when there is a significant 
approved scope change that has cost and/or schedule implications and consequently 
changes the project's approved project budget. 
 Baselines are used to monitor, compare, and measure project performance 
throughout the life cycle. From our definition, risk is measured against a baseline to 
determine shortfall. In other words, if a project is managing its issues so that there is no 
probability of overrun, delay, or unmet performance requirements, there would be no 
risk. Relaxing this analogy, gives allows for a project that is managed within the limits of 
its cost reserve, schedule slack, and performance goal margin, we would also say that no 
risk has occurred. 
 Creating a baseline profile works the same way as outlined for RSDs. The project 
has an expected cost number ($0 loss) and some probability associated with other loss 
events. Initial cost models will typically provide an "S-curve", CDF, of the cost estimate. 
Margin (also known as management reserve) is calculated as a function of the 
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expectation cost. Similar analyses are done for schedule and performance attributes. 
Same utility functions are applied and the resulting curve is the baseline risk profile, B(x). 
The function is no different than any other risk profile except that it is the basis of 
comparison to determine the project risk metric.  
 Since the baseline can be modified due to contractual changes, so will B(x). This 
means that the project risk metric can change even without a change in risk items. As the 
change in scope is accepted so is the risk associated with the change. As a practical 
matter, configuration control over B(x) needs to be maintained as the project progresses. 
6.2 Project Risk Metric 
 The goal is to develop a figure of merit for project risk that is consistent with our 
definition of project risk (see Chapter 2) and can be applied to show comparative 
differences among risk profiles. The project risk metric (Rm) is a quantified measure of 
shortfall as referenced from the project baseline risk profile.  
 There are few figures of merit used with PRM to communicate risk. Most are 
designed to capture a sense how much risk is present in a single risk item.  
6.2.1 Counts 
 Since PRM does not provide a measure for total risk, PMs use the number of risk 
items to obtain a sense of risk within a project. This of course is not so much a measure 
of risk as it is a "punch list" for how much work is to be done. The number of "red" risk 




6.2.2 Risk Figure of Merit 
 A most common figure of merit representing risk is: 
	  
The idea of multiplying probabilities and consequences is a well-established practice. 
This equation is nearly ubiquitous in PRM guidance documents. What is not well 
communicated however are the limitations of this construct so as not to produce 
misleading risk rankings. Several authors (Conrow, 2003; Cox, 2008; Elmaghraby, 2005; 
Williams, 1996) have written papers demonstrating mathematically and through 
examples how this happens. Many issues revolve around the use of ordinal values instead 
of probabilities. Another is blind faith in average expected value; “Be leery of crossing a 
stream that is only 4 inches deep on average.” Some other metrics have been proposed 
with varying levels of acceptance (Ferguson, 2004). 
 Within a new PRM process called Project Risk Response Planning (P2RP), a 
metric is proposed that addresses deviations from a baseline for cost, schedule, and 
project scope (Seyedhoseini, Noori, & Hatefi, 2009). This index called the Scope 
Expected Deviation (SED) shows weighted ratios of time (T), cost (C), target 
specifications (Q) between success criteria (designated with 0) and the same given a risk 








 where:  (t + q + c) = 1: weighting coefficients for time, quality, and cost 
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This particular approach to defining a metric fits well with the stated risk definition, 
involving the deviation from acceptance. 
6.2.3 Risk Metric Calculation 
 Figure 6-1 shows a conceptual view of Rm. Algebraically, we show this as an 
integration of the difference of two profiles. 
1
	 	  
 where: i is any RSD identifier 
  max is the highest consequence value  
  k is a normalization factor 
Earlier discussions about utility have shown a maximum value to be 1. However, while 
this is a typical practice it is not dictated by theory. Utility could be any finite range that 
is convenient for the analyst. To account for this, we define a normalization constant, k, 
that is the maximum area of interest: 
∙ Pr  
Notice that when the utility function is set to a domain of 0 → 1, k = 1. 
 Using risk curves from our example yields results in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2. Example risk metrics 
Decision Rm 





6.2.4 Rm Characteristics 
 The Rm function must exhibit behavior consist with our expectation of how risk 
increases or decreases under certain cases.  
 Rm = 0 if there is no risk 
 Rm > 0 if a RSD has more risk than the baseline 
 Rm < 0 if a RSD has less risk than the baseline 
For this will examine the following sensitivity cases. 
Identical Risk Profiles: Two identical profiles when the presence of a risk item 
does not change the baseline risk profile. Even though there is some probability 
that the project will incur loss, it is within margins previously agreed. Suppose 
R(x) = B(x) for all x, then B(x) - R(x) = 0 for all x. Integrating yields Rm = 0.  
Risk Profile Larger Than Baseline: Suppose a RSD risk profile is higher and to 
the right of the baseline. This means that for every x, the probability of exceeding 
that value is higher with the RSD profile than the baseline, meaning that its more 
likely to achieve x with the RSD than the baseline. The is the definition of FSD,  
R(x) >FSD B(x). R(x) > B(x) means that B(x) - R(x) < 0 for all x. Integrating this 
function that is always negative yields Rm < 0. 
Risk Profile Smaller Then Baseline: Suppose a RSD baseline is higher and to the 
right of the RSD. This means that for every x, the probability of exceeding that 
value is higher with the baseline profile then the RSD. B(x) > R(x) means that  
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[B(x) - R(x)] > 0 for all x. Integrating this function that is always positive yields  
Rm > 0. 
Intersecting Profiles at Only 1 Point: In this case we examine the situation where 
the risk profiles intersect as shown in Figure 6-3.  
 
Figure 6-3. Intersecting risk profiles 
This case is divided into three sub-cases; equal area on both sides of the 
intersection, area is greater on the high side, area greater on the low side. Let a be 
the intersection point of R(x) and B(x) such that 
 B(x) > R(x); x < a 
 B(x) = R(x); x = a 
 B(x) < R(x); x > a 
 Eq 1 
When the intersection is placed such that the area low and high between the 
curves are equal the risk on either side balance each other for no net change in 
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risk. We can see with the above equation the integrands will be equal magnitude 
but opposite signs. Rm = 0. 
When the intersection is placed such that left side area is greater than the right 
side area, the risk should indicate that the RSD is more risky than the baseline. 
The first term is positive and large in magnitude while the second term is negative 
and small in magnitude. The net result is Rm > 0. When the intersection is placed 
with the right side having the greater area, Rm < 0. These can also be shown true 
if R(x) and B(x) exchange positions in Figure 6-3: Rm = 0, Rm < 0, and Rm > 0 
respectively for the sub-cases. Note these results are consistent with the notion of 
SSD. 
2 or More Intersections: With more intersections, the integral in Eq 1 is split the 
same way as above at each intersection. The sign will be positive where B(x) > 
R(x) and negative where B(x) < R(x). The differences sum across all the areas 
created to determine Rm. 
 Thus far, information from RSDs is transformed into risk profiles using 
probability calculations endstate utility functions. Risk curves can be compared and a 
figure of merit, Rm, has been introduced providing a tangible measure of risk. Chapters 
that follow, extend these concepts to derive a total project metric and importance 





Chapter 7 Composite Project Risk Metric 
 Combining RSDs across an entire project provides a project-level risk profile 
metric to aid project analyses and risk driver rankings. The previous section defined a 
risk metric as the area between a risk profiles. This is incomplete for our purposes in that 
it is only a metric for a risk item and not for the entire project. Combining RSD risk 
profiles if the next step in the ISPAR process. 
7.1 Combining Risk Profiles 
 Within PRAs, total risk is developed by gathering endstates across all the ESDs 
by assuming that initiating events happen one at a time and never concurrently. This 
greatly reduces complexity of the problem. In this application, we cannot assume 
independence. Things can go wrong and mitigations are implemented simultaneously. In 
addition, dependencies exist among root causes, pivotal events, mitigation actions, and 
the basic events that make up these logic models.  
 It is tempting to treat risk profiles as self-contained entities and combine them at 
that level through sampling or some other method4. However, there are two situations 
                                                 
4 One method attempted involved OR-ing cutsets gathered by endstate values, constructing a histogram, 
and then a risk profile. The logic being that each cutset represents a path to a specific endstate and any 
combination of such cutsets would yield a new probability versus consequence curve. 
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that would make such a curve incorrect. First, combining endstates will not necessarily 
yield the same state but instead a very different endstate. Second, cutsets may be 
dependent on events from other RSD that do not show up in the original. Both these cases 
are amplified below. There may be other situations not addressed here. Combining risk 
profiles as entities will not produce an exact solution and so a model for integrating all 
RSDs is necessary. 
 The method for creating the project risk profile is to make a large integrated 
project risk model of RSD basic events in the form of an event tree (with decision 
points). Event trees were chosen here to maintain as much consistency with PRAs as 
possible, recognizing that other modeling techniques could be more efficient and easier to 
incorporate into software. This model is intended to be a tool for risk analysts and not a 
tool to be used by the PM or other team-members that own individual risk items. An 
Event tree allows us to work with logic and examine all paths that could possibly exist. 
7.1.1 Endstate Combination 
 We start with two simple RSDs shown in Figure 7-1. If either α or β occurs then 
the result is consequence (utility) x1; implied is consequence x0 if neither occurs. Assume 
that risk items α and β are independent. Probabilities are computed at the endstates as 
shown using the event tree. Notice however, that should both occur the result could be x1, 




Figure 7-1. Independent RSDs 
 For illustration purposes, suppose that a project is worried about two separate 
tests, α and β. The failure of each would result in a delay of one month, x1. The tests are 
not in the same schedule path so that failure of both still results in a delay of one month. 
By contrast, if both were on the critical path, failure of both tests would result in a delay 
of two months. Even though neither risk showed a potential for a two month slip the 
combination in context of the project schedule makes that a possibility. Attention must be 
paid to the context of paths through an event tree. 
7.1.2 Cutset Combination 
 Cutsets may need to be altered in the presence of other RSDs. Take for instance 
the two following RSDs, Figure 7-2. Upon evaluating RSD-α we get a cutset show that 
the failure of E1 yields on x3 endstate. In fact, the failure of E1 means x3 endstate 
regardless of which risk item occurs (ignoring the endstate combination issue). For RSD-
α, cutset α E1 leads to x1. In the presence of RSD-β however, E1 does not guarantee that 
x1 will be reached. E2 must also be true otherwise the x2 is a possibility. So in order to get 





Figure 7-2. Dependent RSDs 
 The integrated event tree is shown Figure 7-3. Risk items and events are listed 
across the top. The tree structure to the left ensures that all the possible combinations are 
quantified. Each path stops at a labeled endstate corresponding to those shown in the 
figure above. Each endstate also shows the probability expression. The separate tree 
structures to the right of the double line illustrate the cutset reduction process for each 
consequence xi. No ordering of the event tree events was imposed, although it is 
recognized that much efficiency could be gained by the order which they are placed.  
 A comparison of the cutset results from combining them as independent RSDs 
and within an integrated models reveals identical cutsets for endstate x0, x2, and x3. 





Figure 7-3. Integrated Project Risk Model 
 
Table 7-1. Cutset comparison 
 Cutsets 









α E1 E2 
β E1 E2 
α  E1 















































x3: E1 OR E1






 This quick example shows errors created by looking at RSDs independently. As 
more and more RSDs are added during the course of a project, this error becomes larger. 
The example also only addressed the cutsets at a pivotal event level, for completeness the 
same process must be followed at the basic event level. 
 When implemented in a model with many elements, the number of paths 
increases rapidly. To solve this path explosion problem software implementation of 
Binary Decision Diagrams can be used. 
7.1.3 Composite Project Risk Profile 
 As RSDs are created they are incorporated into the integrated risk model. The 
intent is not to show this detail to management, but use it internally to the risk analysts 
workings and preparation. RSD risk profiles are combined to form one composite project 
risk profile (CPRP) as shown in Figure 7-4. 
 
Figure 7-4. Composite Risk Profile 
The key steps of process for creating a total project risk profile are: 
 
128 
Incorporate new information into integrated model: RSDs are continuously 
transferred into the integrated model at the basic event level. New risks are 
encountered and old risks are retired or accepted during a project. It is intended 
that a risk analyst keep this model up to date and provide information back to 
management. Most projects require this risk feedback at periodic management 
meetings already. One can easily envision that as new risks items are entered as 
RSDs, the total project risk profile will change position and shape. The amount of 
change, as measured by Rm, can be tracked and communicated. Other information 
must also be incorporated into the model. These include; decisions already made, 
events already occurred, and consequence model changes. As decisions are made 
or overcome by events (No Decision) the model structure changes as whole 
sections as pathways disappear. In addition, as more information becomes 
available about uncertainty, probabilities will change.  
Remove illogical paths: Since the model takes into account all possible 
combinations as a default, there will be paths that cannot logically exist. This pass 
through helps to reduce the number of paths. More importantly, the credibility of 
the analysis improves if these impossible scenarios are not quantify and 
communicated outside the analysis. 
Evaluate endstates: Endstates must be re-evaluated each time a new RSD enters 
the integrated project risk model. This may require interactions with the owners 
of other models for cost, schedule, and performance. The risk analyst will be able, 
based on the cutsets, what parameters are necessary for re-evaluation of those 
models. All utility functions are then applied. 
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Gather cutsets and reduce: As with any event tree model, a cutset reduction 
process must occur. These new cutset are then gathered for all identical 
consequences. 
Quantify probabilities: With cutset associated with consequences, probabilities 
can be quantified. This will define the project level probability mass function, f(xi) 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Develop the risk profile: At this point the risk profile for the project is developed. 
At this point the profile is treated just like any other risk profile to be compared to a 
project baseline. 
7.2 Composite Project Risk Metric 
 With the risk profile created for the project, the process specified in Chapter 6 is 
used to determine a Composite Project Risk Metric (CPRM). CPRM is a function of the 
RSDs, their risk items, cutsets, basic event probabilities, and decisions which are traced 
through the model. 
 
Figure 7-5. Composite Project Risk Metric 
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 CPRM is a function of all the RSDs in the model. It encompasses a variety of 
potential endstates, combinations of events across RSDs, combination of endstates based 
on scenario-context, and the PM's preference and risk aversion. In essence it is the 
measure of total risk currently incurred by the project. This one measure can now be used 
to trend the overall risk performance throughout the project's life cycle. It will also be the 
bases of various importance measures (discussed later in Chapter 8) to explore relative 
contribution of risk items, events, decisions, preferences, and scenarios. 
 Neither CPRM nor Rm translate to a physical quantity. They are scalar quantities 
that represent a conglomeration of endstates, scenarios, probabilities, consequences, and 
preferences. There is no upper or lower limit to the quantity, but since it is calibrated to 
the accepted project risk baseline, there is meaning to zero. A value of zero means 
equivalency to the baseline.  
7.3 Alternate Approach 
 Two approaches to derive Rm were explored. While not fully vetted the 
alternative approach offers some advantages. The current approach is consistent with how 
decision analysts apply utility theory to each scenario to derive a single number at each 
endstate. Risk profiles created from utility as shown in Figure 7-6 where the utility is 





Figure 7-6. Risk metric is based on gathered utility values 
 An alternate approach applies attribute utility to a set of gathered endstates to 
form separate risk profiles for each attribute and subsequently to a risk metric for each, 
see Figure 7-7. A multi-attribute utility model would combine these attribute risk metrics 
to produce one composite metric. The benefit of this is approach is the separation of 
attributes and separate risk metrics so that management is provided insight into each. 
Importance measures and sensitivity analysis can focus on each. At this point, no further 
work has been done on this approach to see if it is logically and mathematically 
equivalent to the current approach. 
 




























7.4 Quantitative Summary 
 In chapters 4-7 many moving parts to the process were discussed. Before 
proceeding with how to use the metrics, a review is in order. An identified risk item is 
described as a scenario in a RSD. RSD cutsets and endstates are determined and 
quantified using a project's consequence models, PM's preferences, and an organization's 
data repository. Ordered pairs of utility and probability create a PMF that is transformed 
into a CCDF risk profile. Risk profiles are compared to a baseline to compute Rm. 
Multiple RSDs are combined into an integrated risk model which determines the total 
risk profile. The total risk profile is also compared to the baseline to determine CPRM. 
Figure 7-8, illustrates the connections and relationships of various ISPAR elements. 
 





Chapter 8 Importance Measures 
 The ability to rank order project elements with respect to their risk significance is 
one of the most useful aspects of this methodology. It represents one of the major 
improvements over current PRM practices. In PRA parlance, values computed to perform 
rankings are called importance measures (IM).  
 Rm can certainly be used in ranking risk items. However, it provides value only 
when comparing RSDs with respect to other RSDs. It does not provide insights into the 
contribution of individual events or parameters to the total risk. Rm can be decomposed 
easily since all the constituent information exists in the model framework. With a 
database tool a risk analysts could easily answer questions about the percentage of risk 
attributed from any number of factors, such as type of risk items, type of consequences, 
decisions pending in near term versus long term, or dependant on vendors. Taxonomies 
for characterizing elements in the model can be developed to addressed any of these.  
 This chapter examines several importance measures currently used by PRA 
analysts and decision analysts for their use in this framework. There are four layers of 
metrics presented for; project, risk item, event, and decision.  
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8.1 Event Importance Measures 
 PRA analysts have created a set of IMs to evaluate risk contributions of any given 
item in a model. Most applications of importance measures are aimed at providing 
management insight into three broad areas: design or redesign optimization, test and 
maintenance strategy development, and daily configuration control (Van der Borst & 
Schoonakker, 2001). Several risk assessment texts contain detailed explanations and 
derivations of these (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Hoyland & Rausand, 1994; Modarres, 
2006; NASA, 2004; Vesely, Davis, Denning, & Saltos, 1983). These measures can also 
be applied to provide insights for a particular risk item and constituent elements. 
 While these measures can provide significant insight, they can also be misleading 
if applied improperly. Modarres cautions against the non-discriminate use of IMs noting 
that "formal importance measures are context dependent and their meaning varies 
depending on the intended application of the risk results" (Modarres, 2006). Van der 
Borst also stresses this point noting that a particular importance measure is dependent on 
the endstates of interest. 
 Consider a project system made up of n component events and let pi denote the 
probability of success for each event i and let Dj denote the m decision points. We define 
two vectors, for probabilities p = {p1, p2, …, pn} and for decision points D = {D1, D2, …, 
Dm}. Then in accordance with previous chapters, CPRM is a function p of D denoted by 
, 	  
At the RSD level Rm is also a function of probabilities and decisions and can be 
represented similarly.  
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 With the logical construct of event trees and fault trees, cutsets are in the form of 
sum of products for event probabilities. For illustrative purposes, Wall simplifies the 
representation of total risk, R, using a linear equation (Wall & Worledge, 1996). 
 
This equation apportions cutsets based on the event of interest. So aP represents all 
cutsets containing event P. Parameter b represents all other cutsets. This formulation is 
enhanced to show the effect of D on total risk by splitting aP into a term containing 
cutsets (a1P) without D and a term with D (a2PD). 
 
The addition of term a2PD represents those cutsets containing event P and decision point 
D. All other cutsets not containing event P are still represented in b. Since decision points 
are not quantified, a set of IMs will be generated for each event P. If no decision points 
are included in the a1P, the R reduces to the original equation. The next sections apply 
various IMs and shows that they are consistent with their original intent. 
8.1.1 Birnbaum 
 Birnbaum measures a component’s importance by determining the rate of change 





For a given event, a large IMBn means that a small change in an element's probability will 
result in a large change in system risk. A rank ordering of IMBn for the elements tells the 
analyst where risk is sensitive to minor changes. Another useful form of IMBn is the 
magnitude of risk change (Hoyland & Rausand, 1994): 
1 0  
8.1.2 Risk Reduction Worth 
 Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) measures change in risk assuming an event of 
interest is perfect (will not fail). In other words it measures of how much improvement to 
a system can be made by fixing one event. 
0
 
 Since D is either 1 or 0, but yet un-quantified, we will get two RRW values. 
Should D=0, RRW reduces an expected expression. If D=1, all cutsets are treated 
identically to those in the first term, and again RRW reduces to an expected expression. If 
the event of interest is a decision point, we substitute D for P. There is no limitation in 
the model structure to prevent this representation.  
8.1.3 Risk Achievement Worth 
 Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) is the inverse of RRW in that it measures 
improvement possible if no credit is taken for a given component. RAW is the change in 





 Since D is either 1 or 0, but yet un-quantified, we will get two RAW values. 
Should D=0, RAW reduces an expected expression. If D=1, all cutsets are treated 
identically to those in the first term, and again RAW reduces to an expected expression.  
8.1.4 Fussel-Vesely 
 The Fussel-Vesely (FV) IM is a fractional contribution of a component to total 
risk. As before, D is either 1 or 0, but yet un-quantified, we will get two FV values. 
Should D=0, FV reduces an expected expression. If D=1, all cutsets are treated 
identically to those in the first term, and again FV reduces to an expected expression. 
 
If the metric is 0 there is no contribution from event P, if the metric is 1 then all the risk 
involves event P. 
8.1.5 Discussion 
 Since CPRM is a function of basic event probabilities, the above IMs work when 
applied with respect to decision points. Decision points are treated as any other event in 
cutsets even though they are not quantified. CPRM is differentiable with respect to any 
decision point variable and therefore can and does work in this context. However, since 
decision point variables are not quantified IMs yield no numeric answer until they are 
given a value. The example below shows IMs calculated for both decision responses. 
Using the quantification example from Chapter 5, IMs are calculated (see Table 8-1) for 
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both the "Do Nothing" case and the "Implement" case with respect to RSD Rm. 
Computations of these IMs with respect to one event is shown in detail below.  
 The resulting risk profile is a function. When the probability values are not 
quantified the expression for Rm is: 
1.52 10   0.375  0.197	DP 0.075	 DP 0.375 
0.122	DP 0.375 0.197	DP 0.075 DP  
where a, b, c, and d are the event probabilities. DP is the decision variable. When DP = 0, 
the Rm simplifies to: 
1.52 10   0.375 0.375  0.375  
We can get expressions for Rm with a = 0 and a = 1. 
1.52 10   0.375  
1.52 10   0.375  0.375 0.375  
The importance measures equations are used to get equations in terms the remaining 
variables. For example, IMBn is: 
0.375  0.375  
Substituting probability values for b and c yields: 
0.067 
This process continues for the other IMs with DP=0 and DP=1 with respect to variable a. 
All steps are repeated for all the other variables. Notice that the DP point is no different 
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than any other variable in the original Rm equation and can therefore be processed as 
well. 
Table 8-1. Example IMs 
DP=0 a b c d DP 
Bn 0.067 0.311 0.261 0 -0.047 
FV 0.494 0.419 0.494 0.000 0.000 
RRW  1.973 1.721 1.973 1.000 1.000 
RAW 1.108 3.371 2.855 1.000 0.576 
      
DP=1 a b c d DP 
Bn 0.032 0.222 0.124 0.011 -0.047 
FV 0.407 0.519 0.407 0.000 -0.735 
RRW  1.169 2.080 1.685 1.000 0.576 
RAW 1.089 3.942 2.530 1.170 1.000 
 
 Another to way to look at the same information is to examine the rank orders 
based on these numbers. Table 8-2 shows the orderings with and without the mitigation 
action. 
Table 8-2. Example IM rank orders 
Bn  FV  RRW  RAW 
DP=0 DP=1  DP=0 DP=1  DP=0 DP=1  DP=0 DP=1 
b b  a, c b  a, c b  b b 
c c  b a, c  b a, c  c c 
a a  d, DP d  d, DP d  a d 
d d   DP   DP  d a 
DP DP        DP DP 
 
 This section introduced various IMs used in traditional PRAs. It shows that IMs 
can be computed and used within this framework given the presence of decision points 
within the risk function. IMs provide numerical guidance about risk significance of 
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events and conditions within a project. They identify common contributors appearing in 
multiple scenarios and cutsets and when ranked by risk significance they can drive testing 
and resource allocation.  
 IMRAW is useful for estimating risk significant of equipment or process steps 
removed from a project flow while IMRRW is useful for bounding benefits from proposed 
mitigation activities. IMFV provides the fraction of a project’s risk that involves the failure 
of a given event. IMBn represents the maximum spread in project risk when an event 
switches from the condition of perfect functioning to the condition of certain failure. A 
weakness of IMBn means that it completely depends on the model structure and not on an 
event’s probability. However, when examining decisions, this criticism is moot since 
decision points do not carry an inherent probability. They only have meanings in the 
extremes (0 or 1).  
 Modarres cautions against the indiscriminate use of IMs, noting that their 
behavior may be affected by model structure and event probabilities (Modarres, 2006). 
IMs should be used to determine candidates for improvement or watched for trends. 
8.2 Decision Point Importance Measure 
 One way to characterize the importance of a decision is based on the magnitude of 
potential change in CPRM. These decisions are conditioned on the likelihood of having to 
make a decision. Therefore, this importance measure is a function of both. Let R0 and R1 
be expected values of CPRM given the decision D=0 and D=1 respectively and let Pd 
denote the probability from all cutset preceding the decision point D. The change in 




Substituting the definition of IMBn we get: 
∙  
The measure is essentially the risk of the decision point. It contains the elements of 
likelihood and consequence. Since it is normalized to a baseline, all decision points can 
be compared among each other. 
 Let us examine the behavior of this measure. If there is no chance that the 
decision will be reached, Pd = 0, then the decision would not be important, IMD = 0. If on 
the other hand Pd = 1, then the decision importance rests solely of the decision outcomes. 
If there is no difference between decision alternatives, R1 - R0 = 0, then again the decision 
is not important, IMDP = 0. If the difference between decision alterative is large with 
respect to the baseline, then the decision could be important and therefore IMD would be 
large and conversely a small difference could mean little importance.  
 We can also apply this same construct locally to get a sense of resources / 





 Since the IMDP is inherent to a decision point and normalized, values can be 
compared among decision points throughout the project. They can also be compared to 
the same decision point placed in a different place in the scenario. Let us explore this by 
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moving the decision point in the example to before the pivotal event E1 as shown in 
Figure 8-1. 
 
Figure 8-1. Example RSD with changing decision point 
 The cutsets change in response as does the structure of the RSD. When these two 
RSDs are analyzed the decision importance decreases with the move, see Table 8-3. The 
negative sign is an indication that Rm is larger with a "No" decision than an "Implement" 
decision. 
Table 8-3. Example IMD Results 
 IMBn Pd IMDP 
Original -0.0474 0.255 -0.0121 
Moved -0.0080 0.85 -0.0068 
 
8.3 Time Importance 
 Time influences risk assessments in many ways. Exposure times are used to 
determine probabilities of component failure. Risk is often shown changing in time. 
Within projects, time influences the perception of risk. The closer an event or potential 
event is, the more conscious management becomes of its potential consequences. It is 
tempting to infuse time before a decision into importance measures with some 
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justification. However, time is used in ordering only. The decision time horizon may 
increase the perception of risk by a PM, likelihoods, and endstates do not change. Some 
alternative may not be available due to a time constraint, but this is a matter of modeling 
choices no different than alternatives not pursued because they cost too much. 
 When ranking elements based on metrics or IMs, items with same or similar 
values can be ordered secondarily based on time. 
8.4 Uncertainty Importance 
 Importance measures also exist for uncertainty. These metrics determine 
contributions of uncertainty of each element to total system risk uncertainty. The 
approach is similar to IMRAW in that variability is set to zero and compared to base results. 







Chapter 9 Implementation 
 Implementation of ISPAR is consistent with current PRM process and enhances 
information available to support projects decisions. PRM is a well established element of 
large project management efforts. Any hope of incorporating new ideas and frameworks 
requires that they seamlessly fold into existing processes. This chapter discusses areas 
where integration works well and where challenges still exit. 
9.1 Working with Current Practice 
 Management has been biased toward simple (less resource intensive) PRM 
procedures. However identifying threats to meeting objectives and reducing wasted 
resources requires integration with all disciplines throughout a project and careful 
thought about all potential scenarios leading to unwanted endstates. Given historical 
performance of projects, the relatively few resources spent on PRM makes it one of the 
more cost efficient activities management can undertake. Specifically, understanding 
dependencies and uncovering hidden risk can lead to more effective decisions.  
 ISPAR methodology is designed to work in conjunction with current PRM 
process as shown in Figure 9-1. In Chapter 3, steps of this process were described. Notice 
that ISPAR replaces the "risk analysis" block while leaving other process steps intact. 
risk management planning activities are accomplished early in the project in order to 
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secure appropriate level of resources. Risk identification processes used can and should 
continue as currently constituted. Checklists, brainstorming, and other techniques are 
required to determine risk items to be analyzed. Creating risk statements in now 
augmented by RSDs. The nature of risk assessment changes when the quantification 
portion is invoked. However, if only the RSDs are developed without quantification then 
risk assessment remains unchanged. Risk Handling is now treated as an integration 
activity with scenario development as mitigation actions are planned and become part of 
the RSD modeling. Risk monitoring activities (data collection, parameter tracking) feed 
RSD models using Bayesian updating techniques providing a capability to rethink 
upcoming decisions given the latest available information about causes and 
dependencies. 
 
Figure 9-1. ISAPR integration with current PRM practices. 
 A major impact to risk management resources is a need to increase the skill level 
requirements of persons responsible for implementing PRM. No longer can they only be 
















risk scenario modeling, data collection and reduction, integrating consequence models, 
and communicating results and recommendations to management. 
 Risk analysts often hear statements similar to “since data is lacking, a risk 
assessment will tell you nothing.” But this statement misses the point. It is the lack of 
data that leads to higher uncertainty and therefore risk. Risk assessments account for what 
is unknown and what impact that has on a project. The time to perform a risk assessment 
is when a project does not have all data. If all is known then management only has to fix 
problems already gone wrong with no need to worry about potential issues. PRA analysts 
and researchers have developed quantitative and semi-quantitative techniques to handle 
these situations and given that this methodology is based on PRA fundamentals, all these 
techniques can be effectively applied. 
 Projects may be unique, but this does not mean that constituent tasks are unique. 
Products also do not just appear. They are an evolutionary result of many projects and 
research. Data to support risk models can be adapted from the past given that events are 
decomposed to appropriate levels. Granted the application may not be identical, but 
similarity with past project plus the inclusion of uncertainty allows project analysts to 
infer data for the current project. 
9.2 Risk Communication 
 Within a project context, management routinely presents status. Risk management 
is one of the subject areas often presented. One can argue that status meetings are part of 
risk management for organizations. Material presented herein, is not meant to be shared 
outside of the analysts work. So information has to be distilled to a set of meaningful 
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information that provides insight into a project's current and future risk posture. Frank 
summarizes it this way; "The ability to clearly communicate risk issues, methods, and 
results with a high degree of credibility and in a way that is obviously targeted toward the 
overall success of the project becomes at least as important as the analysis itself" (Frank, 
2008).  
9.2.1 Risk Issue Presentation 
 We have shown that creating RSD provides a more robust view of scenarios and 
potential consequences than can be accomplished with a risk statement. Using RSDs as a 
communication vehicle also has carries the same advantages. Recognizing significant 
inertia behind using "if-then" risk statements, it is recommended that RSDs be shown 
together with risk statements. The statement can act as the focus of a PMs concern while 
RSDs show other circumstances at play and what work has occurred regarding 
mitigation, transfer, or acceptance.  
 RSDs provide a traceable, transparent, and documented support for decision 
rationale. All alternatives are laid out in front of management with pointers to all 
associated quantitative data.  
 This format lends itself well to providing status of all aspects of a risk item if so 
desired by a review team. RSDs can act as the basis for so called "burn-down" charts, 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 Appendix B contains RSDs from a current Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory project. Tables show consequence for each endstate. These can be 
qualitative statements or outputs from consequence models. There is also a place to 
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capture a narrative description of the context. Configuration control is maintained with a 
standard title block. 
9.2.2 Risk Metric Presentation 
 Two risk metrics have been previously presented, CPRM for total project risk and 
Rm for risk items. CPRM is a useful measure to track as it embodies influences of all 
identified risk items, basic event data as currently known, and more importantly results of 
decisions. Used as a project level performance measure it can provide indications of a 
project's risk posture. Rm provides a basis of comparison among risk items as it measures 
the deviation from the baseline due to a single risk item. 
 These two metrics and their associated uncertainty distributions can be plotted 
over time. Current PRM practices have no equivalent to CPRM as a measure of total 
project risk and no way to show quantitatively the change in risk due to a single risk item, 
or the uncertainty about that either number. Since these numbers are computed with a 
model based on events and decisions, explanations for changes in CPRM can be easily 
explained. Currently the lack of experience using CPRM means that there is no validation 
about what value constitutes an acceptable risk. However, as more experience is gained 
and mapped to risk items and actual events, this concern will diminish. 
9.2.3 Risk Matrix 
 One of the many reasons why current PRM practices persists in project 
management is the ease of communication with a risk matrix. Earlier we discussed their 
limitations with using it as an analysis tool. As a communication vehicle is works well. 
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So the key is to take this rich set of information and distill it to a presentation that is 
familiar and useful.  
 One way to put risk profiles on a matrix is to plot utility and likelihood as shown 
in Figure 9-2. Two risk items are plotted, black and white. Risk profiles are divided into 
segments of utility with its associated likelihood. How large a circle depends on the 
percentage allocated to that segments. So the black risk item has 95% of its utility within 
segment "1" and 5% in segment "2". Likewise, the white risk item has 5%, 20%, and 
75% in segment "1", "2", and "3" respectfully. This representation keeps a look and feel 
of the risk matrix but indicates the spread within developed scenarios. 
 
Figure 9-2. Enhanced risk matrix 
 However, the better alternative is to show the risk profiles. 
9.2.4 Risk Profile Presentation 
 Even with the computation of CPRM and Rm, there is value in showing risk 




and Rm can be seen in the profiles since they are essentially normalized areas. It is often 
easier to gain a sense of where these metrics are most sensitive. 
 A quick examination of risk profiles with and without mitigation (see Figure 6-2) 
can tell one if the mitigation is likely to reduce risk significantly.  
9.3 Feedback mechanisms 
 PRM feedback mechanisms are avenues to report on progress of mitigation 
activities. They are focused on actions created for mitigating the risk item at hand. The 
assumptions inherent with typical applications are that efforts to close a risk item are 
worth the resources to do so, that mitigations will succeed, and any movement is better 
than doing nothing. This approach is not very efficient when multiple risks are being 
worked simultaneously.  
 Based on the author's observations working in projects with PRM systems and 
with data collected for this study, after mitigation actions are completed, the associated 
risk item is deemed closed. If concerns still exist, another mitigation approach may be 
offered and pursued or more often another risk item is generated in the risk register. Data 
about successful or failed implemented mitigation actions is not captured to feed update 
probability estimates of the remaining risk items. Being a quantitative based approach, 
this framework can and should use this data to update the decomposed event types, i.e., 
basic events. This would not only benefit the current project but would be even more 
useful for the next. 
 A Bayesian updating methodology can easily be structured to support risk 
management systems and consequence models. Each event and mitigation action planned 
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and recorded is fertile ground for a feedback loop. A system whereby data is collected to 
update existing probabilities and models is envisioned. With new data informing 
probabilities, ISPAR can be re-evaluated in time for the PMs monthly management 
briefings. With model runs occurring on a continuing basis, trends in risk performance 
can start to track mitigation successes and decision effectiveness. 
9.4 Risk "Burn-down" Charts 
 A risk burn-down is a graphically representation of how risk is expected to 
decrease over time mitigation actions are implemented. Figure 9-3 illustrates a typical 
chart. The heavy line represents a plan considering mitigation steps and the layers 
represent priority zones found on a risk matrix. The idea is that a risk item will gradually 
move through a risk matrix from "High" to "Low". Notice here that risk level is 
combination of severity and likelihood. Often this combination is PC, which is a flawed 
construct when dealing with ordinal scales. This representation suffers from the same 
limitations as a risk matrix, but perhaps more so since future actions planned are not 
analyzed for potential problems and therefore alternative scenarios are not considered.  
 
Figure 9-3. Risk burn-down chart 
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 As actual events occur (mitigation actions or other), they are superimposed on this 
chart. The problem is that an event or step in a procedure does not relate to a score for 
risk reduction. An analyst is left to estimate the risk improvement with no basis. 
 Consider now a similar circumstance using ISPAR. We start with a RSD similar 
to examples used previous, see Figure 9-4. Notice, the mitigation action is now 
represented by 5 separate events (tasks). Failure of any one of them is a failure of the 
mitigation action. Next to the RSD is the "burn-down" chart of a risk reduction plan 
shown at Rm versus time. At t = 5, the mitigation will start, and for each subsequent time 
period a task will be accomplished. Rm values are recomputed with the planned 
completion of each task. This is done be setting the task probability to 1, meaning that 
once completed a task cannot fail to be completed. At this point the project has fully 
implemented to protection against an initiating event. Rm is not 0 since resources have 
been spent. 
 














 At t = 3 however, the initiating event occurs (set to fail within the model). 
Following this event, the decision made to begin implementing mitigation tasks. By t = 5, 
the PM is showing chart Figure 9-5. The RSD indicates which events have occurred and 
the "burn-down" chart shows the corresponding change in Rm. Rm rose after the initiating 
occurred and dropped when the first task was accomplished. The PM is able show risk 
posture and reasons for changes. Also note that with a decision to implement tasking, an 
endstate is no longer reachable and so indicated with dotted lines on the RSD. 
 
Figure 9-5. Burn-down chart, intermediate 
 At t = 6, tasking is completed under an accelerated pace rendering another 
endstate unreachable. Rm is lower. At t = 15, the occurrence of the initiating events is no 
















Figure 9-6. Burn-down chart, final 
 By tracking Rm on a periodic basis management can actively monitor project risk 
with respect to various events and activities. As we showed paths disappearing with time, 
other paths could just as easily appear given more information. 
9.5 Residual risk 
 Even after mitigation actions have been implement, risk is still likely to exist, this 
is called residual risk. Current PRM practice is to disposition risk item in one of two 
methods: 
Closed – a risk that will no longer be actively mitigated or handled. These are risk 
items that have been reduced to a level where the residual risk is considered 
negligible and further risk reduction activity is deemed unnecessary. Closure 
rationale is typically required before closure approved is granted.  
Accepted – accepted risks have residual risk but continued efforts to prevent or 
mitigate are not deemed practical. Accepted risks will be reviewed periodically to 















Residual risk is obviously still present for Open risk item as well. 
 Residual risk is rarely quantified. There are two reasons for this 1) there is no 
mechanism to compute and combine residual risk, and 2) residual risk is typically 
deemed negligible and therefore ignored. A concern arises when cumulative risk of 
hundreds of dispositioned risk items could be quite large. ISPAR computes residual risk 





Chapter 10 Fire Suppression System Example Project 
 Fire Suppression System (FSS) is a fabricated test platform used to illustrate the 
ISPAR methodology. It is based on a PRA example for a fire suppression system in 
(Modarres, 2006), and has been expanded to include the project design, installation and 
operations.  
 Risk items are identified and characterized using current Project Risk 
Management practices and also analyzed using this new method to show the advantages 
in the insight and amount of risk information that can be used by the management team. 
This is not meant to show optimum solutions of these particular management issues, but 
only to exercise the methodology. In fact, the type of contracts, incentives, and insurance 
provisions for sharing risk among parties would most likely have been put in place. 
10.1 Project Description 
 The project is presented as a system with programmatic and technical 
descriptions. Programmatic environment and assumptions are presented along with 
descriptions of the baseline consequence models. Project descriptions include the system 
hardware and operational scenarios. 
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10.1.1 Programmatic Description 
 A fire suppression system is being acquired to extinguish all possible fires in a 
plant with toxic chemicals. This system must be installed before the unit is allowed to 
operate. Data provided by the insurance company estimates loss following levels of; 
minor damage ($1 Million), major damage ($92 Million), and catastrophic ($210 
Million). 
 A company has been contracted to design and install the system. This contract is 
for $325,000 and a delivery date 24 weeks from contract award. The contractor's PM has 
been told by his management that his priorities are cost first, then schedule, and then 
performance of the system. The PM is under pressure to bring in cost and schedule on 
plan. He is generally cautious about making decisions that have large impacts to the 
company. With these considerations, utility function parameters are given in Table 10-1 
for use with preference utility and multi-attribute utility equations presented in Chapter 6. 
Same assumptions about the independence of preference to each other are used here for 
simplicity. 





Cost 0.08 0.55 
Delay 0.2 0.25 
Pr Loss 510-5 0.20 
 
 Risk items and quantification are first developed from a viewpoint of the 
contractor PM. Later the same data will be evaluated from the plant management 
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perspective where the preferences are quite different. The plant management is extremely 
sensitive to schedule, then the performance of the system, while cost is nearly irrelevant. 
This discrepancy is because the plant's pressure is to get the unit in service producing 
revenue as soon as possible. The revenues generated dwarf the cost of this improvement. 
10.1.2 System Description 
 Due to the unique nature of the chemicals, a special new technology sensor is 
required for operation in one location in the plant. This sensor will interface with an 
existing Detector / Alarm / Actuator (DAA) design. A third party vendor is developing 
the proprietary sensor based on experience designing and producing similar sensors. 
 FSS system design is shown in Figure 10-1, consisting of two physically 
independent water extinguishing nozzles designed such that each is capable of controlling 
all types of fires in the plant. Extinguishing nozzle 1 is the primary method of injection. 
Upon receiving a signal from the DAA device, pump 1 starts automatically, drawing 
water from the reservoir tank and injecting it into the fire area in the plant. If the second 
path is not available, the operators will call for help from the local fire department, 
although the DAA also sends a signal direction to the fire department. However, due to 
the delay in the arrival of the local fire department, the magnitude of damage would be 
higher than it would be if the local fire extinguishing nozzles were available to extinguish 
the fire.  
 Under all conditions, if the normal off-site power is not available due to the fire or 
other reasons, a local diesel generator, which is normally on standby, would provide 
electric power to the pumps. The power to the DAA is provided through batteries, which 
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are constantly charged by the off-site power. Even if the AC power is not available, the 
DC power provided through the battery is expected to be available at all times.  
 Manual valves on the two sides of pumps 1 and 2 are normally open, and only 
remain closed when they are being repaired. The entire fire system and the generator are 
located outside of the main chemical reactor compartment, and the therefore not affected 
by an internal fire.  
 
Figure 10-1. Example Fire Suppression System 
10.1.3 Consequence Models 
 A contractor schedule and cost estimates have been approved by both parties as 
part of contract negotiations. Estimates are derived using the following models; a cost 
estimate based on a WBS roll-up, a CPM/PERT schedule, and a system PRA to 
determine expected loss. All have been set up as probabilistic models with Monte-Carlo 
simulations in Microsoft Excel with Palisades @Risk add-on. Simple triangle probability 
distributions are associated with each data element in the following consequence models. 
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 The project schedule is shown in Figure 10-2. The simplified spreadsheet 
implements this PERT/CPM using standard equations to compute the critical path 
(Stewart, 1991). Solid bars in the schedule indicate that the task is on the critical path 
while the others are not. A Monte-Carlo simulation results in the probability of 
exceedance curve in Figure 10-3, with a mean of 24 weeks. This defines the schedule 
baseline. 
 This model is used to evaluate potential delays at a task level to produce the 
amount of delay of the final delivery date.  
 
Figure 10-2. FSS milestone schedule 
Project Duration 24.17
Description Durn ES Durn
Select Contractor Critical 1.3 0 0
Deliver Building Plans Critical 1.3 1.266667 0
Develop System Layout Critical 4.1 2.533333 0
Design/Build/Test new DAA 8.3 1.266667 8.333333
PDR Critical 0.2 6.6 0
Finish detailed design Critical 4.1 6.8 0
CDR Critical 0.2 10.86667 0
Build-up Sub Assemblies Critical 4.2 11.06667 0
Install Piping Critical 3.5 15.23333 0
Install Fixtures 2.1 15.23333 2.1
Inspection Critical 1.1 18.73333 0
Install Electrical Components 2.1 15.23333 2.133333
Inspection 1.1 18.73333 1.133333
Charge System Critical 0.6 19.86667 0
Pressure Test Critical 0.8 20.5 0
Electrical Test Critical 0.8 20.5 0
Communication Test 0.8 19.86667 0.8
Review Test Results Critical 1.0 21.3 0
QA Audit of Calibrations Critical 0.6 22.3 0
Obtain County Approvals Critical 1.2 22.93333 0





Figure 10-3. FSS estimated duration 
 
 A cost model based on a Work Breakdown Structure was employed to determine 
a cost estimate. The WBS and costs for each element is shown in Table 10-2 resulting in 
a spend plan shown in Figure 10-4. An estimate of just under $325K is produced along 
with its probability of exeedance distribution, see Figure 10-5. 
 
 





































Table 10-2. FSS cost consequence model 
Code WBS Item Wk4 Wk8 W12 W16 W20 W24 Total 
1 Project Management 1 1 1 1 1 2 7.12 
2 System Engineering 3 3 2 1 1 4 14.23 
3 Fire Protection System        
3.1 Electrical        
3.1.1 Detector / Alarm / Actuator Device 50  25  25  101.67 
3.1.2 System Wire Harness  1 3 3 2  9.15 
3.1.3 Communication Hookup    0.5 1  1.53 
3.1.4 Power Hookup    1 3  4.07 
3.2 Mechanical        
3.2.1 Piping   5 5 5  15.25 
3.2.2 Pumps    2 15  17.28 
3.2.3 Valves   1 5   6.10 
3.2.4 Injection Nozzles    2 10  12.20 
3.2.5 Diesel Generator   75 5   81.33 
4 System Support        
4.1 Construction Equipment   2.5 5 5 5 17.79 
4.2 Logistic Support  1 1 1 1 1 5.08 
4.3 Transportation   2 2 2 2 8.13 
5 System Test & Inspection        
5.1 Test Equipment      4 4.07 
5.2 Test & Inspection Coordination      6 6.10 
6 Operational Support        
6.1 Spares      8 8.13 
6.2 Training      5 5.08 
 Monthly Totals 54 6 118 34 71 37 324 
 
 





















 The system model is a PRA consisting of one ESD shown in Figure 10-6, fault 
trees of each pivotal event, basic event probability data (Modarres, 2006). All endstate 
probabilities are conditioned given a fire in the unit. Table 10-3 lists all cutsets for the 
endstates as generated by SAPHIRE5. The single figure of merit is an expectation of loss 
given the loss profile in Table 10-4. The baseline is $896 with a probability of 
exceedance curve in Figure 10-7. 
 
Figure 10-6. FSS system ESD 
 The preceding baseline consequence models are combined to produce the baseline 
risk profile in Figure 10-8 which yields a baseline Rm or 0.9738. All of these models are 
produced in projects as a matter of normal best practices. Even if a simulation is not run 
against the models, analyst's opinion about the estimate variances can be elicited to 
produce similar curves and input for the risk baselining process. 
 
                                                 
5 SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations) is a probabilistic 
risk and reliability assessment software tool developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
by the Idaho National Laboratory. 
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Table 10-3. FSS PRA cutsets 
Catastrophic Endstate Cutsets  Major Endstate Cutsets 
Frequency per Year Events  Frequency per Year Events 
1.789E-010 LFD,  PUMPCCF  1.278E-006 PUMPCCF 
7.100E-011 DAA,  OP2  2.300E-007 P1,  P2 
3.221E-011 LFD,  P1,  P2  1.278E-007 OP1,  P1 
1.789E-011 LFD,  OP1,  P1  7.100E-008 DAA 
9.940E-012 DAA,  LFD  5.368E-008 P2,  V11 
7.515E-012 LFD,  P2,  V12  5.368E-008 P2,  V12 
7.515E-012 LFD,  P2,  V11  5.368E-008 P1,  V22 
7.515E-012 LFD,  P1,  V21  5.368E-008 P1,  V21 
7.515E-012 LFD,  P1,  V22  2.982E-008 OP1,  V11 
4.175E-012 LFD,  OP1,  V12  2.982E-008 OP1,  V12 
4.175E-012 LFD,  OP1,  V11  1.252E-008 V12,  V22 
1.753E-012 LFD,  V12,  V21  1.252E-008 V11,  V22 
1.753E-012 LFD,  V11,  V21  1.252E-008 V12,  V21 
1.753E-012 LFD,  V12,  V22  1.252E-008 V11,  V21 
1.753E-012 LFD,  V11,  V22  7.100E-009 TANK 
9.940E-013 LFD,  TANK  4.295E-009 DG,  OSP 
6.014E-013 DG,  LFD,  OSP  1.278E-010 N2,  P1 
1.789E-014 LFD,  N2,  P1  1.278E-010 N1,  P2 
1.789E-014 LFD,  N1,  P2  7.100E-011 N1,  OP1 
9.940E-015 LFD,  N1,  OP1  2.982E-011 N2,  V11 
4.175E-015 LFD,  N2,  V12  2.982E-011 N2,  V12 
4.175E-015 LFD,  N2,  V11  2.982E-011 N1,  V22 
4.175E-015 LFD,  N1,  V21  2.982E-011 N1,  V21 
4.175E-015 LFD,  N1,  V22  7.100E-014 N1,  N2 
 
Table 10-4. FSS probability of loss 
Endstate Loss ($) Pr 
Minor 1,000,000 7.0810-4 
Major 92,000,000 2.0410-6 





Figure 10-7. FSS expected loss 
 
 
Figure 10-8. FSS baseline risk profile 
 
10.2 Project Risk Management Using Current PRM Approaches 
 Normal procedures produced five identified risk items listed Table 10-5 that 
threaten successful completion of the project. Likelihood and consequence assignments 







































values similar to those shown in Chapter 2. A risk matrix, Figure 10-9, determines 
priority levels for risk reduction. 
Table 10-5. FSS risk register 
# Risk Mitigation Type L C 
1 
If sensor head cannot be built to match 
specific chemical signature, then the DAA will 
not be effective. 
Use standard sensor head Technical 1 5 
2 
If cost of materials continues to rise, then the 
project reserve will be eroded. 
Purchase before design is 
approved 
Cost 4 4 
3 
If site prep discovers an old chemical spill, the 
project will be delayed. 
Move DG inside Schedule 2 2 
4 
Industry alert concerning nozzle types 
potentially defective 
None, use nozzles as is Technical 1 3 
5 
If the new inspector (unfamiliar with plant 
specifics) does not approve of the previous 
informal agreements with past inspectors, then 
the project will slip. 
Include inspector in 
design process 
Schedule 3 1 
 
 
Figure 10-9. FSS risk matrix 
 Risk item #1 is based on technical information from the DAA vendor. Risk item 
#2 is written as a threat to cost with a consequence of $10k and supplier information 









Risk items #2 and #1 get the most attention. Risk items 3-5 are deemed negligible and are 
essentially ignored. 
 Mitigation action plans developed for Risk Items #1 and #2 would be developed 
and implemented. Status of each risk item would be discussed at weekly/monthly reviews 
with management to show how these risks are under control. 
10.3 Project Risk Management Using ISPAR Approach 
 This section uses risk information presented in the previous section and applies 
the ISPAR methodology as described in Chapters 3 - 8. RSDs are created for each of the 
five risk items. For simplification the analysis is performed at the pivotal event level. For 
each risk item risk profiles and risk metrics are shown with and without mitigation 
actions. A total project CPRM and risk profile are also presented. Risk item, event, and 
decisions are rankings using various importance measures. 
 A note of quantitative convention, the Rm values are small so for readability they 
have all been multiplied by 106. 
10.3.1 Risk Item Analysis 
 The following are descriptions of each risk item presented in the risk register. It is 
envisioned that the same identification procedures would be used to identify the risk 
items. So the point of departure between PRM and ISPAR would be the analysis of the 




Risk Item #1: Sensor Head Design 
 Risk item 1 is a concern about of the sensor head performance which can be either 
a manufacturing issue or a design flaw. The vendor does have in place a prototype test 
that catches 95% of all problems. A software change is an option costing $25K. The 
estimated 2-week delay of DAA will not affect the critical path. The engineers estimate 
the DAA failure rate will increase 25%, only 80% of potential issues can be addressed. 








EV[ Loss ] 
($) 
Utility 
1-1 0 0 896 0.9738 
1-2 25 0 898 0.9726 
1-3 25 0 954 0.9709 
1-4 0 0 1537 0.9543 
Figure 10-10. FSS risk item #1 RSD 
 Quantifying the RSD yields risk profiles for RI#1 with no mitigation and with 
mitigation as a result of decision point 1shown in Figure 10-11. Recall that up and right is 
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better than down and left. One can easily see that implementing the mitigation will 
improve the situation. A result that should be intuitive, but now the amount of 
improvement is tangible, especially when examining Rm for each which yields an 
improvement from 2938 to 440 (smaller is better). 
 
Figure 10-11. FSS risk item #1 risk profile 
 
Risk Item #2: Cost Escalation 
 Information from suppliers and vendors indicate a 75% chance that costs will 
escalate by $10k across the board. Ordering material early runs the risk that the design 
will change and therefore $5k and 2 weeks will be lost. Historically a change in a design 
is an in-frequent event. However, risk items #1 and #3 have design changes as potential 

































EV[ Loss ] 
($) 
Utility 
2-1 0 0 896 0.9738 
2-2 5 2 896 0.9734 
2-3 10 0 896 0.9763 
Figure 10-12. FSS risk item #2 RSD 
 This risk is ranked as the only high risk on the risk matrix, due mostly to an over-
reaction by the PM about his number one priority. The risk metric indicates that this is a 
much less significant risk than RI#1.  
 
Figure 10-13. FSS risk item #2 risk profile 
 
Risk Item #3: Chemical Spill Site 
 This initiator is a remote event, but the potential consequence could be large if a 


























where the diesel generator is slated to reside. The alternatives would be to move the 
diesel generator inside or remove it from the design until a later date. Should these two 








EV[ Loss ] 
($) 
Utility 
3-1 0 0 896 0.9738 
3-2 5 0 896 0.9737 
3-3 6 1 903 0.9733 
3-4 50 10 896 0.9599 
3-5 1 0 903 0.9736 
Figure 10-14. FSS risk item #3 RSD 
 The risk profiles show that either alternative will decrease risk and that there is no 




Figure 10-15. FSS risk item #3 risk profile 
 
Risk Item #4: Injection Nozzle Defect 
 No mitigation is possible for a potential defect in the nozzles. The project must 
rely on a series of tests already scheduled. This type of defect is a latent failure that could 
remain until the system is called upon. The result here is a significant increase in the PRA 







EV[ Loss ] 
($) 
Utility 
4-1 0 0 896 0.9738 
4-2 0 0 4954 0.8393 












































 Analysis shows the risk level to be quite high relative to the other risk items. 
 
Figure 10-17. FSS risk item #4 risk profile 
 
Risk Item #5: New County Inspector 
 There is always a chance that a new inspector unfamiliar with this plant would be 
assigned to the project. History shows that these inspectors are much more cautious and 
will not approve the design until a successful system test. However, if the inspector is 
part of the process early the likelihood improves. The system test event is the same event 






























EV[ Loss ] 
($) 
Utility 
5-1 0 0 896 0.9738 
5-2 10 4 896 0.9728 
Figure 10-18. FSS risk item #5 RSD 
 
 


























10.3.2 Risk Profiles 
 Some insights can be obtained by having all the risk profiles provided to the PM 
as shown in Figure 10-20. This graphical presentation shows RI#1 to be the largest threat 
while RI#2 and RI#5 have little significance. RI#3 and RI#4, thought to be negligible are 
indeed contributors. Other observations are that RI#1 has a large variation in the 
probability while the variation in RI#4 comes from consequences.  
 
Figure 10-20. FSS risk profiles for all risk items 
 These profiles are combined to form a composite profile in Figure 10-21 and used 
to calculate CPRM. Notice that CPRM (4201) is not the sum of Rm (3997). That is 



























Figure 10-21. FSS composite risk profile 
10.3.3 Risk Metrics 
 Each risk item has a Rm signifying its inherent risk if nothing is done to mitigate 
it. Notice that the priority ranking is different than that of the risk matrix. This difference 
is not just an artifact of this case study, but an example of how a scenario can provide 
insight to risk items.  








1 2938 440 2261 
2 171 58 3908 
3 278 
D32=0;  8 
D32=1;  3 
3735 
3729 
4 573 573 4201 
5 37 13 4162 
 
 Since, the basic events are populated with probability distributions (arbitrarily 
assigned triangular distributions), we also get distributions for Rm and CPRM. Monte-
























output has been fit to a normal distribution with parameters μ = 4159 and σ = 5561. 
Recall that a risk metric is compared to a baseline, so we read this as the project having 
77.5% chance of incurring a shortfall. If the PM implements all the mitigations, this 
number falls to 57.6%.  
 
Figure 10-22. FSS CPRM distribution 
 This uncertainty is based on the variability in event probabilities only. We can 
extend the analysis by incorporating uncertainty in consequence models and by treating 
the baseline as uncertain. A latter case would be a comparison of overlapping 
distributions. This analytical capability shows the impact of assumptions on the total risk 
picture. It would allow for other types of alternatives to be considered, such as testing to 
reduce uncertainty. It also sets the stage nicely for data collection and monitoring 
feedback mechanisms to influence results through Bayesian updating. 
10.3.4 Importance Measures 
 The previous section presented metrics by which the risk items could be ranked. 




ordered and prioritized. From the importance measures in Table 10-7 and Table 10-8 the 
following priorities are established: 
 Manufacturing defect in the new sensor head design  
 Decision D11 
 System test 
 all three nozzle events (tied) 
 
Table 10-7. FSS importance measures 
 0 1 Bn RRW RAW FV 
Sensor manufacturing issue 20751 1280 19471 3.2820 4.9395 0.00078 
Sensor Design flaw 5013 4185 828 1.0038 1.1933 0.00024 
Test condition 4516 4185 331 1.0038 1.0750 0.00024 
Software change 4201 4201 0 1.0000 1.0000 0.00024 
Cost of material increase 4323 3824 499 1.0986 1.0290 0.00026 
Design change after order 4201 4201 0 1.0000 1.0000 0.00024 
Clean-up 8480 3726 4754 1.1275 2.0186 0.00027 
Clean-up on schedule 6103 3726 2377 1.1275 1.4527 0.00027 
Floor reinforcement 4201 4201 0 1.0000 1.0000 0.00024 
Electrical redesign 4201 4201 0 1.0000 1.0000 0.00024 
New Inspector 4380 4141 239 1.0145 1.0426 0.00024 
Design approval 4553 4183 370 1.0043 1.0838 0.00024 
Bad Nozzle 4302 3627 675 1.1583 1.0240 0.00028 
Supplier test 4775 3627 1148 1.1583 1.1366 0.00028 
Nozzle inspection 9371 3627 5744 1.1583 2.2307 0.00028 
System test 9722 3588 6134 1.1708 2.3142 0.00028 
D11 4201 2261 1940 1.8580 1.0000 0.00044 
D21 4201 3908 293 1.0750 1.0000 0.00026 
D31 4201 3735 466 1.1248 1.0000 0.00027 
D32 4201 3729 472 1.1266 1.0000 0.00027 











D11 0.151 0.0696 
D21 0.750 0.0523 
D31 0.020 0.0022 
D32 0.020 0.0022 
D51 0.250 0.0023 
 
 This ranking is consistent using any of the importance measures. When we 
examine the decision importance measures we note confirmation that D11 is the most 
important, but unlike the other measures, D21 is the second most important. This fact is 
attributable to the probability having the make a decision being relatively high. 
10.4 New Perspective 
 Suppose the contactor submits his risk items and metrics to plant management for 
review. Here ISPAR can take the same basic information about the scenarios, 
probabilities, and decisions and translate them through a different lens. Plant 
management is much more sensitive to schedule and system performance than to cost as 
shown in Table 10-9. In addition, they are much more risk averse to system performance. 
These values replace the contractors values and provide an indication of risk from their 
perspective. 





Cost 0.0004 0.05 
Delay 0.1333 0.75 




 Upon re-running the model, CPRM = 4630, which is a higher level of overall risk. 
Risk level for the individual risk items also increased with one exception. RI#1, while 
still the highest, is quite a bit less than it is for the contractor. In addition, risk with 
mitigations are much higher than before. Notice, that RI#2 actually gets worse with its 
mitigation.  








1 2135 530 3016 
2 686 692 4639 
3 880 
D32=0;  20 
D32=1;  16 
3777 
3773 
4 555 555 4630 
5 397 141 4379 
 
 Changing preferences yields the following rank ordered list based on new 
importance measures. 
 Manufacturing defect in the new sensor head design  
 Probability of spill to be cleaned up 
 System test 
 Nozzle inspections 
 Clean-up schedule 
While the sensor head is still the top priority, the rest of the list is differs. Decision D11 is 
no longer in the top 5 while the spill events are now on. 
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 A shift in decision importance has also occurred, see Table 10-11. D11 is still the 
most important, but D51 is the next. Notice, D21 is negative reflecting that its mitigation 
makes matters worse. Its absolute value is the smallest signifying that it is not important 
from the plant management perspective. 






D11 0.151 0.0525 
D21 0.750 -0.0015 
D31 0.020 0.0037 
D32 0.020 0.0037 
D51 0.250 0.0136 
 
 This capability to substitute preference parameters means that different 
organizations can make independent assessments based on the same data. No censoring 
of low risk items needs to take place, which may filter risk significant events from a 
different perspective. In this case study, plant management and contractor can discuss 
differences in perceived risk and understand where there source. Specific risk items, 
events, decisions, assumptions, or parameters can be identified and resolved in a mutually 
beneficial manner. 
10.5 Discussion 
 This case study of a Fire Suppression System Project illustrates how ISPAR could 
be used. It provides a more robust understanding of a projects risk posture by using 
scenarios to describe risk items and integrating them into a unified model. The risk item 
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metrics provide a systematic, traceable, and defendable measure of relative risk 
magnitude and potential improvement.  
 Analysis shifts focus from status updates for mitigation plans to decisions to be 
made and specific future events. Focus is set on a sensor issue and the outcome of a 
system test as key issues. These are tangible items management can study and impact. 
 The ability to share data and apply separate criteria will increase understanding 
among partners in a venture. Relying less on ambiguous notions of a matrix location and 
more on event probabilities based on data and judgment; and consequence analyses sets 
stage for decisions based on quantitative risk information. 
 This example illustrates ISPAR's implementation through process and modeling. 
A premise was the ability to start with identified risk items using identical processes as 
PRM whether they be brainstorming or checklist techniques. Mitigation activities and 
plans are woven into risk scenarios from the outset as an integral process step. Rankings 
of risk items can be used identically as they are now, but much more information can 
accompany them as they are presented to management.  
 Finally, a word about this particular example application. The model exists as an 
Excel spreadsheet and enhanced using Palisade @Risk simulation add-on. Cost, schedule, 
and PRA models are in the spreadsheet alongside event tree representations of each RSD. 
The composite risk model lays out all combinations in a large tree structure. Care was 
taken to evaluate each path for effects on consequences. All Rm, CPRM, and IM results 
are produced within the spreadsheet. Working in this environment is labor intensive, but 




Chapter 11 Application 
 During this study access was provided to risk registers being generated for two 
projects. The first, Project #1, was a relatively small project designing and building a 
spacecraft sensor. Preliminary ideas for creating RSDs were tried. Lessons were learned 
and used to modify techniques and methodology for use in the next project application. 
Project #2 was a large scale spacecraft development effort that allowed full access to the 
risk database, risk manager, system leads, and the Project Manager. RSDs were 
developed for each risk item in a period of time. This chapter discusses the observations 
and lessons learned during these activities. 
11.1 Small Project #1 
 Project #1 was an endeavor to design and build a scientific instrument that would 
be integrated with a larger suite of instruments for a future space mission. The instrument 
measures energy and angular distribution of various element atoms and other ions. 
Despite having many new engineering and science challenges to overcome, the project 
had an aggressive delivery schedule. 
 The project team consisted of 10-15 people; engineers, scientists, technicians, and 
managers. Our participation was limited to receiving data in the form of risk item entries. 
Since this effort was exploratory in nature, there was no expectation of further 
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interaction. Risk data was used to create RSDs and to discover pros and cons of the 
process.  
 Surprisingly, the data was difficult to use. Both because of its form and its 
content. No database existed as a repository, instead we were given monthly briefing 
packages to the customer which contained a page or two listing that months current top 
ten risks. As such, the data showed only a one-line descriptor and an associated position 
on a 5x5 risk matrix. As a communication tool, this apparently worked well when risk 
items were fresh and being worked day-to-day, however, as an archive to be used for 
research after the fact, it was lacking. 
 Risk items tended to be problems currently plaguing the project and not future 
potential problems. Statements in the charts were status reports of how problems were 
being rectified. Unexpectedly, this was rather difficult to diagram when the mind set is 
focused on describing events and future interactions. Also diagramming deterministic 
relationships started to lose meaning. Upon reflection, difficulty stemmed from my view 
that RSDs needed probabilistic alternatives and decisions. When this emphasis was 
relaxed it became apparent that risk items with an initiator probability of one could not 
only be modeled but could be useful. This realization ultimately led to an understanding 
that RSDs were a convenient tracking and status tool. 
 An interesting aspect of project #1 was that it was closely coupled with 2 other 
projects. All three shared the same core design and resources, but were built to different 
quality assurance and documentation requirements depending on their intended mission. 
As one might expect, much of the risk was tied to these dependencies. 
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 Experience working Project #1 lead to a strong sense that an integrated scenario-
based systematic risk management methodology was needed. It also led to enhancements 
in process steps: 
 Integrating a more robust form of project risk management requires a PM that 
fully believes in the effort and actively uses it as a way to manage the project. 
 Sole reliance on the risk register makes it impossible to develop RSDs 
because by the nature of being " if-then" statements provide no other 
information exists about other alternatives on the table. 
 Using risk matrix scales without any information as to how they were 
developed and/or calibrated only leads to a vague notion of the PM "feeling" 
of both severity and likelihood. 
 Consolidate risks items as much as possible. Do not try to make a one RSDS 
for every risk item unless the dependencies are expressly shown. Risk items 
created as the program moves along can recreate the same risk many times. 
11.2 Large Project #2 
 Project #2 is a large multi-year venture to design, build, launch, and operate a 
scientific mission to Earth orbit. The scope covers all mission aspects including, 
spacecraft, instruments, ground control center, data processing centers, and networks. 
Many organization within the prime contractor, as well as partner institutions and 
equipment vendors are contributing to this mission's success. 
 The PM was extremely helpful and gracious providing full access to the entire 
online risk register database, access to the risk manager, access to all risk board meetings, 
access to systems engineers, and system design leads.  
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11.2.1 Project #2 Risk Management Process 
 Project #2 has an active and robust risk management process in place. As 
documented in a risk management plan, "Risk management shall be implemented to 
ensure risk items are mitigated and/or resolved before they jeopardize the successful 
execution of the program, become major sources of rework, or lead to cost and schedule 
overruns." It is structured around several "risk boards" deliberating about area specific 
risk items and elevating them when resolution cannot be decided or implemented at that 
level. The process is implemented by a "risk manger" but ultimate responsibility for risk 
management belongs to the PM. 
 Project #2 classifies risk items using Table 11-1 through Table 11-3 to identify 
risk area, likelihood and severity. These charts are pulled from the project's Risk 
Management Plan. Guidance on the use of these charts is provided by the parent 
organizations Risk Management Procedure: 
Both scales are a bit subjective in both dimensions. Developing risk 
attribute categories and the risk severity table is complicated by 
fundamental differences between technical, programmatic, and safety 
risks, particularly with respect to likelihood values. Technical risks 
generally operate in a regime of less than one in a billion to perhaps a few 
percent. For instance, a technical risk that yields a 10% chance of on-orbit 
failure would generally be considered quite high. On the other hand, 
programmatic risks usually operate on a scale from about 1% to nearly 
100%. This represents both the lower fidelity in estimating programmatic 
risks and the higher tolerance of programmatic risks. 
From the combination of likelihood and consequence is derived a severity 
indicated by color (green, yellow, red) that is roughly identified with low, 
medium, and high levels of concern. Green risks are generally not 
discussed or reviewed in reviews. Yellow denotes a significant concern 
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that requires deliberate and careful assessment, monitoring, with 
consideration of mitigation, and with awareness and buy-off at all level 
when the program/project reaches “go/no-go” decision points. Similarly, a 
red assessment is taken to mean “no-go” without mitigation. This does not 
mean stop the project immediately, but it does mean that an acceptable 
mitigation plan shall be part of the path forward, and that mitigation must 
reduce the color level to yellow or green. 
 
Table 11-1. Project #2 risk type classification 
Risk Classification Description 
Technical Risk 
Product Risk - focused on technical performance of the product. This includes 
risks associated with meeting performance specifications, maintaining adequate 
margins, and ensuring acceptable quality.  
 
Process Risk - addressed development methods including design methods, 
analysis methods and limitations, design validation, fabrication, assembly, and 
verification and testing approaches.  
 
Performance Risk - addressed risk associated with satisfying on orbit objectives. 
These may be Instrument performance risk, life expectancy, availability and other 
issues that manifest themselves following deployment  
 
Safety - emphasizes the potential for damage or injury to personnel, facilities, 
project equipment or the environment posed by project development, 
deployment, and operations activities.  
Schedule Risk 
The uncertainties linked to the adequacy of time estimated and allocated for 
development and production of the system. Schedule risk is usually analyzed in 
terms of: (1) the risk that schedule estimates and objectives are inaccurate, and 
(2) the risk that program execution will fall short of schedule objectives as a result 
of failure to identify and mitigate risks. 
Cost Risk 
The potential impact of contractual and budgetary constraints, as well as the 
resources available for a particular project. Cost risk analysis, in general, 
examines (1) the risk that cost estimates and objectives are inaccurate, and (2) 
the risk that program execution will not meet the cost objectives as a result of a 
failure to identify and mitigate operational or development risks.  
Programmatic Risk 
Catch-all for risks that do not fall into the previous categories. Programmatic risks 
may be associated with project staffing, facility availability, the sponsor 
relationship, subcontractor relationships, legal action, the dynamic nature of 
institutional policies, priorities, and risk tolerance, as well as the overall project 




Table 11-2. Project #2 likelihood scale 
Likelihood Safety Technical Cost/Schedule 
 Likelihood of safety event 
occurrences 
Estimated likelihood of not 
meeting mission technical 
performance requirements 
Estimated likelihood of not 
meeting allocated Cost or 
Schedule requirement or 
margin 
5 Very High Ps > 10
-1 PT > 50% Pcs > 75% 
4 High 10-2 <Ps > 10
-1 25% <PT < 50% 50% < Pcs ≤ 75% 
3 Moderate 10-3 <Ps > 10
-2 15% <PT < 25% 25% < Pcs ≤ 50% 
2 Low 10-5 <Ps > 10
-3 2% <PT < 15% 10% < Pcs ≤ 25% 
1 Very Low Ps > 10
-6 0.1% <PT < 2% Pcs ≤ 10% 
 
 
Table 11-3. Project #2 consequence scale 
Consequence Safety Technical Cost Schedule 
5 Very High Death or 
permanent 
disabling injury 
Loss of S/C, instrument, 
or P/L 
Project cost overrun 
of greater than 20% 
of allocated 
 
4 Major Severe injury Loss of one or more 
Level-1 science 
requirements 
Project cost overrun 
between 10% and 
20% 
Schedule slip 
greater than 3 
months 
3 Medium Injury with lost 
work time 
Major loss of capability of 
S/C or P/L 
Project cost overrun 








2 Minor Minor injury 
with no lost 
work time 
Decrease in S/C or P/L 
capability/ margin, but all 
mission requirements met, 
or need for requirement 
definition or design/ 
implementation 
workaround 
Project cost overrun 
between 1% and 3% 
of allocated 
Schedule slip not 
on critical path 




Project cost overrun 







 One of the project's requirements is to report risk status to its sponsor monthly as 
stated in the plan, "The risk report consists of two viewgraphs, a Top 10 risk list and a 
Risk Matrix Report." Formats are specified in the Statement of Work. 
  Project #2 adopted use of a risk management database tool called Project Risk 
Information Management and eXchange (PRIMX). This tool was developed under a 
NASA contract. It combines risk identification, analysis, planning, tracking, control, and 
communication into a single, comprehensive environment that meets NPR 7120.5B and 
NPR 8000.4 requirements. The PRIMX database is organized into several levels, with the 
top level being the Project; levels below that include Instruments, Spacecraft, and Ground 
Operations.  
11.2.2 RSD Development 
 All risks in the project database were examined although only a few were 
subjected to creating RSDs. For a period of four months during the design phase (April - 
July 2010), RSDs were developed in parallel with normal risk management process. 
During this time 28 new risk items were entered into the system. These can be found in 
Table 11-4 (see Appendix B for more complete entry information) along with the risk 
registry entries. Entries and examples are redacted and modified under an agreement with 






Table 11-4. Project #2 risk registry 
ID Title Statement L C Type 
160 Nutation Damper 
Leak 
If the nutation damper leak is not resolved in a timely 
manner, then the beginning of spacecraft I&T will be 
delayed.  
 
2 2 Sched 
161 Instr-H HV Part 
Failures 
If the HV parts are not qualified for flight use, then the 
delivery of the full unit (with the high voltage board) will 
be delayed. 
 
2 2 Sched 
162 PSE HW Schedule 
Slip 
If the PSE hardware continues to slip schedule then 
the hardware will be late to system I&T. 
 
5 3 Sched 
163 SSPA Part Leakage If the SSPA amplifier part can not be made resistant to 
flux, solvent, and moisture degradation and long-term 
reliability ensured, then SSPA delivery schedule will be 
impacted. 
 
1 4 Sched 
164 Meeting Spin Balance 
Requirements 
If our spin table is not used for final processing and 
checkout of the Observatory at the launch site, then 
uncertainty will be introduced into the spin balance 
measurements before launch. 
 
2 2 Tech 
165 PDU Op Amp 
Interface Qualification 
Test 
If the op amp interface qualification test fails then the 
PDU flight build schedule will be impacted and PDU 
telemetry measurements will be degraded. 
 
1 2 Sched 
166 Radiation and Charge 
Monitoring 
If additional spacecraft radiation and charge 
monitoring data is not available on-orbit then 
spacecraft model correlation and anomaly resolution 
will be difficult to achieve. 
 
1 2 Tech 
167 SSPA DC/DC 
Converter Burn-in 
Failure 
If the purchased in-stock DC/DC converter cannot be 
used for flight, then SSPA schedule will be impacted. 
 
2 2 Sched 
168 PDU Flight Part 
Delivery 
If PDU flight parts currently on order do not arrive in 
time to replace non-flight parts installed to allow board-
level processing and test, then there will be a schedule 
impact. 
 
2 3 Sched 
169 Use of Bond Wire in 
SA Substrates 
If the use of bond wire in some of the SA substrates is 
accepted, then the wires will become magnetized in 
space and will influence the Instr-M measurement 
results. 
 
1 2 Tech 
170 Instr-M Hybrid 
Delivery 
If the hybrid boards are late, then the delivery of Instr-
M units to the Spacecraft for I&T will be delayed. 
 
1 3 Sched 
171 Instr-M Detector 
Procurement and 
Delivery 
If the solid state detector assemblies are delayed then 
the Instr-M instrument will experience delays that will 
impact the delivery schedule. 
 
3 3 Sched 
172 Instr-E DFB FPGA 
Verification 
If the Instr-E DFB FPGA design verification and flight 
FPGA programming is not complete by July 2010, then 
Instr-E will deplete all of its funded schedule reserve 
and the Project I&T schedule will be impacted. 
 
1 3 Sched 
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ID Title Statement L C Type 
173 SSPA Schedule Slip If the SSPA continues to have part availability and 
fabrication issues, then there will be a critical-path 
schedule impact. 
 
1 2 Sched 
174 Part x Life Test 
Failure 
If the part x failure investigation results in a rejection of 
remaining lot of parts, then there will be a XCVR 
receiver delivery impact. 
 
2 3 Sched 
175 Instr-R Waiver 006 
Technical Risk - Pin 
gold thickness 
If Instr-R uses pins/sockets with less than the 
minimum plating thickness of 50 microinches, a failure 
of a pin may occur. 
 
1 2 Tech 
176 I&T Staffing Shortage If the I&T staffing shortage continues with no relief, 
system-level I&T scripts will not be ready when 
needed, and there will be a schedule impact. 
 
1 3 Sched 
177 Instr-R Resource 
Conflict with another 
mission 
If the other program schedule moves to the right then 
Instr-R resource conflicts will occur affecting mission 
critical path. 
 
1 3 Sched 
178 Instr-R Mechanical 
Part Fabrication 
If all Instr-R mechanical parts are not available when 
required, and have to be fabricated or ordered, then 
there will be a schedule impact. 
 
2 3 Sched 
179 Magnetometer Team 
Resources 
If sufficient resources are not available to the 
magnetometer development effort to allow it to 
respond to additional work identified at another 
mission CDR, then the Instr-F magnetometer effort will 
incur schedule delays. 
 
2 2 Sched 
180 Instr-F Filter Tin 
Whiskers 
If the existing filter flight parts cannot be used as is 
and require rework involving disassembly and 
reassembly of the filter cans, schedule will be very 
severely impacted. 
 
2 3 Sched 
181 Use of DC/DC 
Converters in the IEM 
If the root cause of the unit failures is not resolved 
before flight part installation, then additional failures 
are possible. 
 
1 3 Tech 
182 IEM Flight Model 2 
Schedule Slip 
If the IEM flight mode 2 continues to have part 
availability, fabrication, and acceptance test issues, 
then there will be a critical-path schedule impact. 
 
5 3 Sched 
183 XCVR Schedule Slip If the XCVR continues to have part availability and 
fabrication issues, then there will be a critical-path 
schedule impact. 
 
5 3 Sched 
184 PDU Flight Model 2 
Schedule Slip 
If the PDU flight model 2 experiences part availability 
and fabrication issues, then there will be a critical-path 
schedule impact. 
 
1 2 Sched 
185 Lot Jeopardy Parts 
Fail Qual Testing 
If hardware being fabricated and/or tested use parts 
released on lot jeopardy, and those parts fail 
qualification testing, then there will be a schedule 
impact. 
1 3 Sched 
186 Spare Parts Not 
Available for 
Hardware 
If spare parts (either mechanical or electrical) are not 
available to meet fabrication/rework needs, then there 
will be a schedule impact. 
 
1 3 Sched 
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ID Title Statement L C Type 
187 IEM Test Team 
Staffing 
If the IEM test team is not sufficiently staffed to work 
both flight box qualifications in parallel then the IEM 
delivery schedule will be impacted. 
 
2 3 Sched 
188 Instr-F Late Delivery 
to Observatory I&T 
If the Instr-F suite is delivered late to the Observatory, 
guidance & control test schedule will be impacted 
which will impact the launch date. 
2 3 Sched 
 
 As a risk was entered into the database, information was taken along with more 
extensive discussions with project personnel to create an RSD with alternative paths, 
mitigations, and decisions. The goal of this activity was three fold; 1) to determine 
feasibility of drawing RSDs in real time instead of risk statements, 2) to gain an 
understanding of the resources required, and 3) determine the value of such an activity 
constrained to qualitative assessments. 
 RI-160 was previously discussed in Chapter 4 as case study 1. Another example 
RSD is illustrated here, RI-161; Instrument-H High Voltage part failures, is one such risk 
item. Figure 11-1 shows the database entry and the corresponding RSD created is in 
Figure 11-2. 
ID: RI-161  
 
Title: Instrument-H HV Part Failures 
 
Statement: If the HV parts are not qualified for flight use, then the delivery of the full unit (with the high 
voltage board) will be delayed. 
Context: Eleven optocoupler parts are used in each Inst-H on the high voltage power supply board. Vendor-
S uses these part on 2 other sponsor missions. Recent HV failures on those programs have occurred. The 2 
failure types on those programs were broken bond wire and LED lifting from the substrate. In addition, 
inspection of Inst-H parts found 2 parts appeared to have weak bonds as evaluated by x-ray and another 
had LED lifting. 
Likelihood: 4     Consequence: 3     Timeframe: Near Term; up to 3 months 
Class: Schedule     Area: Science Instruments     System/SubSys: Instr-H  
Risk Owner: xxx     Area Lead: xxx     Risk Status: Open     Risk Action: Mitigate 





Endstate Cost Delay Loss of Mission 
1 x% increase of parts Baseline Approx baseline 
2 x% increase of parts + delay cost Refurb date Approx baseline 
3 x% increase of parts + delay cost Late for I&T Approx baseline 
4 Baseline Baseline Baseline 
5 Delay cost Refurb date Baseline 
6 Delay cost Late for I&T Baseline 
Figure 11-2. Project #2 RI-161 RSD 
 Included in the figure is an endstate legend which describes qualitatively the state 
the project would be in if it reached this point. It is a qualitative representation aimed at 
providing more information about the risk item so that likelihood and consequences 
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scores can be assigned. There is still a need for a narrative description of the context for 
the risk item. Any recent history and pertinent data is valuable for the process. 
 Despite having two mitigation options identified in the database, two questions 
were uncovered regarding what to do if: 
 root causes are not definitively identified - No answer was immediately 
forthcoming by the engineer, so the question was left as is to inform the PM 
that it is still potentially open ended. 
 what happens if alternative parts are unavailable. The presumption was that 
existing parts would be used, but the engineer did not have the span of 
authority to make that call. Again its left as an open item to bring attention. 
From a larger perspective, the thought process investigating questions about failure or 
off-nominal mitigation actions is not pursued. Identifying them leads to a more robust 
view of issues. 
11.2.3 Observations and Insights 
 During the process of examining the risk items a number of observations were 
made regarding the nature of risk items with respect to PRA scenarios. These 
observations point to the benefits of having an integrated, scenario-based systematic 
process for analyzing risk items across multiple organizations and throughout the project 
life cycle. 
 Early in the program risk items were general and vague as to what the real 
issues were. For example, RI-006 states "Given the current understanding of 
the science investigation concepts, requirements, and constraints, there is a 
possibility that the design solution space will not converge without changes in 
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one or more of these areas." This particular risk item had no mitigation 
assigned to it and eventually was closed when a design was developed. RI-035 
states "If mission cost growth beyond allocated reserves occurs, then mission 
descopes will be taken" and illustrates a general concern with no hard data or 
alternatives (as written in the risk item) to consider. 
 Multiple risk items are open for the same issue. The lack of flexibility in 
describing multiple scenarios forces the project to create and manage several 
items. RI-010 and RI-011 illustrate this point, their respective risk statement 
are: "Given that Principal Investigators will require a higher data rate than 
given in their updated proposals, there is a possibility that additional, 
strategically located, Ground Stations will be required which will impact 
Phase E cost." and "Given the uncertainty in the availability of ground 
stations, it is possible that the average daily data return requirement cannot be 
met." Additional ambiguity sets in with the type of risk assigned. Both are 
labeled as technical risks, but clear implications can be seen on cost and 
schedule. 
 One can see when the PM took over. The nature of the risk items changed as 
did their specificity. 
 30% (8 of 28) of risk items entered are problems. Meaning that an initiator has 
already occurred. They are entered as risks because the next event in the 
scenario is still uncertain or because the eventual severity is still unknown. 
 RI-164 is interesting because the consequence is not a change in cost, 
schedule, or LOM. Instead, the result is an increased uncertainty in a 
measurement to be taken; in particular uncertainty in spin balance 
characteristics of the spacecraft. 
 Some risk items were identified because an important event was getting 
closer. Nothing had changed about the event and it carried the same amount of 
risk as it had months prior. The only thing that had changed was the 
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perception of risk. RI-203, was opened stating "if IEM #2 uncovers issues 
during EMC testing, then IEM #1 will … need to be modified." This test was 
not newly added to the schedule, it has been there since the beginning. The 
change is that this test was only six weeks away and modifying any unit 
would be an issue. Opening this risk items was not prompted by a new 
discovered condition or event; or a change to likelihood or severity. 
 Risk items have been previously entered. Risk items are not explicitly 
duplicated, instead they are restated with different outcomes or with a 
different scope. The first is a procedural byproduct when conditions or events 
no longer fit the risk statement as written, a new risk item is opened. 
Sometimes this is accompanied by closing the original risk item. Second, a 
new risk item is a subset scenario of an existing risk item, but since there is no 
way to track it (with its new detail), a new item is opened. Third, a new risk 
items is opened due to off-nominal conditions in a previous risk item. Fourth, 
repeating or sustained underlying issue is reported by writing risks against 
different symptoms. RI-176 is a staffing issue, as are risk items 042, 066, 110, 
and 187. In addition, risk items 177 and 179 might be related as staffing could 
be root cause for these. 
 External events are captured. Risk items 171, 177, and 179 are events that the 
project cannot affect, but their impacts will cause problems. The project is 
using this system to proactively address influences from outside the program.  
 Observations regarding development of RSDs were also captured. One of the first 
questions asked by management was how much would this cost to implement, time and 
budget. Time to create a RSD is longer than typing a risk narrative. However, this 
superficial view of the process is misleading. A majority of time is spent understanding 
various scenarios that can spawn from an initial event. This time is the same whether the 
end product is a sentence or a diagram. My experience and those of colleague engineers 
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is that a lot of time is spent simplifying and making risk statements politically palatable, 
striking a balance between voicing a concern but not over-emphasizing potential 
undesired outcomes. "This will be useful, it's how I think. It's confining to put a whole 
process into one sentence." commented one of the lead engineers. With RSDs, tempering 
the potential outcomes is a natural outcome of the probability cutset analyses. 
 Budget requirements would be similar for a qualitative implementation. 
Essentially maintaining diagrams instead of, or in addition to, a narrative database would 
not require a different skill set. A quantitative implementation of ISPAR however, would 
require a risk analyst skilled in modeling techniques, data analysis, utility function 
generation, and risk communication.  
 An additional item needed for implementation would be a tool set to develop 
RSDs under a configuration protocol; create, gather, combine, and calculate cutset; and 
compute risk metrics and importance measures. 
 Early in 2011, a meeting was held with the Project #2 technical management 
team. At the meeting were the PM, lead mission engineer, lead systems engineer, and the 
risk manager. Progress and qualitative results were presented. The discussion focused 
around a question posed to them; is the process of creating RSD useful? Response from 
the team was encouraging. As a process tool and a communication vehicle the RSDs 
were received well and the team agreed on the value of a couple aspects. First, 
identifying dependent events among risk items. This suggests that at a minimum, for 
qualitative assessments, cutsets should be generated for analysis. The PM found 
particularly interesting the paradigm of including all possible alternative and decision 
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points in the diagrams. He mentioned that being able to "see" the decision apriori would 
be help in his management activities for planning and budget/schedule discussion with 
the sponsor. The risk manager took exception to a system that would have the project 
"think through so many activities that far into the future." Without prompting the PM 
chimed in with "isn't that kinda the point."  
 The systems engineer, responsible for the spacecraft risks, had trouble seeing a 
concrete connection to the existing process saying "How do I take this and put it on a 
5x5?"  This suggests that a procedure to distill qualitative scenario and consequence 
information into appropriate ordinal values would help with non-quantitative 
implementations. 
 Perhaps the common perception that ISPAR is a labor intensive activity prompted 
the mission engineer to say "I can't see doing this for all risks." This suggests that a 
screening procedure may be needed. This would have to filter low-consequence, low-
probability, independent risk items. Perhaps, given project history within an organization, 
this filter can be tuned based on how "routine" risk items are typically handled. 
 The meeting ended with perhaps the best encouragement of all when the PM 







Chapter 12 Discussion 
 The initial premise was that current PRM practices were not up to state-of-the-art 
standards for risk assessments. Four main areas stood out; PRM is not scenario-based, 
PRM does not integrate risk items or consequence types, PRM does quantify risk items to 
form a total project risk picture, and PRM does not address management's risk posture or 
preferences. ISPAR is a framework to correct these shortcomings by adopting methods 
and techniques from PRAs and DAs. Some new procedures or modifications were 
required to integrate the entire framework. As discussed in Chapter 2, many of the 
methods used in the proposed methodology were first developed to assist in technical risk 
assessments and decision analyses. They have been incorporated to solve particular 
shortfall and are identified in the table. 
 This study expands the field of risk assessment in several key areas for project 
risk management and probabilistic risk assessments. ISPAR creates a framework to treat 
a project as a system for analysis, a system that includes development, fabrication, 
fielding, operations, and the product. Both stochastic events and non-stochastic decisions 
are essential modeling elements. 
 Profound shifts in PRM mindset are required. Project risk management can no 
longer be viewed as a simple repository of everyone's concerns. Instead, PRM is an 
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analytical tool requiring skill and a level of sophistication in order to model scenarios, 
data, uncertainty, and metrics. The change in PRM scope and depth of analysis must be 
commensurate with the PM's span of responsibility and the project's magnitude.  
 Risk is now a project level trait with risk items in combination, instead of several 
independent undesired events. Project risk is defined as a shortfall in achieving goals with 
constraints. It is measured against a baseline. Risk items are scenarios of off-nominal 
events or conditions propagating through a project causing multiple effects, not a cause 
with one specific effect limited to one type of consequence. Inherent process responses to 
events must be actively reflected in these scenarios as well as alternative choices 
available to the PM. Alternatives must be viewed with their potential costs not just as 
optimistic get well plans. 
 This systematic process requires data to support risk item modeling efforts instead 
of relying on group consensus assignments for likelihood and severity. Data at a basic 
event level is more readily available than data for a risk item since basic events are not 
unique to a given project. For instance, while a risk item may be concerned with schedule 
delay of a new technology, component life tests or conformal coating processes are not. 
Sophisticated Bayesian techniques support the inclusion of judgment and expertise. 
 In order to make this new framework viable, several technical issues were 
addressed to incorporate ingredients from current state-of-the-art methodologies. 
Assumptions and boundary conditions were explored to ensure compatibility with proven 
techniques. The following sections detail contributions of this work in combining 
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separate methodologies and creating new techniques to solve some the challenges of this 
integration. 
12.1 Scenario-Based Risk Items 
 A scenario-based view of risk items provides a richer context for project decisions 
involving risks. RSDs allow project personnel to articulate pivotal events that exist 
between initiator and end effect, alternative courses of action, decisions required, and a 
range of potential impacts. The act of decomposing a risk item, diagramming decisions, 
and populating them with the best information at hand support the decision-making 
process.  
 Scenario-based risk assessments and decision analyses have been in existence for 
years, but have not adopted for PRM. The creation of a hybrid ESD / DT allows an 
analyst to examine the impact of decision on risk as an inherent parameter of a risk 
model. PRAs are currently used to assess probabilities of alternatives. In this sense, they 
support decision analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, decision trees often model top level 
events, but do not typically examine cutsets at lower levels for dependencies, common 
cause failure modes, or single point failures. The combination enhances both 
methodologies. Facilitating this integration is that both use a consistence probability 
calculus framework and set of assumptions. From a PRM perspective this combination 
adds capability not found in current practice. 
 Scenarios are represented by RSDs are meant to augment and replace "If-Then" 
statements as the preferred method of documenting risk items. Decomposing risk items 
into more than initiator and endstate allows development of procedures for probability 
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assignments using data collection and expert elicitation in a far more rigorous, traceable, 
and defendable manner. 
 Within this study, scenario-based techniques have been applied to several 
examples and to a spacecraft development project. Examples show that specific 
conceptual constructs will work. RSDs creation was shown to be feasible in its 
implementation. 
12.2 Integrated Assessments 
 Integration provides a systematic treatment of both project and product with 
successful combination of consequence models to produce a multi-faceted view of 
project risk. The PRA domain is expanded into the project management arena, increasing 
insights provided to project managers and demonstrating versatility of PRA to the project 
management research community. Risk analyses are presented to management for a 
variety of reasons, but ultimately, they are to inform decision-makers of all appropriate 
information needed to make a decision if and when the time comes.  
 PRAs have supported DA in the past with endstate probabilities providing input to 
decision tree chance nodes. Here decisions are an integral part of the modeling process. 
Risk depends on the decisions needed and decisions depend on the risk analysis. 
 Central to integrating the two risk assessment methods has been showing how 
RSDs integrate with decision trees, decision trees with fault trees, and the methodology 
with various system risk assessment styles. This also includes the calculus for new risk 
scenario models containing decision points, common cause analysis, dependency of 
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multiple risk scenarios occurring simultaneously, and calculations with some basic events 
appearing on either side of decision points.  
 PRM rarely addresses various types of impacts from a risk item simultaneously, 
instead opting to address only a type deemed to be the worst-case. This framework 
unifies cost and schedule risk models with system risk models. Consequence models are 
analyzed given the same set of circumstances in the form of cutsets that determine model 
configurations at endstates. Output from these models are combined using well 
established multi-attribute utility techniques thereby providing an endstate with a single 
value (and its distribution) based on common inputs. This allows existing consequence 
models to operate in their own unique environment without interference.  
 This new risk management framework explicitly accounts for items that greatly 
impact the probability of project success, such as dependencies (PRM assumes 
independence of risks items), uncertainty (aleatory and epistemic uncertainties), and 
decision points (needed for managers to interact with analysis). 
12.3 Quantitative Assessment 
 PRM uses consequence  probability to rank order individual risks based on 
ordinal scores. ISPAR quantifies risk in a metric CPRM that is a composite of all risk 
items, decisions, and consequence types. This metric also has an associated uncertainty. 
Since CPRM is a function of the model's logic structure and event probabilities, it can be 
used to derive risk contributions from any event or decision in the models. Popular 
importance measures are shown to be valid within this framework and to provide a set of 
tools for PRM heretofore not available.  
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 Within the realm of PRM, risk items exist and progress simultaneously. A basic 
assumption in PRA is that initiating events are independent. Accident sequences occur 
and propagate relatively quickly and so only one ESD can occur at a time. This allows 
analysts to simplify the computations. A brute force methodology was developed to 
combine all cutsets into one composite model for all endstates.  
 This leads to another modeling challenge, endstate compounding. Endstates' 
computations are dependent on the path taken to get there. A methodology was devised to 
examine the paths and recomputed the consequences. 
 Data collection for project basic events can be collected and analyzed with the 
benefit of updating the ISPAR risk models using standard Bayesian techniques. In 
addition, the system is available to quantitatively assessment expert opinion under a 
Bayesian framework as data supporting basic events. This transforms PRM from a 
committee based consensus building effort to one where defendable analysis is used 
throughout. 
12.4 Risk Aversion and Preferences 
 Finally, while decision analysis specifically addresses a decision-makers 
preferences, PRM does not. This leads PMs to lose credibility in risk results, arbitrarily 
reassigning scores, or self censoring the information. An approach is employed to adjust 
consequence model results for PM's own risk aversion and preferences. This has some 
nice side benefits. A systematic controllable methodology provides a much more 
consistent response from decision-makers. It also nullifies many of the effects of 
"groupthink" influences on decisions. 
 
205 
 When managers from different perspectives enter, they bring their own set of 
biases and preferences. This system can exchange utility functions, allowing the same 
data to flow but to yield different results based on a different context or perception. These 
differences result from changes in scope of responsibility or authority, changes in 
organizational or personal priorities, etc. 
12.5 Summary of Contributions 
 This methodology makes contributions to Project Risk Management in two areas. 
First, it provides a new paradigm for PRM by integrating various elements and processes 
expanding the analytical capability heretofore not available. Second, several new 
techniques, methods, and metrics were developed to fill the gaps created by the 
integration effort. 
 The scope of PRM is expanded by integrating development of a project with 
performance and operation of a product into one system for analysis. Previous practice 
limited risk analysis to development activities, while system operations and performance 
were analyzed separately. In this work, traditional PRA methods are combined with 
decision analysis concepts providing a more robust view of the project risk landscape. It 
explicitly addresses project controls (i.e., decisions) available to PMs. Collapsing all 
consequence types into a single value through the use of utility functions allows PMs to 
examine all aspects simultaneously. Finally, integrating all risk items into a single model 
expands the view of risk from item-by-item to total-project perspective. Overall, PRM is 

























    
Only one potential outcome at a time    Scenario-based ESD 
Severity assigned as worst-case    Scenarios present a variety of outcomes 
Decisions not addressed    Hybrid ESD/DT 
No common cause to risk posture    CCF analysis  
Event dependencies not addressed    Scenarios/FTA modeling 
External event dependencies    Events or initiator 
Lacks accounting for root causes of risk item     Failure logic decomposition 
 
Integrated Assessment 
    
Treats project and product risks separately    Project/product system definition 
Treats cost, sched, and perf separately    Multi-Attribute Utility theory 
Consequences are not modeled    Existing model integration 
Consequence independent of path    Endstate compounding methodology 
Risk item dependencies not addressed     ET/FTA style analysis framework 
Risk items treated as independent events   
Modeling does not require assumption of 
independence 
Off-nominal mitigations not addressed    ESD modeling style 
 
Quantitative Assessment 
    
Total project risk not computed    CPRM, Rm created 
Ordinal scales can introduce errors    Risk profiles 
Probabilities estimates for entire risk item    Decomposition 
Lacks risk contribution rank ordering    PRA Importance Measures 
Uncertainty not addressed    Integral part of both 
Feedback and status are qualitative    
Bayesian techniques updates risk based on 
data collection 
 
Risk aversion & Preferences 
    
Decisions not addressed     Modified to handle decisions in cutsets 
Decision ranking not determined    Decision Importance Measure 
Group dynamics influence process 
 Assignments by committee 
 Groupthink 
 voting schemes can be irrational 
   Systematic risk assessment methods 
Cannot integrate risks up and down 
organization without censorship (editing) 




 As a result of defining this new methodology, several shortfalls of current PRM 
practice were uncovered. Table 12-1 provides a summary list of many identified 
shortfalls along with an indication of how each one was addressed. Solutions used within 
this framework originated either from PRA, DA, or newly created or modified in this 
research. The table also indicates a solution to the particular shortfall. 
 Many of the contributions, while new for PRM, are not new from a risk 
assessment perspective. Listed here are only those items newly created or modified for 
use within this methodology. 
 Risk Sequence Diagrams are a hybrid of Event Sequence Diagrams and 
Decision Trees. The combination allows examinations of scenarios in the 
presence of decisions. Heretofore, PRAs have supported decision trees by 
quantifying the potential outcomes, assuming a decision, but decisions have 
not been imbedded into the scenarios. The necessary algorithms for solving 
cutsets with the inclusion of non-stochastic events are developed and 
validated. 
 The common assumption in system PRA methods, where scenario initiators 
are considered to be mutually exclusive, is often not valid for PRM where risk 
scenarios are occurring simultaneously. Therefore a modeling framework is 
developed that incorporating basic events from all risk item scenarios. 
 Endstate compounding is addressed to capture the correct combination of 
system configurations in determining an endstate consequence value. 
Gathering endstates as one would in traditional PRAs can lead to incorrectly 




 Risk metrics for the entire project and for risk items is developed. The metrics 
combine information about likelihoods, consequences, and PM preferences 
into a single value consistent with the definition of project risk. 
 Decision importance measure is introduced to rank order decisions. This 
measure provides a scale value combining decision impacts with the potential 
of having to make the decision. Decisions can be compared across the project 






Chapter 13 Future Work 
 This study is a foundation on which to continue building project risk management 
techniques and infrastructure. Continuing use of scenario-based assessments will increase 
management's understanding, communication, and decisions about project risk. These 
building block integrate system and project; PRA and DA; cost, schedule, and 
performance consequence models; and qualitative and quantitative techniques under the 
same assessment methodology. Other techniques and tools can be integrated to expand 
capability. Figure 13-1 illustrates a development roadmap spawning from the 
methodology presented here.  
 I envision a computer tool, a modeling environment, that allows an analyst to 
develop RSDs in a graphical interface. RSDs would be translated to logic models 
producing information required for qualitative assessments of cutsets and dependencies. 
Logic would feed a quantitative engine that incorporates datasets of event histories 
(industry and organizationally specific), expert judgment, and preferences to produce risk 
metrics at every level of a project. Further, automated information exchange with 






Figure 13-1. Roadmap of future work 
 Within this study a few process steps were discussed where supporting algorithm 
development could increase capability and efficiency. One such area is the creation of 
composite logic models incorporating pivotal and basic events. Branch and path 
explosion problems have been addressed elsewhere concerning expansion of binary trees. 
An efficient algorithm is needed to keep up changing nature of a project as decisions are 
made and outcomes of stochastic events becoming known. Each change alters model 
structure. One such research project is underway to create an environment where a risk 
can be continually updated in order to reflect current status of the risk posture. 
Specifically, as decisions are made and risk events either manifest or are made negligible, 
the model will allow reflection of these facts and will update the integrated risk posture.  
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 The endstate combination process, which at this point is labor intensive, is another 
candidate. Perhaps a rule-based algorithm integrated with a consequence model exchange 
protocol could be employed. 
 Handling time in this framework has only been briefly discussed. There is much 
potential for incorporating event horizons to events and decisions. Risk as a function of 
time would then be an inherent characteristic of scenarios and models. It could also 
greatly facilitate "burn-down" charts and monitoring aspects of this implementation. 
There are also aspects of time versus risk perception that could be addressed including 
time dependent utility functions for managers. 
 While this study has focused exclusively on project risk, there is potential for 
application to system safety processes. System safety as a discipline possesses many 
similar characteristics of PRM, not the least of which is the use of a 55 matrix. Shifting 
to a scenario-based assessment has shown to be invaluable in other safety dominated 
industries like nuclear power and chemical processing, but a full embrace of quantitative 
assessments in system safety is elusive. This may be a compromise platform from which 
to start a discussion. Another more detailed process to explore is the practice of writing 
waivers and deviations against requirements and standard operating procedures. Each 
carries risk and could couple with other deviations.  
 Recently, models have been developed to include influences of organizational 
factors with system models. They are implemented as Bayesian Belief Networks that sit 
in parallel with a systems modeling logic to change event probabilities. This could also 
be integrated with ISPAR to accommodate influences of organizational preferences and 
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constraints,  culture, contract types, project environment (commercial or government), or 
type of work. 
 Finally, this study has been resolute in stating this is not for predicting decisions. 
Decisions are left as model variables and not quantified. Information about decisions is 
provided to inform decision-makers about their importance. However, optimization 
algorithms could be a fertile research area. More interesting could be decision-makers' 
behavioral responses to such a system. 
 ISPAR sets the foundation to move PRM into employing state-of-the-art risk 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sensor manufacturing issue DAA_SNS_MFG 0.85
Sensor Design flaw DAA_SNS_DSGN 0.98
Test condition DAA_TEST 0.95
Software change DAA_SW 0.8
Cost of material increase COST_INCR 0.75
Design change after order DSGN_CH 0.05
Clean-up SPL 0.1
Clean-up on schedule SPL_SCHED 0.8
Floor reinforcement FLOOR 0.99
Electrical redesign ELECT_RED 0.99
New Inspector INSPTR 0.25
Design approval APV|OLD 0.95
Design approval w/new APV|NEW 0.8
Bad Nozzle NOZZ_BAD 0.85
Supplier test NOZZ_SUP 0.5
Nozzle inspection NOZZ_INSP 0.9
Nozzle system test NOZZ_SYS 0.9
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Project #2 Risk Item Registry 
RI#  Title  Likelihood  Impact  Classification 
1  Project lifecycle cost at ICR  3  4  Unspecified 
2  Test Risk #1  3  4  Unspecified 
3  Phase A Requirements Development Duration  4  1  Cost 





6  Spacecraft concept convergence  1  2  Unspecified 
6  Spacecraft concept convergence  1  2  Unspecified 





9  Rad-hard parts availability  1  3  Schedule 
10  Additional Ground Stations to Increase Downlink  5  3  Unspecified 
11  Availability of Ground Stations  1  5  Technical 
12  Observatory Robustness  1  5  Technical 
13  Space Weather Broadcast Requirements  3  2  Technical 
14  Attitude knowledge pointing requirements  1  3  Technical 
15  Burst mode concept  3  1  Schedule 
16  Science investigation team staffing levels  2  3  Schedule 
17  Upgrades to 18m  1  1  Cost 
18  Bldg. 21 Construction completion date  1  3  Cost 
19  PRIO Fabrication Cost Risk  2  3  Schedule 
20  TRIO-A Availability  2  1  Cost 
21  Integral Systems, Inc. could be sold  3  2  Unspecified 
22  Harness Shielding for EMC  5  2  Technical 
23  Rad-hard star tracker/scanner for spinning spacecraft  2  3  Technical 
24  On-Orbit Spin Rate  1  3  Technical 
25  Instr-R MCP Mount  1  4  Cost 
26  Nutation Dampers  2  3  Cost 
27  Instr-E Detector Procurement  3  2  Schedule 
28  DDD Mitigation Implementation Risk  1  3  Schedule 
29  xxx chip-scale packaging in RF Subsystem  1  3  Schedule 
30  Early Long Lead Procurements  1  1  Cost 
31  Mission Cost Cap  2  2  Cost 
32  Low Power Margin  1  3  Technical 
33  45 Day Commissioning  4  5  Unspecified 
34  Instr-E Data Sharing  1  3  Technical 
35  Instr-H Time of Flight Electro-optics  2  4  Schedule 
36  IT Security Clause  3  2  Programmatic 
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RI#  Title  Likelihood  Impact  Classification 
37  Earned Value Implementation Cost  1  1  Cost 
38  Solid State Detector Design  3  3  Technical 





41  Instr-E Particulate Contamination Environment  2  2  Schedule 
42  Staffing  3  3  Schedule 
43  Instr-RP Detector Procurement and Delivery  1  3  Schedule 
44  SBC/SSR Procurement Schedule Delay  4  3  Technical 
45  Magnetometer Software Classification  2  3  Schedule 
46  Project Use of Actel   1  3  Schedule 
47  Acoustics Testing   2  4  Safety 
48  Spin Table Availability  1  2  Cost 
49  S/C Fit in Thermal Chambers  1  2  Cost 
50  Cmd/Tlm/1PPS Signal Interface Resolution  2  3  Technical 
51  xxx Part Availability  1  1  Schedule 
52  Project Schedule  5  5  Schedule 
53  PDU Development  2  3  Cost 
54  Instr-E1 Reserves  5  1  Cost 
55  Instr-E2 Reserves  3  1  Cost 
56  Instr-E Reserves  5  1  Cost 
57  Instr-R Reserves  5  1  Cost 
58  Processor Board Cost  5  2  Cost 
59  SSR Development Cost  5  2  Cost 
60  Undefined Space Asset Protection Requirements  3  1  Cost 
61  Instr-E Thin Wire Approach  1  4  Schedule 
62  Propulsion Subsystem Cost  3  1  Cost 
63  Observatory Materials Acceptability  1  2  Schedule 
64  Inter-Organizational Communications Issues  1  4  Programmatic 
65  Prohibited Connectors per EEE-INST-002  1  5  Technical 
66  Spacecraft Staffing  1  2  Schedule 
67  Phase B Flight Hardware Procurements  1  1  Schedule 
68  IEM Sun Sensor Interface Changes  2  3  Schedule 
69  Redundancy of DC Magnetometer Measurements  2  4  Technical 
70  IT Security Compliance  1  4  Schedule 
71  Instrument PDR Schedules  2  3  Schedule 
72  Other Mission Conflicts with APL 18m Antenna Usage  1  3  Schedule 
73  Instr-E Spin Plane Boom Damping  2  3  Schedule 
74  Low Power Margin  3  3  Schedule 
75  Low Mass Margin  3  3  Technical 
76  Funding Delay  1  3  Schedule 
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RI#  Title  Likelihood  Impact  Classification 
77  Redundant Magnetometer Data Path  1  4  Technical 
78  IT Security Clause   1  1  Schedule 
79  Vendor xx Deliverables  3  3  Schedule 
80  IEM DC-DC Converter Procurement  3  3  Schedule 
81  PAF Size Change  1  3  Cost 
82  Science Instrument Team Late Invoicing  1  2  Schedule 
83  Instr-M Thermal Design  3  3  Schedule 
84  Simulator May Require PSE  3  1  Cost 
85  Adequate Estimate of Phase C/D Direct Cost  3  1  Cost 
86  Subcontracted Component Procurement Costs  5  1  Cost 
87  Increased Labor Costs Affect Mgmt Reserve  3  1  Cost 
88  Power Converter for Transceiver  1  2  Schedule 
89  Vendor xxx Connector Schedule Delay  2  3  Schedule 
90  Staffing for Instr-E  2  3  Schedule 
91  Soldering Process  1  3  Schedule 
92  Launch Vehicle Selection  2  3  Schedule 
93  Transceiver Prohibited Connector  2  5  Technical 
94  Increased Usage of Plastic Parts  3  1  Cost 
95  Component Engineering Costs  1  1  Cost 
96  Fabrication Facility Loading  2  3  Schedule 
97  Observatory Robustness  1  3  Technical 
98  Observatory EME Testing  1  3  Technical 
99  Instr-E Prohibited Connector  4  2  Schedule 
100  Propulsion ICD Delivery  2  3  Schedule 
101  Early Structure Fabrication  2  1  Schedule 
102  Transceiver DSP Slice Connector  1  3  Schedule 
103  Instr--E Connector Delivery  3  2  Schedule 
104  Implementation of TRIO Functions Totally Within IEM  2  3  Schedule 
105  Instrument Compatibility Tests  1  3  Schedule 
106  Simulator not delivered to MOPS by I&T start  1  2  Schedule 
107  Instr-M Quality Mgmt System  2  3  Schedule 
108  Additional Fault Protection Testing  2  3  Schedule 
109  Box-Level Mechanical Design Issues  1  4  Cost 
110  Additional vendor-xxx Oversight Labor  1  2  Cost 
111  Commissioning Timeline  1  3  Schedule 
112  DC-DC Converter Hermeticity Issue  3  2  Schedule 
113  Charging of Solar Cell Coverglass with Coating  5  2  Technical 





116  XCVR Use of Mini-Circuit Non-Standard Parts  1  3  Schedule 
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RI#  Title  Likelihood  Impact  Classification 
117  Flight Propellant Tank Availability  2  2  Schedule 
118  PWB Fabrication Before CDR  4  1  Cost 
119  Provided Separation Hardware  1  1  Cost 
120  Instr-E System Interface Maturity  1  3  Schedule 
121  XCVR Qualification Program  2  3  Schedule 
122  IEM Engineering Model Fabrication and Test  3  2  Schedule 
123  xxx Costs Higher Than Expected  5  1  Cost 
124  Spurious Emission Temperature Testing  3  2  Technical 
125  Solar Panel Laydown Design and Development  2  3  Schedule 
126  Qualification of Hypertronics Flight Connectors  4  3  Schedule 
127  Instr-H Detailed Design of the Door  2  3  Schedule 
128  Instr-M ASIC Design/Delivery/Testing  2  2  Schedule 
129  Completion of Instr--M EM2 End-to-End Testing  3  3  Schedule 
130  Instr--E Flight Drawing Release Status  2  2  Schedule 
131  Instr-H HVPS Additional Mechanical Board Support  2  2  Schedule 





134  Instr-M LVPS Design Updates  1  2  Schedule 
135  xxx Design Completion  1  3  Schedule 
136  PGS Subsystem Drawing Release  2  3  Schedule 
137  Ground Station Upgrade Funding  3  1  Cost 
138  XCVR FPGA Utilization  1  2  Schedule 
139  Pressure Transducer Delivery  3  3  Schedule 
140  Search Coil MLI Standoff Requirements  2  2  Technical 
141  IEM vendor-xxx Connector Solder Process  3  3  Schedule 
142  PRIO Test Risk  3  3  Schedule 
143  PDU Fuse Board  2  2  Technical 
144  Flight Fabrication  1  3  Schedule 
145  Development Delay  1  3  Schedule 
146  Instr-RP Instrument Performance  2  3  Schedule 
147  XCVR RCVR Crystal Filter Delivery  2  3  Schedule 
148  Support Reliability  3  1  Cost 
149  PDU Flight Board Fabrication  2  3  Schedule 
150  Instr-M Preamp Board TVAC Anomaly  2  2  Schedule 
151  Titanium Exoneration  1  3  Schedule 
152  Air Force C-17 Cost  1  1  Cost 
153  IEM & XCVR FPGA Rework  1  4  Schedule 
154  Completion of Vendor-xx Qualification Program  1  1  Schedule 
155  Instrument Management Reserve  5  1  Cost 
156  Propulsion Subsystem Delivery  1  3  Schedule 
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158  Umbilical Connector Delivery  2  3  Schedule 
159  Instr-H Diode Multiplier String  1  4  Technical 
160  Nutation Damper Leak  2  2  Schedule 
161  Instr-H Part Failures  2  2  Schedule 
162  PSE Hardware Schedule Slip  5  3  Schedule 
163  SSPA Part Leakage  1  4  Schedule 
164  Meeting Spin Balance Requirements  2  2  Technical 
165  PDU Op Amp Interface Qualification Test  1  2  Schedule 
166  Radiation and Charge Monitoring  1  2  Technical 
167  SSPA - DC/DC Converter Burn-in Failure  2  2  Schedule 
168  PDU Flight Part Delivery  2  3  Schedule 
169  Use of Bond Wire in SA Substrates  1  2  Technical 
170  Instr-M Hybrid Delivery  1  3  Schedule 
171  Instr-M Detector Procurement and Delivery  3  3  Schedule 
172  Instr-E FPGA Verification  1  3  Schedule 
173  SSPA Schedule Slip  1  2  Schedule 
174  Part xx Life Test Failure  2  3  Schedule 
175  Instr-R Waiver 006 Technical Risk - Pin gold thickness  1  2  Technical 
176  I&T Staffing Shortage  1  3  Schedule 
177  Instr-R Resource Conflict with JEDI  1  3  Schedule 
178  Instr-R Mechanical Part Fabrication  2  3  Schedule 
179  Magnetometer Team Resources  2  2  Schedule 
180  Instr-E Filter Tin Whiskers  2  3  Schedule 
181  Use of DC/DC Converters in the IEM  1  3  Technical 
182  IEM FM2 Schedule Slip  5  3  Schedule 
183  XCVR Schedule Slip  5  3  Schedule 
184  PDU FM2 Schedule Slip  1  2  Schedule 
185  Lot Jeopardy Parts Fail Qual Testing  1  3  Schedule 
186  Spare Parts Not Available for Hardware  1  3  Schedule 
187  IEM Test Team Staffing  2  3  Schedule 
188  Instr-E Late Delivery to Observatory I&T  2  3  Schedule 
189  Loss of Fluxgate Instr-M Data  1  4  Technical 
190  Propulsion Module Delivery  2  3  Schedule 
191  HVPS Redesign To Alleviate Discharge  1  2  Technical 
192  Instr-E delivery requires the replan I&T need date  3  1  Cost 
193  Instr-H delivery requires the replan I&T need date  3  1  Cost 
194  Instr-RP delivery requires the replan I&T need date  3  1  Cost 
195  Instr-R delivery requires the replan I&T need date  3  1  Cost 
196  Low Voltage Sense (LVS) False Trip  1  2  Technical 
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RI#  Title  Likelihood  Impact  Classification 
197  Battery Overcharge Due to Saturation of PGS Shunt  2  2  Technical 
198  Pressure Transducer High Current Mode  1  1  Technical 
199  Latent Damage from EM Zap Testing  1  4  Technical 
200  Use of State Of The Art (SOTA) Resistors  1  1  Technical 
201  Black Paint  1  3  Technical 
202  IEM Card Precision Oscillator  1  1  Technical 
203  IEM FM1 Shortened EMC Testing  1  3  Schedule 
204  Instr Interface Testing  3  3  Schedule 
205  Solar Cell Interconnect Failures  3  3  Schedule 
206  Remanufacture of Flight Bobbins  2  3  Schedule 
207  High Electron Transfer Board for Instr-MS  1  3  Schedule 
208  Detector Rework for Instr-M  4  3  Schedule 
209  Instr-R Capacitor Replacement  3  3  Schedule 
210  Launch Flow Planning  5  1  Schedule 
211  Instr-M Detector Pin Retention Issue  2  4  Schedule 
212  Flight Hardware EMC Testing Resources  2  3  Schedule 
213  Low Project-Level Schedule Reserve  3  4  Schedule 
214  PSE Vibration Failure  3  4  Schedule 
215  IEM FM1 Anomaly Investigation  4  4  Schedule 
216  Instr-H Delivery To I&T  5  3  Schedule 
217  Instr-ES Delivery To I&T  2  3  Schedule 
218  Instr-E1 Delivery To I&T  3  3  Schedule 
219  Instr-RP Delivery To I&T  3  3  Schedule 
220  Instr-R Delivery To I&T  3  3  Schedule 
221  Instr-E Cost Growth  3  3  Cost 
222  Ground Offset High Current Fault on LVDS Interfaces  1  3  Technical 
223  Instr-M Proton Telescope Detectors  3  2  Technical 
224  Jackpost Torque Issues  2  3  Schedule 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This mathematica code is the quantitative implementation of RSD example from Chapters 4 - 8.
 RiskSeqDiagrams`
eslb  "BL", "ES1", "ES2", "ES3";
ü RSD quantification at the pivotal event level




Endstate expressions from RSD
esBL  1     1  E1;
es1   E1 DP 1  M1;
es2   E1 DP;
es3   E1 1  DP;
eslb1, esBL, eslb2, es1,




ES3 0.251025 1  DP
Apply DP = 0 or DP = 1 to get columns for Table 5 - 1.
DP  0;
presD0  esBL, es1, es2, es3;
DP  1;
presD1  esBL, es1, es2, es3;




TableHeadings  None, "Endstate", "Do Nothing", "Implement"
Print
Table 51





ClearesBL, es1, es2, es3, DP, , E1, M1, presD0, presD1;
ü RSD quantification at the basic event level
Computations are displayed symbolically for RSD d.  The cutset are generated at the basic event
level and are consistent with figure 5-4. 
251
cutsetx0  1  a 1  b  1  b a 1  c;
cutsetx1  1  b a c DP 1  d;
cutsetx2  b DP  1  b a c DP d;
cutsetx3  b 1  DP  1  b a c 1  DP;
Define probabilities.
pres  cutsetx0, cutsetx1, cutsetx2, cutsetx3
1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c, a 1  b c 1  d DP,














TableHeadings  None, "Endstate", "Do Nothing", "Implement"
Print
Table 52





Consequence definition. Each set contains {cost, delay, Loss}




crav  1  .5 chigh  clow
uccx_ : Expcrav chigh  cx  1
Expcrav chigh  clow  1
FullSimplifyucx
0.0008
1.15652  0.156518 0.0008 x
esx  ucescqAll, 1;
252




None, "Endstate", "Consq", "Utility", "Do Nothing", "Implement"
Print
Table 53
Endstate Consq Utility Do Nothing Implement
BL 0 1. 0.70363 0.70363
ES1 100 0.986964 0 0.146224
ES2 125 0.983539 0 0.150146
ES3 2000 0.381281 0.29637 0
Schedule Delay Utility function
dhigh  50;
dlow  0;
drav  1  .8 dhigh  dlow
uddx_ : Expdrav dhigh  dx  1
Expdrav dhigh  dlow  1
FullSimplifyudx
0.025
1.40155  0.401551 0.025 x
Loss of Mission Utility function
lhigh  1;
llow  0;
lrav  1  .25 lhigh  llow
ullx_ : Explrav lhigh  lx  1
Explrav lhigh  llow  1
FullSimplifyulx
4.
1.01866  0.0186574 4. x
Multi-Attribute Utility function
utlist_ : 0.3 uclist1  0.5 udlist2  .2 ullist3
esx  Tableutescqi, i, 1, 4;








Endstate Utility Do Nothing Implement
BL 1. 0.70363 0.70363
ES1 0.986964 0 0.146224
ES2 0.983539 0 0.150146
ES3 0.381281 0.29637 0
ü Risk Profile
Cleara, b, c, d, DP
pdf  SortByTableesxi, presi, i, 1, 4, First
ccdf  Ccdfpdf
rm  1.  AreaCalcccdf
0.381281, b 1  DP  a 1  b c 1  DP, 0.983539, b DP  a 1  b c d DP,
0.986964, a 1  b c 1  d DP, 1., 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c
0, 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c  b 1  DP  a 1  b c 1  DP 
b DP  a 1  b c 1  d DP  a 1  b c d DP, 0.381281,
1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c  b DP  a 1  b c 1  d DP  a 1  b c d DP,
0.983539, 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c  a 1  b c 1  d DP,
0.986964, 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c, 1., 0
1.  0.0130359 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c 
0.00342521 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c  a 1  b c 1  d DP  0.602258
1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c  b DP  a 1  b c 1  d DP  a 1  b c d DP 
0.381281 1  a 1  b  a 1  b 1  c  b 1  DP 
a 1  b c 1  DP  b DP  a 1  b c 1  d DP  a 1  b c d DP
pdfD0  SortByTableesxi, presD0i, i, 1, 4, First;
pdfD1  SortByTableesxi, presD1i, i, 1, 4, First;
ccdfD0  CcdfpdfD0;
ccdfD1  CcdfpdfD1;
rmD0  1.  AreaCalcccdfD0;





t61  TablepdfD0i, 1, pdfD0i, 2,
ccdfD0i, 2, pdfD1i, 2, ccdfD1i, 2, i, 1, 4;
Print
Print"Table 61"
PrintTableFormt61, TableHeadings  None, "Utility",




Utility f Do Nothing R Do Nothing f Implement R Implement
0.381281 0.29637 1. 0 1.
0.983539 0 0.70363 0.150146 1.
0.986964 0 0.70363 0.146224 0.849854
1. 0.70363 0.70363 0.70363 0.70363
t62  rmD0, rmD1  TableForm
0.18337
0.00437773




Applied as d Rm
d q
, where q is the parameter of interest
im  ImBirnbaumrm,  &  a, b, c, d, DP;
AppendToim, im;
ü Fussell - Vesely




, where q is the parameter of interest
im  ImFVrm,  &  a, b, c, d, DP;
AppendToim, im;
ü Risk Reduction Worth
Applied as Rm
Rm  q = 0  , where q is the parameter of interest
im  ImRRWrm,  &  a, b, c, d, DP;
AppendToim, im;
ü Risk Achievement Worth
Applied as Rm  q = 1 
Rm
, where q is the parameter of interest











TableHeadings  "Birnbaum", "FussellVesely", "Risk Reduction",





TableHeadings  "Birnbaum", "FussellVesely", "Risk Reduction",




a b c d DP
Birnbaum 0.110441 0.512176 0.431247 0. 0.178992
FussellVesely 0.493876 0.41897 0.493876 0. 0.
Risk Reduction 1.9758 1.72108 1.9758 1. 1.
Risk Acheivement 1.10841 3.37416 2.85791 1. 0.0238738
DP  1
a b c d DP
Birnbaum 0.00232752 0.0142157 0.00908841 0.000501348 0.
FussellVesely 0.435971 0.487093 0.435971 0.000114522 40
Risk Reduction 1.77296 1.94967 1.77296 1.00011 0.0
Risk Acheivement 1.0957 3.76019 2.64008 1.11441 1.
Cleara, b, c, d, DP
ImBirnbaumrm, a
0.  0.375323  0.375323 b c
ImFVrm, a
a 0.  0.375323  0.375323 b c 
0.000152284  0.375323 b  0.375323 a c  0.375323 a b c
ImRRWrm, a
0.000152284  0.375323 b  0.375323 a c  0.375323 a b c 
0.000152284  0.375323 b
256
ImRAWrm, a
0.000152284  0.375323 b  0.375323 c  0.375323 b c 




(* Mathematica Raw Program *) 
 
StepPlotData[list_] :=  
 (* Produces all the points to draw a discrete cdf *) 
 Module[{i = 1, nlist}, 
    nlist = {}; 
    While[i < Length[list], 
      AppendTo[nlist, {list[[i, 1]], list[[i, 2]]}]; 
      AppendTo[nlist, {list[[i + 1, 1]], list[[i, 2]]}]; 
     i++]; 
    AppendTo[nlist, {list[[Length[list], 1]], 0}]; 
    nlist 
   ] 
   
AreaCalc[list_] :=  
 (* Computes the area under a ccdf *) 
   Module[{i = 1, area = 0}, 
    While[i < Length[list], 
      area = area + (list[[i + 1, 1]] - list[[i, 
1]])*list[[i, 2]]; 
     i++]; 
    area 
   ] 
    
Ccdf[list_] :=  
 (* Creates a complementary cumulative density function *) 
 Module[{i = 2, cum = 0, prsum, nlist}, 
  prsum = Total[list[[All,2]]]; 
    If[list[[1, 1]] == 0, 
      nlist = {{list[[1, 1]], prsum - list[[1, 2]]}}, 
      nlist = {{0, prsum}, {list[[1, 1]], prsum - list[[1, 
2]]}} 
     ]; 
    cum = list[[1, 2]]; 
    While[i < Length[list] + 1, 
      cum = cum + list[[i, 2]]; 
      AppendTo[nlist, {list[[i, 1]], prsum - cum}]; 
     i++]; 
    nlist 
   ] 
    
ImBirnbaum[eq_, elem_]:= Simplify[D[eq, elem]] 
 
ImFV[eq_, elem_] := Simplify[D[eq,elem]*(elem/eq)]  
 
ImRRW[eq_, elem_] := Module[{eq1}, 




ImRAW[eq_, elem_] := Module[{eq1}, 
 eq1=eq /. elem -> 1; 
 Simplify[eq1/eq] 
]   
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PrOR[list_]:= 1-(Times @@ (1-# & /@ list)) 
 
GatherCutSets[list_] :=  
 (* Gather Cutsets and OR them together *) 
 Module[{i, n, m, l1, l2, lans = {}, lans1 = {}}, 
    l1 = GatherBy[list, First]; 
    n = Length[l1] + 1; 
    For[i = 1, i < n, i++, 
      l2 = l1[[i]]; 
      m = Length[l2]; 
      AppendTo[lans, { l2[[1, 1]], PrOR[l2[[All, 2]]]}]; 
     ]; 
    lans 
   ] 







Akintoye, A., & MacLeod, M. (1997). Risk Analysis and Management in Construction. 
International Journal of Project Management, 15(1), 31-38.  
APM. (2004). Project Risk Analysis and Management Guide (2nd ed.). Norwich, UK: 
Association for Project Management. 
Apostolakis, G. (2004). How Useful is Quantitative Risk Assessment? Risk Analysis, 
24(3), 515-520.  
Arizaga, J. (2007). A Methodology for Project Risk Analysis Using Bayesian Belief 
Networks Within a Monte Carlo Simulation Environment. PhD, Univ of Maryland, 
College Park, MD.    
Arrow, K. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd ed.). New York, NY: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Aven, T. (2003). Foundations of risk analysis: a knowledge and decision-oriented 
perspective: Wiley. 
Aven, T., Vinnem, J., & Wiencke, H. (2007). A decision framework for risk 
management, with application to the offshore oil and gas industry. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 92(4), 433-448.  
Bawa, V. (1982). Stochastic Dominance: A Research Bibliography. Management 
Science, 28(6), 698-712.  
 
261 
Bedford, T., & Cooke, R. (2001). Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and Methods. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bernstein, P. (1998). Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk. New York, NY: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
Bier, V. M., & Azaiez, M. N. (2009). Game theoretic risk analysis of security threats: 
Springer. 
Boehm, B. (1991). Software Risk Management: Principles and Practices. IEEE Software, 
8(1), 32-41.  
CalTrans. (2003). Project Risk Management Handbook. Office of Project Management 
Process Improvement. 
Carbone, T., & Tippett, D. (2004). Project Risk Management Using the Project Risk 
FMEA. Engineering Management Journal, 16(4), 28-35.  
Chang, K. (10/11/2008). Next Mars Rover Mission on Schedule Even as Cost Rises, The 
New York Times.  
Chapman, C. (1990). A Risk Engineering Approach to Project Risk Management. 
International Journal of Project Management, 8(1), 5-16.  
Chapman, C. (1997). Project Risk Analysis and Management — PRAM the Generic 
Process. International Journal of Project Management, 15(5), 273-281.  
Chapman, C., & Ward, S. (2003). Project Risk Management; Processes, Techniques and 
Insights (2nd ed.). West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Charette, R. (2005). Why Software Fails. IEEE Spectrum, 42(9), 36.  
Charette, R. (2006). A Risk of Too Many Risk Standards. Paper presented at the Sixteenth 
Annual International Symposium of the International Council on System Engineering.  
 
262 
Charette, R. N. (1996). Large-Scale Project Management is Risk Management. IEEE 
Software, 13(4), 110-117.  
Chong, Y., & Brown, E. (2000). Managing project risk: Business risk management for 
project leaders: Financial Times Prentice Hall, London; Tokyo. 
Christoffersen, P. F. (2003). Elements of financial risk management: Academic Pr. 
Clemen, R., & Reilly, T. (1999). Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools Suite (2nd 
ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury. 
Clemen, R., & Winkler, R. (1999). Combining Probability Distributions From Experts in 
Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis, 19(2), 187-203.  
Conrow, E. (2003). Effective Risk Management: Some Keys to Success (2nd ed.). Reston, 
VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
Conrow, E., & Charette, R. (2008). Opportunity Management. Defense AT&L, 37(2), 16.  
Cooper, D., & Chapman, C. (1987). Risk analysis for large projects: models, methods and 
cases: Wiley. 
Cooper, D., Grey, S., Raymond, G., & Walker, P. (2005). Project Risk Management 
Guidelines: Managing Risk in Large Projects and Complex Procurements. West Sussex, 
England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Cox, L. (2008). What's Wrong with Risk Matrices. Risk Analysis, 28(2), 497-512.  
Cox, L. (2009). Risk Analysis of Complex and Uncertain Systems. New York: Springer. 
Croson, D. C., & Kunreuther, H. C. (1999). Customizing Reinsurance and Cat Bonds for 
Natural Hazard Risks. Paper presented at the Conference on Global and Catastrophic 
Risk Management, Laxenburg, Austria. 
 
263 
del Caño, A., & de la Cruz, M. (1998). On the Management of Risks in Construction 
Projects. Project Management, 4(1), 54-61.  
Dey, P. (2002). Project risk management: a combined analytic hierarchy process and 
decision tree approach. Cost Engineering, 44(3), 13-27.  
Dillon, R., Paté-Cornell, M., & Guikema, S. (2003). Programmatic risk analysis for 
critical engineering systems under tight resource constraints. Operations Research, 51(3), 
354-370.  
DoD. (2006). Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 6th Ed (6th ed.). 
Washington DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary. 
Dorofee, A., Walker, J., Alberts, C., Higuera, R., Murphy, R., & Williams, R. (1993). 
Continuous Risk Management Guidebook. Pittsburgh, PA: SEI Software Engineering 
Institute, Carnegy Mellon University. 
Dubos, G. F., Saleh, J. H., & Braun, R. (2008). Technology Readiness Level, Schedule 
Risk, and Slippage in Spacecraft Design. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, 45(4), 836-
842.  
Duffie, D., & Pan, J. (1997). An overview of value at risk. The Journal of derivatives, 
4(3), 7-49.  
Eggen, D., & Witte, G. (8/18/2006). The FBI's Upgrade That Wasn't: $170 Million 
Bought an Unusable Computer System, The Washington Post.  
Elkington, P., & Smallman, C. (2002). Managing Project Risks: A Case Study From the 
Utilities Sector. International Journal of Project Management, 20(1), 49-57.  
Elmaghraby, S. (2005). On the Fallacy of Averages in Project Risk Management. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 165(2), 307-313.  
 
264 
Fan, C., & Yu, Y. (2004). BBN-Based Software Project Risk Management. The Journal 
of Systems and Software, 73(2), 193-203.  
Ferguson, R. (2004). A Project Risk Metric. CrossTalk, 17(4), 12-15.  
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Lay foibles and expert fables in 
judgments about risk. American Statistician, 36(3), 240-255.  
Fishburn, P. (1970). Utility theory for decision making. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 
Fishburn, P. (1989). Foundations of Decision Analysis: Along the Way. Management 
Science, 35(4), 387-405.  
Flemming, Q., & Kippelman, J. (2000). Earned Value Project Management. Newton 
Square, PA: Project Management Institute. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right. 
Project Management Journal, 37(3), 5.  
Frank, M. (2008). Choosing Safety: A guide to using probabilistic risk assessment and 
decision analysis in complex, high-consequence systems. Washington, DC: RFF Press. 
Franssen, M. (2005). Arrow’s Theorem, Multi-criteria Decision Problems and Multi-
attribute Preferences in Engineering Design. Research in Engineering Design, 16(1), 42-
56.  
Furberg, C. D., Levin, A. A., Gross, P. A., Shapiro, R. S., & Strom, B. L. (2006). The 
FDA and drug safety: a proposal for sweeping changes. Archives of internal medicine, 
166(18), 1938.  
Galway, L. (2004). Quantitative Risk Analysis for Project Management: A Critical 
Review. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
 
265 
GAO. (2009a). High-Risk Series: An Update. Washington DC: Government 
Accountability Office. 
GAO. (2009b). NASA: Assessments of Large Scale Projects. Washington DC: 
Government Accountability Office. 
Garvey, P. (2000). Probability Methods for Cost Uncertainty Analysis: A Systems 
Engineering Perspective. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker. 
Goodwin, P., & Wright, G. (2004). Decision Analysis for Management Judgment (3rd 
ed.). West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
Goodwin, P., Wright, G., & Phillips, L. D. (2004). Decision analysis for management 
judgment: Wiley Chichester. 
Graves, S., & Ringuest, J. (2009). Probabilistic Dominance Criteria for Comparing 
Uncertain Alternatives: A Tutorial. Omega, 37(2), 346-357.  
Guarro, S. (1989). Risk Analysis and Risk Management Models for Information Systems 
Security Applications. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 25, 109-130.  
Guarro, S., & Feldman, K. (2002). Continuous Aerospace Risk Management and 
Assessment (CARMA): Process, Models, and Software for Risk Management in Space 
Systems Programs  Paper presented at the INCOSE Los Angeles Mini-Conference, Long 
Beach, CA.  
Hadar, J., & Russell, W. R. (1969). Rules for ordering uncertain prospects. The American 
Economic Review, 59(1), 25-34.  
Haimes, Y. (2004). Risk Modeling Assessment and Management. New York, NY: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Haimes, Y. (2008). Models for Risk Management of Systems of Systems. International 
Journal of Systems Engineering, 1(1), 222-236.  
 
266 
Hanoch, G., & Levy, H. (1969). The efficiency analysis of choices involving risk. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 335-346.  
Hazelrigg, G. A. (1996). The Implications of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem on 
Approaches to Optimal Engineering Design. Journal of Mechanical Design, 118, 161.  
Henley, E. J., & Kumamoto, H. (1996). Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management 
for Engineers and Scientists. 
Henson, S., & Caswell, J. (1999). Food safety regulation: an overview of contemporary 
issues. Food Policy, 24(6), 589-603.  
Hillson, D. (2003). Using a Risk Breakdown Structure in Project Management. Journal of 
Facilities Management, 2(1), 85-97.  
Hillson, D. (2006). Integrated Risk Management As A Framework For Organisational 
Success. 
Hillson, D., & Hulett, D. (2004). Assessing Risk Probability: Alternative Approaches. 
Paper presented at the PMI Global Congress, Prague, Czech Republic. 
HM-Treasury. (2004). The Orange Book: Management of Risk-Principles and Concepts. 
London: HM Treasury. 
Howard, R. (1988). Decision analysis: Practice and promise. Management science, 34(6), 
679-695.  
Howard, R. A. (1989). Decision analysis: Applied decision theory. Readings on the 
Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis, 1, 97–113.  
Hoyland, A., & Rausand, M. (1994). System reliability theory: models and statistical 
methods: J. Wiley. 
 
267 
Imbeah, W., & Guikema, S. (2009). Managing Construction Projects Using the Advanced 
Programmatic Risk Analysis and Management Model. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 135, 772.  
INCOSE. (2006). Systems Engineering Handbook (2a ed.). Seattle, WA: International 
Council on Systems Engineering. 
Janis, I. (1971). Groupthink. Psychology Today(Nov), 43 - 46.  
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(2), 263-291.  
Kaplan, S. (1997). The Words of Risk Analysis. Risk Analysis, 17(4), 407-417.  
Kaplan, S., & Garrick, B. (1981). On the Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk analysis, 
1(1), 11-27.  
Keeney, R. (1982). Decision analysis: an overview. Operations Research, 30(5), 803-
838.  
Keeney, R., & Raiffa, H. (1993). Decision with Multiple Objectives: Preference and 
Value Tradeoffs. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Kendrick, T. (2003). Identifying and Managing Project Risk. New York, NY: 
AMACOM. 
Kerzner, H. (1989). Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, 
and Controlling (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Kindinger, J., & Darby, J. (2000). Risk Factor Analysis - A New Qualitative Risk 
Management Tool. Paper presented at the Project Management Institute Annual Seminar, 
Houston, TX. 
Kirkwood, C. (1991). Notes on Attitude Toward Risk Taking and the Exponential Utility 
Function. Retrieved from  
 
268 
Kirkwood, C. (1992). An overview of methods for applied decision analysis. Interfaces, 
22(6), 28-39.  
Kumamoto, H., & Henley, E. (1996). Proabilistic Risk Assessment and Management for 
Engineers and Scientists. New York: IEEE Press. 
Kwak, Y., & Stoddard, J. (2004). Project Risk Management: Lessons Learned From 
Software Development Environment. Technovation, 24(11), 915-920.  
Lambert, J., Haimes, Y., Li, D., Schooff, R., & Tulsiani, V. (2001). Identification, 
Ranking, and Management of Risks in a Major System Acquisition. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 72(3), 315-325.  
Lawrence, P., & Scanlan, J. (2007). Planning in the Dark: Why Major Engineering 
Projects Fail to Achieve Key Goals. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 
19(4), 509-525.  
Levy, H. (1992). Stochastic dominance and expected utility: survey and analysis. 
Management science, 38(4), 555-593.  
Lyneis, J., & Ford, D. (2007). System Dynamics Applied to Project Management: A 
Survey and Directions for Future Research. System Dynamics Review, 23(4), 157-189.  
March, J., & Shapira, Z. (1987). Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking. 
Management Science, 1404-1418.  
Matta, N., & Ashkenas, R. (2003). Why Good Projects Fail Anyway. Harvard Business 
Review, 81(9), 109-116.  
McNeil, A. J., Frey, R., & Embrechts, P. (2005). Quantitative risk management: 
Concepts, techniques and tools: Princeton Univ Pr. 
Meredeth, J., & Mantel, S. (1989). Project Management: A Managerial Approach (2nd 
ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
269 
Miller, R., & Lessard, D. (2001). Understanding and Managing Risks in Large 
Engineering Projects. International Journal of Project Management, 19(8), 437-443.  
Modarres, M. (2006). Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends. Boca 
Raton, FL: Taylor Francis Group. 
Mosleh, A., & Apostolakis, G. (1986). The assessment of probability distributions from 
expert opinions with an application to seismic fragility curves. Risk Analysis, 6(4), 447-
461.  
Mosleh, A., Bier, V., & Apostolakis, G. (1988). A critique of current practice for the use 
of expert opinions in probabilistic risk assessment. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 20(1), 63-85.  
Mosleh, A., Rasmuson, D., & Marshall, F. (1998). Guidelines on Modeling Common-
Cause Failures in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Vol. 5485). Rockville, MD: Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
Müller, A., & Stoyan, D. (2002). Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
NASA. (2004). Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers 
and Practitioners (Vol. Version 1.1). Washington, DC: NASA. 
NASA. (2007). Systems Engineering Handbook. Washington DC: NASA. 
NASA. (2008). Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements. Washington DC: 
NASA. 
NRC. (1983). PRA Procedures Guide. (NUREG/CR-2300). 
NRC. (2005). The Owner's Role in Project Risk Management. Washington DC: National 
Academy Press, National Research Council. 
 
270 
O'Harrow, R., & Dennis, B. (2008, 12/29/08). The Beautiful Machine, The Washington 
Post.  
Øien, K. (2001). Risk Indicators as a Tool for Risk Control. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 74(2), 129-145.  
PMI. (2003). A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide). 
Chapter 11, Project Risk Management (3rd ed.). Newtown Square, PA: Project 
Management Institute. 
Raiffa, H. (1968). Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under 
Uncertainty. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley  
Raz, T., & Hillson, D. (2005). A Comparative Review of Risk Management Standards. 
Risk Management, 7(4), 53-66.  
Roberts, B. (2001). The Benefits of Integrated, Quantitative Risk Assessment. Paper 
presented at the 12th Annual International Symposium of the International Council on 
Systems Engineering, Melbourne, Australia.  
Rodrigues, A. (1994). The Role of System Dynamics in Project Management: A 
Comparative Analysis with Traditional Models. Paper presented at the International 
System Dynamics Conference. 
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1970). Increasing risk: I. A definition. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2(3), 225-243.  
Sanchez, H., Robert, B., & Pellerin, R. (2008). A Project Portfolio Risk-Opportunity 
Identification Framework. Project Management Journal, 39(3), 97-109.  
Santos, F., & Cabral, S. (2008). FMEA and PMBOK Applied to Project Risk 




Savage, C. (6/4/2008). Senator Warns of a 'Crisis' in Pentagon Cost Overruns, The New 
York Times.  
Seyedhoseini, S., Noori, S., & Hatefi, M. (2009). An Integrated Methodology for 
Assessment and Selection of the Project Risk Response Actions. Risk Analysis, 29(5), 
752-763.  
Shang, C. (2002). System Dynamics in Project Risk Management.    
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280.  
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. (2004). Risk as Analysis and Risk 
as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality. Risk analysis, 
24(2), 311-322.  
Stewart, R. D. (1991). Cost estimating: Wiley-Interscience. 
Swaminathan, S., & Smidts, C. (1999). The event sequence diagram framework for 
dynamic probabilistic risk assessment. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 63(1), 
73-90.  
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.  
Van Asselt, M. B. A. (2000). Perspectives on uncertainty and risk: the PRIMA approach 
to decision support: Springer Netherlands. 
Van der Borst, M., & Schoonakker, H. (2001). An Overview of PSA Importance 
Measures. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 72(3), 241-245.  
Verner, J., Sampson, J., Cerpa, N., Nicta, A., & Sydney, A. (2008). What Factors Lead to 
Software Project Failure? Paper presented at the Second International Conference on 
Research Challenges in Information Science, 2008.  
 
272 
Vesely, W., Davis, T., Denning, R., & Saltos, N. (1983). Measures of Risk Importance 
and Their Applications. (NUREG/CR 3385). Washington DC. 
Vick, S. (2002). Degrees of Belief: Subjective Probability and Engineering Judgment. 
Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers. 
Vose, D. (2008). Risk analysis: a quantitative guide: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Wall, I. B., & Worledge, D. H. (1996). Some perspectives on risk importance measures. 
Proceedings of PSA, 96.  
Ward, S. (2003). Approaches to Integrated Risk Management: A Multi-dimensional 
Framework. Risk Management, 5(4), 7-23.  
Ward, S., & Chapman, C. (2003). Transforming Project Risk Management into Project 
Uncertainty Management. International Journal of Project Management, 21(2), 97-105.  
Whitmore, G. (1970). Third-Degree Stochastic Dominance. The American Economic 
Review, 60(3), 457-459.  
Williams, T. (1995). A Classified Bibliography of Recent Research Relating to Project 
Risk Management. European Journal of Operational Research, 85(1), 18-38.  
Williams, T. (1996). The Two-Dimensionality of Project Risk. International Journal of 
Project Management, 14(3), 185-186.  
Winkler, R. (1996). Uncertainty in Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Reliability engineering 
and systems safety, 54(2-3), 127-132.  
Woo, G. (2004). A catastrophe bond niche: Multiple event risk. Paper presented at the 
NBER Insurance Workshop, Cambrige, MA. 
Zhang, H. (2007). A Redefinition of the Project Risk Process: Using Vulnerability to 
Open Up the Event-Consequence Link. International Journal of Project Management, 
25(7), 694-701.  
